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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to examine the underperformance of the Greek 
economy in relation to attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) in the manufacturing 
sector. Two other European Union peripheral countries, specifically Ireland and 
Portugal, are used as a benchmark.
For this purpose three sets of contextual literature have been explored. I first 
examine the theory of the French regulation school in order to comprehend the 
development of the European economy and how Greece, Ireland and Portugal have 
been placed within it, emphasising particularly the ideas associated with peripheral 
Fordism. Then, I refer to the location theory literature in order to identify the factors 
influencing the location decisions of firms. Finally, I look upon the literature relating 
to multinational corporations1 in order to identify their evolution and the particular 
factors influencing their locational decision making process. From this study two key 
factors have been identified that might attribute to the underperformance of Greece in 
relation to FDI: the Greek institutional framework and the failure of policy makers in 
Greece to understand the dynamics of capitalist development. The research of these 
hypotheses consists the essence of the empirical investigation. The empirical analysis 
takes place through a questionnaire survey of the current multinational enterprises 
(MNE) in manufacturing sector in Greece, supplemented by follow- up interviews 
with managers of foreign subsidiaries located in Greece and policy makers of the 
Greek state.
From the above theoretical and empirical analysis the institutional structures in 
Greece have been identified as the main cause for the FDI inflows underperformance, 
enhanced by the geographical peripherality of Greece and the increasing competition 
from the countries of East- Central Europe as a result of communism collapse and 
their entrance in the European Union.
1 I refer to multinational corporation when I am discussing the company as a whole and to 
Multinational Enterprise (MNE) when I am discussing the branch plants.
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INTRODUCTION
0.1 Research Problem
In a time period where Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows have reached 
historic high, Greece’s performance on that field has not followed the same direction. 
The main purpose of this thesis is to examine the underperformance of the Greek 
economy in this field. In this respect, the problem/ question that this thesis aims to 
explore is why Greece has underperformed in relation to Ireland and Portugal. The 
comparison of Greece with Ireland and Portugal is crucial to some kind of 
benchmarks for underperformance as these are in some ways comparable countries, 
given their comparable size, level of development and geographical peripherality.
In order to answer this question, three sets of contextual literature have been 
explored. I first draw upon French regulation theory in order to understand the 
development of the European economy and the differential positioning of states, 
paying particular attention to the ideas relating to peripheral Fordism. I then turn to 
the location theory literature in order to consider the factors influencing the location 
decisions of firms. Finally I draw on the literature relating to multinational 
corporations in order to identify their evolution and the specific factors influencing 
their locational decision making. From this review I have identified two key factors 
that might account for the underperformance of Greece in relation to FDI: the Greek 
institutional framework and the weakness of Greece to understand the dynamics of 
capitalist development. The investigation of these hypotheses forms the main 
substance of the empirical investigation. The empirical analysis consists of two 
elements: First a quantitative survey via a questionnaire of current MNEs in 
manufacturing sector in Greece in order to produce a geographical mapping of the 
different kinds of MNEs currently located in Greece; to identify the factors that 
influenced their decision to invest in Greece and thirdly to identify any issues of 
concern to the firms in relation to their initial location decision and subsequent 
experience of producing in Greece. From the analysis of the questionnaires and the 
literature review one key issue was highlighted, the Greek policy/ institutional 
framework. The significance of the Greek policy/ institutional framework is explored 
via semi- structured interviews that were carried out with a structured selection of 
firms.
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To set the context I now briefly outline the political and economic context in 
Greece and demonstrate the underperformance of the Greece in attracting FDI by 
reference to two comparable states in the European Union: Ireland and Portugal.
0.2 Political and Economic Context
Since the end of World War II major changes took place in the European 
continent, which also affected Foreign Direct Investment. The major change was the 
continuing widening and deepening of the European Community that was transformed 
into European Union (EU). Within this spectrum, the role of Mediterranean Europe 
(of which Greece is part) has been different each time. During the 1960s, 
Mediterranean Europe provided a pool of reserve labour for the core European 
countries, which also constituted EEC, in order to reinforce the post- war boom of 
Northern Europe (Russel and Donati, 1999: 138). Additionally, it became the 
“shelter” of multinational corporations in the changes of production patterns. 
Mediterranean Europe had the advantage of a mass cheap labour force, appropriate 
for investment related to assembly production. Thus, industry sectors, e.g. the clothing 
industry, were relocated from Western Europe to the countries of Southern Europe 
(Hudson, 2002: 265). Since then most Mediterranean countries joined European 
Union. During the 1990s, Eastern European countries started to integrate themselves 
into the world economy, as well as getting ready to become full Members of the EU, 
changing once again location possibilities as even lower labour costs became 
available in the European Union. Thus, the role of the Mediterranean countries also 
changed. Now they have become destination countries for migrants who underpin the 
economic development of these countries. Nevertheless, Southern Europe continued 
to have a different course of economic development in relation to Western Europe. As 
it will be explained in chapter I (one), their mode of development was based on three 
distinct features: a) labour practices alteration, b) regional uneven development and c) 
expansion of the informal sector (Russel and Donati, 1999: 138- 139).
For the first time, Greece recognised the importance of FDI in the early 1950s 
when it initiated legislation that promoted and protected foreign capital into the 
country (Petrochilos, 1989: viii, Louri, Papanastasiou and Lantouris, 2000: 419, Louri 
and Minoglou, 2001: 403). Since then there has been several changes (for or against
11
the attraction of foreign investment) by the Greek State2. Nevertheless, since the early 
1990s there is a clear “devotion” of the Greek state towards the attraction of foreign 
capital in the form of direct investment into the country. This has coincided with the 
increase of FDI at the international level.
But, this clear scope of the Greek government in favour of FDI 
coincided with the opening up of Eastern and Southern Europe to foreign capital. This 
meant that multinational corporations had from now on more choices where to invest 
their capital. In this new economic environment that was formed, new opportunities 
and threats were created. As a result of this new competition (especially since 1990) 
the foreign capital that came into the country in the form of direct investment was 
very little following a steady downward trend. This downward trend took place 
despite the verbal determination of the Greek governments, since 1980s, that is 
willing to initiate policies that will ease the entrance of foreign investors. On the other 
hand, two other peripheral countries of the European Union, Ireland and Portugal 
have managed to follow a different course than Greece in attracting FDI. As a result, 
the following questions are raised: Why have Ireland and Portugal, which have also 
been peripheral countries, managed to attract more FDI than Greece? What is to 
blame that Greece is not with the “winners” of this new era? Is there an explanation 
on that?
0.3 Research Questions
The aim of this thesis is to identify why Greece has attracted a comparatively 
small amount of FDI during the last two decades. In particular it seeks to examine the 
significance of institutional and other factors in stimulating or deterring such 
investment. One of the key ideas to be examined is whether the Greek institutional 
framework, which has been argued to be excessively bureaucratic (Kritsantonis, 1992: 
623), has a negative impact on potential inward investors. This is of particular 
importance because in this new era of technology evolution and the rapid increase in 
the number of countries that are willing to attract FDI, the specific characteristics of a 
country and the territorially embedded institutions might be of particular importance 
in determining competitiveness among countries. In this respect my hypothesis is that
2 The analysis of the policies of the Greek State towards FDI takes place in chapter I.
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the Greek institutional framework has negatively affected the attraction of FDI in 
Greece.
A further issue to be explored is whether Ireland and Portugal, which are used 
in this thesis as a kind of benchmark to Greece, have advanced a more sophisticated 
understanding of the dynamics of capitalist development and therefore been able to 
identify and give preferential assistance to growing sectors (e.g. IT sector). In 
particular, an analysis of how the states of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, as well as 
their socio- economic institutions have responded to the evolutions of the global 
economy since the end of World War II will take place. Here the hypothesis is that 
Portugal and Ireland very early realised the importance of FDI as a key element for 
the development of their economy and followed a consistent policy in favour of FDI. 
On the contrary, Greece has not managed yet to develop a long-term strategy in 
favour of FDI as the different political parties that have come into power have adapted 
different policy stances towards foreign investors.
In addition to institutional factors, however, other host- country 
characteristics, such as physical infrastructure and geographical distance to large 
markets of the European Union are also important. I therefore aim to explore the 
importance of these factors in order to try to explain the comparatively poor 
performance of Greece in attracting FDI. In order to explore these ideas this thesis 
evaluates the comparative importance of these factors to foreign branch plants that 
have been established in Greece. More precisely, I have constructed a data set, 
consisted of the total population of foreign subsidiaries that have manufacturing 
activity in Greece, then I carried out a survey on that data set and at the end I 
statistically analysed these data. The hypothesis is that these factors (physical 
infrastructure, distance to the large markets of the European Union) have also 
negatively affected the amount of FDI inflows in Greece. In chapter V, I explain in 
detail the content and methodology used for the construction of the questionnaire.
Thus, overall, the thesis intends to address the following issues/ research 
questions:
13
• To map the location, within Greece, of foreign subsidiaries that currently have 
an activity in the manufacturing sector.
• To identify the nature of the foreign subsidiaries currently present in Greece, 
in terms of their national origins, time period of entry in Greece, way of entry, degree 
of ownership, reason to enter the Greek market, type of FDI located in Greece, degree 
of autonomy by the parent company.
• To investigate the satisfaction of the foreign investors in relation to quality of 
infrastructure and the operation of institutional factors in Greece (i.e. bureaucracy, 
legislation, access to information, taxation and incentives).
• To explore the significance of government incentives in attracting FDI in 
Greece. In particular, I am going to investigate the importance of the incentives 
provided by the Greek government in FDI decisions.
Finally, in order to answer these questions/ hypotheses, a mixture of approaches (3) is 
used:
a) A survey of multinational enterprises having an activity in the 
manufacturing sector in Greece
b) This survey is supplemented through face to face semi- structured 
interviews
c) The use of secondary data.
0.4 Structure of the Thesis
Thus, in order to fulfill the aims described above, the structure of the thesis will be the 
following one:
In chapter one (I) an analysis of post- war development of the world economy and 
production takes place. At the same time, the major consequences of these changes to 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal are identified. In particular, three broad periods are 
examined, notably the Fordist, post- Fordist and the New Economy ones. Thus, 
chapter one illustrates this changing world as well as the changes where location
14
theory has been based on. In each period apart from the general approach that 
concerns the world economy transformation (in economic and social level), the 
specific transformations of the economies of Greece, Ireland and Portugal are also 
examined. It is shown that the three countries have adopted different policies in order 
to respond to these changes and consequently each country has differently taken 
advantage of the new opportunities that have emerged.
Chapter two (II) illustrates the evolution of some major, for the explanation of 
FDI, location theories, and how they responded to the world economic and industrial 
changes described in the first chapter. Throughout this chapter a comparison between 
the different theories takes place, identifying similarities and differences between the 
various schools of thought. In particular, the most known trends are presented. The 
reason is that the theoretical foundation of FDI is still rather fragmented, compiling 
bits and pieces from different fields of economics (Braunerhjelm and Svenson, 1996: 
833). The usefulness of these theories, despite their weaknesses, is that they give 
some basic explanation on the behaviour of the firm, which is the main actor of FDI, 
under certain circumstances. Finally, this chapter will provide us with the theoretical 
support necessary to evaluate some of the factors that influence particular types of 
FDI, or those from particular countries, which will take place in a later chapter 
(chapter IV).
Chapter three (III) is an illustration of the main organisational structures that 
multinational corporations have adopted since 1945 in order to deal with new 
economic and political developments described in chapter one. In the beginning it 
presents a number of authors who have analysed the structure of the multinational 
corporation (theory of the multinational firm) and their changes over time (e.g. neo­
classical economic theory, traditional organisation theory, path- dependency theory, 
value chains approach, etc.). Drawing on these theoretical ideas, Dicken (1998), 
Belis- Bergouignan, Bordenave and Lung (2001), King and Sethi (2001) have 
produced models which identify more precise factors that affect the decision making 
of multinational corporations. In particular, these authors have formalised the 
discussion of multinational corporations and developed typologies of different types 
of multinationals- some relating to sectors and some relating to changes over time (i.e. 
the main models of MNEs and a critical appraisal of them). Then, for the purpose of
15
this thesis, I am going to draw one framework (vertical and horizontal integration of 
production) in order to help understanding why different types of multinationals will 
be attracted by different kinds of locational factors. Finally, having looked at the 
structure of multinational corporations in the context of the evolution of the economy 
I advance a hypothesis about the types of firm that may be attracted to Greece.
Then, in chapter four (IV), the factors that may influence the decision of a 
multinational corporation to invest in a country in relation to another one are 
described from a theoretical point of view. In addition, despite the fact that the 
location theories tend to take a rather static view of the world and assume that the 
factors influencing location are the same for all time, I indicate why this is not the 
case. In this chapter there are continuous links between the factors selected to be 
analysed and the location and trade theories analysed in chapter II. The factors 
described concern a manufacturing type of investment. The factors are reviewed in 
combination with the most common incentives adopted by the governments in order 
to influence the decisions of multinational corporations. Finally, in the second part of 
this chapter the analysis of another, not locational factor, takes place. In particular, 
since the collapse of the communist regimes in South- Eastern Europe, Greece has 
started to become a source of outward FDI, resulting to the development of an 
outward orientation of the Greek manufacturing firms during the last two decades as 
they try to take advantage the new opportunities raised in Greece’s neighboured 
countries. Thus, chapter IV illustrates that Greece is no longer a net recipient of FDI, 
but on the contrary is also a source of FDI as many of its large firms invest abroad 
(especially in the South- Eastern Europe) in the form of direct investment.
In chapter five (V) the research methodology analysis takes place. In particular, I 
explain in detail the different methodological approaches used for the empirical study 
of my research questions. The research methods adopted are a questionnaire, semi­
structured interviews and the analysis of secondary data. In addition, I will provide 
detailed information in the way research questions and interviews were designed to 
address the objectives of the thesis.
Chapter six (VI) is the core of the thesis. It presents the results of the 
questionnaire that was sent to 144 foreign subsidiaries that currently operate in
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Greece. The first part of the chapter identifies the nature of the foreign subsidiaries 
currently present in Greece, in terms of their key characteristics, including national 
origins, sector, location, market orientation. The second part deals with the specific 
roles the subsidiaries are allowed to take over in Greece by the permission of their 
Headquarters. The third part of the chapter tries to identify which are the particular 
activities of the foreign subsidiaries located in Greece. More precisely, it tries to 
identify the relationships of the subsidiaries, first, with the parent companies, and 
second with local firms. The fourth, and last, section of the chapter tries to identify the 
attitude of the foreign subsidiaries towards some institutional factors and services 
provided by the Greek State then and now. The reason is to see whether there has 
been any improvement in how the subsidiaries see these institutional factors and 
services. The findings are discussed and interpreted with relation to the theoretical 
arguments expressed in the previous chapters.
Chapter seven (VII) uses another form of research (interviews) in order to 
assess the results of chapter VI. In particular, in this chapter I present the results of 
twenty face to face interviews with the managing directors of foreign subsidiaries 
located in Greece. This chapter explores the in depth relationships developed between 
the parent firm and the subsidiary within the Greek economic environment, as well as 
the corporate processes that influence the decision of a foreign firm to invest in 
Greece. Then further two interviews were arranged, this time with policy makers of 
the Greek State. These two interviews were arranged in order to get the opinion of the 
State in some of the conclusions of my research. Thus, by these twenty two interviews 
we (re) investigate the questions/ hypothesis presented in the introduction of the 
thesis.
Finally, in the Conclusion of the thesis, a brief summary of the findings is 
presented indicating weaknesses with what I have done and where it might go.
But, before I establish the underperformance of Greece in relation to Ireland 
and Portugal, I will first give a definition of FDI.
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0.5 Definition
As far as a definition of FDI is concerned, all definitions given by the main 
international bodies that deal with FDI have a lot of similarities. According to the 
Organisation of the Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and 
UNCTAD there are three main features that define FDI: first, the objective of 
obtaining a lasting interest in an economy other than that of the investor (“direct 
investment enterprise3”). Second, the lasting interest implies the existence of a long­
term relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant 
degree of influence on the management of the enterprise. Third, direct investment 
involves both the initial transactions between the two entities and all subsequent 
capital transactions between them and among affiliated enterprises, both incorporated 
and unincorporated. FDI may be undertaken by individuals as well as business entities 
(OECD, 1996: 7-8, UNCTAD, 2002: 291). Somewhat similar is the definition of FDI 
given by Eurostat. The latter defines FDI as “acquisition by an individual or enterprise 
resident in one country of assets located in another... transactions are included as part 
of FDI only if a material interest is acquired in a foreign enterprise (usually defined as 
a shareholding of at least 10 per cent4). Once this condition is satisfied, further capital 
transactions between the two parties concerned, also count as FDI” (European 
Commission, 1996: 53). Because most of the data in this thesis have been taken by 
UNCTAD sources, but also due to the similarity in the definitions of UNCTAD and 
OECD, this thesis adopts the definition of these two international bodies.
0.6 FDI Inflows in Greece, Ireland and Portugal
Greece, Ireland and Portugal have followed a different course as far as FDI 
inflows are concerned. In relation to their size there is an imbalance to the number of 
MNCs that have been established in the three countries. Ireland, is the smallest 
country in size and population, in relation to Greece and Portugal, yet has attracted 
about five times more FDI than Greece and three times more FDI than Portugal. 
Moreover, Portugal having about the same size and population as Greece is 
considered, like Ireland, a “success story” on that field. So the question raised is why 
Greece does not attract as much FDI as Ireland and Portugal?
3A direct investment enterprise is defined as “an incorporated or unincorporated enterprise in which a 
foreign investor owns 10 per cent or more of the ordinary shares or voting power of an incorporated 
enterprise or the equivalent of an unincorporated enterprise” (OECD, 1996: 8).
4 This threshold of 10 per cent is not the same for all the countries.
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Figure 0.1
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Combined Source: UNCTAD. World Investment Report 2002, p. 303, UNCTAD. World Investment Report 2005. p. 303, and 
Eurostat, The Greek Economy in Fisrures. 2001, p. 72
In Figure 0.1 the FDI inflows for Ireland, Portugal and Greece from 1981 to 
2004 are presented5. During this period FDI inflows grew significantly. In this respect 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal performed differently as far as the attraction of FDI is 
concerned. Figure 0.1 shows that for most of the period 1981 to 2004, Greece 
attracted less FDI than Ireland and Portugal, although during most of the 1980s was in 
better position. More precisely, despite the fact that the amounts of FDI that the three 
countries attracted during these years (1980s) were very low in comparison to recent 
figures, nevertheless Greece was in better position than Ireland and Portugal. It was 
not until the end o f 1980s that Portugal firstly, and then Ireland, started to attract 
larger amounts of FDI in relation to Greece. In absolute terms Ireland and Portugal 
have managed to attract much larger amounts of FDI than Greece. Data from 
UNCTAD (UNCTAD, 2001: 10) on the annual average FDI growth rate confirms this 
trend for the period 1986- 2000. During this time period, Greece is placed among 
those countries that FDI inflow increase is between 0- 9.9 per cent. On the contrary, 
Portugal is placed with these countries that FDI inflow increase is between 10- 19.9
5 This time period has been chosen because since then United N ations have available data for all the 
three countries. Before that time, data are m issing from som e o f  the three countries.
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per cent and Ireland among countries which FDI inflow increased more than 30 per
cent.
The same conclusions can be drawn if we analyse Figure 0.2 below where the 
performance of the three countries is examined in terms o f their FDI inflows per 
capita. This ratio that marks the relative performance (i.e. the dynamism) of Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal in terms o f FDI inflows also shows that Greece has the worst 
performance compared to Ireland and Portugal.
Figure 0.2
FDI Inflows per capita 1981-2004 (US dollars)
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Service o f  Greece www.statistics.gr, Central Statistics Office Ireland wv-w.cso.ie, Instituto Nacional de Estatistica www.ine.pt
Table 0.1 presents the absolute figures on FDI for the EU6 1997- 2004. The 
data shows that from 1997 to 2004, Greece attracts less FDI than any other EU 
Member State. Greece attracts small amounts of FDI particularly during the years 
1998, 1999 and 2002. The only positive sign is that during the last two years, contrary 
to the trend to the rest of the EU Member States, the amount of FDI that Greece 
attracts increases, but still remains in the last position as far as the absolute figures are 
concerned. It is still very early to see if this increase in the FDI inflows during 2003 
and 2004 is the beginning of a reversal trend or it is just an isolated phenomenon.
6 W hen referring to the European Union, I mean to the fifteen M ember States and not twenty five.
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Table 0.1: FDI inflows in the European Union Member States (Million of dollars)
Host Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Austria 2654 4533 2975 8840 5909 356 7352 4865
Belgium & Lux. 11998 22691 133059 245561 50996 132844 123153 91366
Denmark 2801 7730 15911 32289 6969 6630 2595 10722
Finland 2119 12138 4613 8834 3615 7919 3296 4648
France 23174 30984 47070 42930 52623 49035 42498 24318
Germany 12244 24593 54754 195122 31833 50516 27265 38557
Greece 984 85 571 1089 1560 50 661 1351
Ireland 2743 11035 14929 24117 9775 28981 26888 9120
Italy 3700 2635 6911 13377 14873 14545 16415 16815
Netherlands 11132 36964 41289 52453 50471 25038 19331 4605
Portugal 2477 3144 1234 6464 6017 1767 6558 1112
Spain 7697 11797 15758 37523 21781 43696 29013 18361
Sweden 10968 19564 60850 23367 12734 11738 1288 371
United Kingdom 33229 74324 87973 116552 53779 24029 20298 78399
Source: UNCTAD. 2002: 303; 2005: 303
Data for Portugal in 2001 are estimates where as for Netherlands are preliminary (for the same year).
However, this way of assessment of FDI performance by comparing the 
absolute values of inflows does not take into account the size of the host economy. 
Reasonably thinking, the larger economies, as measured by GDP, will attract more 
FDI than smaller ones. A more interesting issue would be to estimate how successful 
an economy is in attracting FDI, after taking into account the size of the host 
economy. By this way the importance, to the foreign investor, of other factors, such as 
political and macroeconomic stability, the FDI policy regime, industrial 
competitiveness, natural and human resources, can be identified (UNCTAD, 2002: 
23). For this purpose World Investment Report introduced an Inward FDI Index to 
estimate success in attracting FDI. The Inward FDI performance Index is the ratio of a 
country’s share in global FDI flows to its share in global GDP. Countries with an 
index value of one (1) receive FDI exactly in line with their relative economic size. 
Countries with an index value greater than one attract more FDI than may be expected 
on the basis of relative GDP. This might be due to various factors that affect FDI 
inflows, such as a welcoming regulatory regime, or attractive business environment, 
or good growth potentials. On the other hand, countries with index values below one 
(1) suffer form one or more deficiencies to their economic, political, social and 
business environment. Table 0.2 presents the position of Greece, Ireland and Portugal 
according to the FDI Performance Index during the time periods 1988- 1990,1998- 
2000 and 2002- 2004.
7 Although, U NC TA D  recognises that the Inward FDI performance index should be treated cautiously  
as an indicator o f  countries’ inward FDI position, nevertheless, it adopts that index due to the 
difficulties to measure the factors that may affect FDI. This is because social, political and institutional
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Table 0.2: Values and Country Rankings by the UNCTAD Inward FDI Performance
Index. 1988- 1990. 1998- 2000 and 2002- 2004
Value Rank
Economy 1988-1990 1998-2000 2002-2004 1988-1990 1998- 2000 2002-2004
Greece 1.3 0.1 0.2 45 125 129
Ireland 0.7 5.1 7.8 71 4 5
Portugal 3.2 0.9 1.19 18 64 81
Source, UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2002. and World Investment Report 2006
According to UNCTAD, countries with low value index receive less FDI than 
warranted by their size (UNCTAD, 2002: 29). From Table 0.2 it is clear that currently 
Greece and Portugal have deteriorated their position in relation to 1990. On the 
contrary, Ireland from the 71st position among 140 countries that possessed in 1990 
raised to the 5th one in 2004. Moreover, according to this index Ireland indeed 
received an important amount of FDI, where as Greece and Portugal very little 
Especially, Greece currently receives a minimum amount of FDI in relation to the size 
of its market and is positioned 129th among United Nations Members. This is also 
verified by UNCTAD where it states that “in the bottom 20 countries are mainly 
developing countries including several Less Developed Countries (LDCs), but they 
also include Japan and Greece” (UNCTAD, 2002: 29). The data shown indicates that 
compared to other small economies in the European Union, Greece has 
underperformed in terms of attracting FDI. The main objective of the thesis is to try to 
identify the reasons why. But, before I analyse in more depth the objective of this 
thesis, firstly, I will present how FDI has performed at world scale during the last two 
decades.
0.7 FDI World Trends During the Last Two Decades
Having analysed FDI trends in Greece, Ireland and Portugal also the 
analysis o f FDI world trends during the last two decades is presented in order to see 
whether the three countries under examination followed a similar or different path, in 
relation to the rest of the world.
factors are difficult to quantify at the national level as w ell as it is especially  d ifficult to evaluate how  
effectively policies are implemented (U NC TAD , 2002: 24).
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Table 0.3 FDI Inflows by Host Region and Economy, 1983- 2004 (Million of dollars)
World D eveloped Econom ies Developing Econom ies
1983-87 (Annual average) 77,1 58,7 18,3
1988-92 (Annual average) 177,3 139,1 36,8
1993 207,9 129,3 73,1
1994 225,7 132,8 87,0
1995 314,9 203,2 99,7
1996 386,140 219,908 152,685
1997 478,082 267,947 191,022
1998 694,457 484,239 187,611
1999 1,088,263 837,761 225,140
2000 1,491,934 1,227,476 237,894
2001 735,146 503,144 204,801
2002 716,128 547,778 155,528
2003 632,599 442,157 166,337
2004 648,146 380,022 233,227
Source: World Investment Report 1996, 2002 and 2005. Combined data
Since the end of the World War II, FDI flows among countries have been 
steadily increased with a small break at the beginning of 1980s (Chan, 1996:1). This 
break was due to the petroleum crisis that took place that era and negatively affected 
the world economy. However, since the beginning of 1983, FDI started rising again, 
stopping only for a couple of years at the beginning of 1990s, due to a new financial 
crisis. In 1996, this amount reached to $(US) 386 billion (Table 0.3). This year is a 
mark point because for the first time FDI has overtaken world exports (European 
Commission, 1999: 1).
Despite the Mexican peso crisis and the Asian financial crisis in the late 
1990s, FDI continued to grow. In 1999, FDI surpassed the one trillion-dollar mark. 
But, the new international financial crisis in 2001 resulted in a sharp decline (almost 
halved as seen in Table 0.3) in FDI flows. This significant drop is due to the slowing 
of economic activity in the world’s largest economies, notably the American, 
Japanese and the European Union ones, and the slow down of new international
o
investment, notably the cross- border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) that have 
driven recent FDI. Table 0.3 illustrates that it was mainly the developed countries, in 
which Ireland, Portugal and Greece are part of, that were particularly hit by this new 
international financial crisis. In the developed world the decline in FDI inflows
8 A ccording to U NC TA D  (p. 3) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee A gency (p. 1) M & A s have 
driven FDI growth over the last decade. During 1990s investment has remained rather stable on a world  
basis, notably between $200 billion and $300 billion annually.
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reached 59 per cent (UNCTAD, 2002:3). On the contrary, in the countries o f the 
developing world, FDI inflows were only slightly decreased. This can probably 
suggest that the dynamism that has marked the developing world (or at least a 
significant part of it) as a location of FDI could not be harmed by this new crisis in the 
world economy. Since then, FDI inflows have not yet managed to recover to the 
levels of 2000. United Nations data support that this drop in FDI could be explained 
by the theory of business cycle. In particular, the decline in FDI flows in 2001 
followed rapid increases during the late 1990s. The same happened during the late 
1980s and early 1990s, and in 1982- 1983. Consequently, since the early 1980s there 
have been three business cycles (UNCTAD, 2002: 4). All three business cycles 
coincide with changes in world economic environment.
Additionally, the developed countries still remain the main sources of FDI 
(Table 0.4). This is because the home of the largest multinational corporations, which 
drive globalisation, is still found on the so- called developed economies. All this 
despite the expectations of UNCTAD few years ago (UNCTD, 1997: 4) that this time 
developing countries would play a more important role, in comparison to the two 
previous investment booms9, as far as the participation in FDI investment is 
concerned, it seems that this did not happen. Once again developed countries drove 
the investment boom.
Table 0.4 FDI Outflows by Home Region, 1990- 2001 (Millions of dollars)
World D eveloped Econom ies D eveloping E conom ies
1990-95 (Annual average) 253 302 221 005 32 021
1996 394 996 332 395 61 309
1997 474 010 394 999 74 797
1998 684 039 631 291 50 256
1999 1 042 051 965 977 73 636
2000 1 379 493 1 271 273 104 207
2001 620 713 580 624 36 571
2002 652, 181 599,895 47,775
2003 616, 923 577,323 29,016
2004 7 3 0 ,2 5 7 637,360 83,190
Source: World Investment Report 2002 and 2005, combined data
9 The first investment boom , which took place in the period 1979-1981 was led by petroleum  
investments in oil producing countries, and the second investment boom , which took place in the 
period 1987-1990, was concentrated in developed countries (U N C T A D , 1997: 4).
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But, what have been the causes of this increase in FDI trends? As it will be 
analysed in chapter I, in the late 1960s, the Fordist crisis has as a consequence 
multinational corporations to start seeking refuge in the Newly Industrialised 
Countries (NIC). This is the time where the large Western firms started founding new 
subsidiaries, or merging with native firms of the new markets.
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CHAPTER I
The Development of the World Economy and Regulation Approach
1.1 Introduction
In the first part of the chapter an analysis of the development of the world 
economy since 1945 (end of World War II) takes place. At the same time the 
development of multinational corporations within this context is described. Finally, 
the situation of European regional economies in each phase of world transformation is 
also analysed. In particular, the analysis of the development of world economy 
follows the approach of the Regulation School that has emphasised the restructuring 
of the production systems and how this has influenced the positioning of countries in 
the world power system. Moreover, Regulation approach argues that changes in the 
industrial organisation are broader patterns of development within both core and 
peripheral countries. In this respect, in this chapter the analysis of the restructuring of 
the production systems is divided into three broad categories: the first one, called 
Fordist period, took place from the end of World War II (1945) to the end of 1960s. 
The second period, called Post- Fordist, took place during the 1970s and 1980s. The 
last period, called New Economy or even Globalisation era, took place from 1989, 
with the fall of the Berlin Wall and lasts until today.
Within these three time periods very important changes took place, as far as 
the structure and organisation of capitalism is concerned. Production processes 
changed, the purchasing capacity of populations became greater, and the power 
equilibrium between nations also changed dramatically. As a result of these 
transformations, as it will be analysed below, governments started to become keener 
to accept foreign capital. The vast majority of countries opened their economies and 
adopted economic and political measures aiming at the attraction of FDI. 
Additionally, the role of the so- called peripheral countries also became more 
important (in Europe and elsewhere). These countries became a pole of attraction by 
multinational enterprises. More and more operations of multinational corporations 
were transferred to these countries, changing by this way the world’s economic
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balance of power10. This chapter considers how Greece, Ireland and Portugal 
integrated in this new world economic system, as well as the relative position of 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal at global scale as a result of this shift in structure and 
organisation of capitalism. It is shown that the three countries have adopted different 
policies in order to respond to these changes and consequently each country has 
differently taken advantage of the new opportunities that have emerged. By this way I 
will be able to demonstrate the weakness of Greece to understand the dynamics of 
capitalist development.
10 As it will be shown later in this thesis, ex- developing countries increased their share of inward and 
outward FDI in relation to the previous decades. Countries in Southeastern Asia, such as Philippines 
and Taiwan, but also in the European continent, such as Portugal, Spain and Ireland increased their 
status in the field of international economics and politics.
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1.2 Perspectives on Economic Restructuring in the Twentieth 
Century
1.2.1 Fordist Period (1945- 1960s)
In order to understand the economic structure of the today world, it is essential 
to comprehend the developmental logic of the post-war period. The economic boom 
just after World War II was an illustration of the supremacy within the main advanced 
capitalist countries11 of a peculiar “pattern of development” and of the constancy of a 
“world of configuration” that linked them together. Recognising the difficulties of 
combining theory and history, this thesis will track the approach developed by the 
French Regulation School, which first took up this challenge when it tried to 
understand the rise and demise of Fordist growth regime (Dicken, Forsgren and 
Malmberg, 1994: 28; Boyer, 2000: 143). This school put emphasis on the 
restructuring of production systems, which intensified during the 1980s, indicating an 
all- embracing shift between two historical periods: Fordism and Post- Fordism. It 
maintains that the processes shaping industrial organisation are broader patterns of 
development within both core and peripheral countries. More precisely, they consider 
the history of capitalism as a succession of phases, each differentiated by certain 
historically developed, socio- institutionally defined structural forms12 that give rise to 
distinctive economic trends and patterns (Brenner and Glick, 1991: 46; Harvey, 2000: 
86). Consequently, it is particularly useful for the questions raised in this thesis. The 
framework rests on four key concepts: regime of accumulation, mode of regulation, 
mode of socialisation and the role of the state.
More precisely, according to Aglietta (1979: 68) accumulation reproduces the 
relations of production by continuously altering their operations. In this way the 
“regime of accumulation” is a form of social transformation that leads to the increase 
of the relative surplus- value. In other words, by the term “regime of accumulation” is 
meant a recorded set of regular macroeconomic interactions, which includes the
11 This hegemonic pattern of development was named Fordism.
12 According to Boyer (1990: 69) the concept of “structural forms” as used in the regulation approach 
should not be confused with that of “institutions” as used by the institutionalists. The formers are 
global in nature, and have effects felt throughout the whole economic system. The latter may be quite 
local in character, with consequences principally at the microeconomic or intermediate levels.
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critical economic conditions for the operation of the productive system (technology, 
organisation of the labour process, relations between the departments of production). 
These norms are by themselves an invaluable guide for investors (Leborgne and 
Lipietz 1991: 28- 29; Mavroudeas, 2003: 487). The “mode of regulation” is the case 
where any uncertainty of the investors about the future coherence of the regime of 
accumulation is eased by regulatory mechanisms, institutions, compensatory 
mechanisms and information systems. The “mode of regulation” relies on actual, 
historically specific institutional forms. More than one “mode of regulation” can be 
implemented in a certain “regime of accumulation”. Which will dominate depends on 
the indeterminacy of history. However, not every “mode of regulation” is appropriate 
for every “regime of accumulation”. This system continually adjusts the expectations 
and activities of individuals to the general logic of the regime of accumulation 
(Leborgne and Lipietz 1991: 28- 29; Mavroudeas, 2003: 487).
The third term is the “mode of socialisation”. This is the establishment and 
consolidation of a mode of regulation, which is heavily dependent on the political 
sphere. In politics what matters are political and social struggles as well as agreements 
and institutional compromises. The different social groups, regardless of the 
divergences in their interests and their economic inequalities, over the long- run make 
up a nation in which power relations are perpetuated without major dispute. This 
stable system of relations of domination, or for some others, of concessions among 
different social groups (dominant and subordinate) is called social block (Leborgne 
and Lipietz 1991: 28- 29). Finally, the last key concept is the “role of the state”. 
According to the Regulation School the role of the state is vital because it reinforces 
the institutionalised compromises, asserts its monopoly of “institutionalised violence”, 
defends the currency, enforces legislation, and manages relations with other nations 
(Leborgne and Lipietz 1991: 28- 29).
Moreover, as Boyer (1990: 68- 69), a prominent regulationist, argues, 
institutional differences at the nation- level are very important, but, in the long- run, 
economic developments depend upon the dominant mode of regulation in each 
historical era. Thus, whereas, especially OECD countries, operate under a common 
environment, differences at the mode of regulation at the national level may explain 
their relative competitiveness and growth rates (Boyer, 1990: 23). This is a very
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important argument for the evolution of this thesis. At the end of this chapter my 
intention is to clarify how, through different modes of development, the different 
national institutional regimes of Greece, Ireland and Portugal were driven towards the 
dominant mode of regulation, which was their more and more integration into the 
world capitalist system. But, this argument further stimulates the basic question of this 
thesis: why does not Greece attract the amount of FDI that Ireland and Portugal do? 
Having this argument in mind the following structure of this chapter has two tasks. 
The first one is to describe the world developments, driven mainly by USA and some 
large European countries, since the end of WWII. The second task is to describe how 
the countries in question, and particular their institutional regimes, were affected by 
these developments and what were their (re) actions to them. The two tasks will take 
place following the regulation approach of things.
Thus, beginning the analysis of the post- war developmental logic, the 
immediate post- 1945 era was characterised by the Fordist mode of development 
originated in the United States. More precisely, the Fordist industrial paradigm 
included the Taylorist13 principles of rationalisation, plus constant mechanisation. 
Aglietta (1979: 114) defines Taylorism as the sum total of those relations of 
production internal to the labour process that tend to speed up the completion of the 
mechanical cycle of movements on the job and to fill the gaps in the working day. 
Taylorist rationalisation was based on a separation of the intellectual (i.e. research and 
development, design, and the scientific organisation of work) and manual (i.e. 
unskilled operational tasks) aspects of labour. The establishment of the Taylorist- 
Fordist labour process was supported by a transition in the mode of regulation of 
capital- capital relations away from full competition towards oligopoly. A qualitative 
increase in the intensity of capital, the rise of finance- dominated trusts, and the 
emergence of modem firm allowed for greater inter- capitalist control of competition, 
markets and in general of the overall investment environment (Brenner and Glick, 
1991:74- 75).
According to Aglietta (1979: 114- 116) Taylorism organised work in such a 
way that reduced the workers’ degree of autonomy and placed them under constant
13 In the USA, Taylorism came into force in the engineering industries at the end of the 19th century 
(Aglietta, 1979:114).
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surveillance and control. In this respect the relationship between capital and labour 
had the following form. Each production worker was given a simpler cycle to 
perform. The inauguration of patterns of this kind led to the conception of new 
methods of production and new types of machine- tools. “Technical progress” was 
completely determined by the intensification of output norms. It sought to alter the 
substance of jobs in such a way as to dodge the workers’ resistance where it was not 
possible to break it directly. At the same time with the above initiations on production 
methods, there was an attack on organised labour. In the United States, for example, 
since the end of WWII, and until the 1960s, there was a modification in the 
relationships between industrial capital and labour unions. More precisely, there was 
an agreement under which both parties accepted that the unions would contribute to 
reduce industrial warfare under a “social contract”. This would take place in the 
following way: in exchange for union- demanded wages and benefits, workers would 
give up control over industrial production to management. The cost of this 
arrangement would be transferred to the consumers, through higher prices for 
commodities, rather than in narrower profit margins. This agreement particularly 
benefited workers in large oligopolistic industries, where unions were strong and 
profits were significant (Bonacich and Appelbaum, 2000: 6).
After the end of WW II, Taylorist management techniques were incorporated 
in most industries both in the USA and in Western Europe. This was also favored by 
the implementation by the USA of the Marshall Plan14. The Plan aimed to give to the 
countries of Western Europe (and Japan) that had suffered from the war those 
financial and technical means that would allowed them to catch up15. As a result of 
these new management techniques a vast deposit of homogenous and mobile labour- 
force, both controlled and submissive to capitalist labour discipline, was created. The 
mass migration of workers particularly contributed to the growth of this pool of 
labour. Additionally, there was a relatively regular rise in real wages, which was the
14 Marshall enunciated the Plan at Harvard University on June 5, 1947. The Marshall Plan, whose 
official title was “European Recovery Program” aimed at: (1) increasing production; (2) expanding 
European foreign trade; (3) facilitating European economic co-operation and integration, and (4) 
controlling inflation, which was the program’s chief failure 
('www.marshallfoundation.org/about gem/marshall plan.htm. access date: November 2000).
15 There is a further argument that this was also part of the cold war, i.e. there was concern that people 
in Europe might be attracted to the Soviet way of life. At this time- contrast to the present- there was an 
alternative social mode.
31
result of a constant fall in real social wage costs (Aglietta, 1979: 161). This was 
because of the increase in productivity.
Whereas this was the case for the United States and the large European 
countries (and Japan), what about peripheral Europe, and particularly Greece, 
Portugal and Ireland which are at the focus of this thesis? As mentioned above 
Fordism contributed to Taylorism by incorporating the collective knowledge of the 
labour force into the machine system itself. Additionally, the Fordist regime of 
accumulation stimulated not only a rapid increase in the volume of investment per 
head but also a growth in per capita consumption. Within this context, the role of 
peripheral countries was very limited. The reason was that Fordism was based on the 
principles of mass production and mass consumption. The less wealthy peripheral 
countries could not fulfil this principle. They could not produce massively, because 
they could not consume massively. The United States of America in their effort to 
help peripheral countries to develop some level of mass consumption initiated 
different forms of aid (the most known one is the so- called “Marshall Plan”) so that 
in the long run the European markets, including the peripheral ones, could consume 
more American products as a result of the improvement of their quality of life.
But, since the mid- 1960s a slow down in real social wage costs was 
observed, which challenged Fordism as the principle mode of management of wage- 
labour. Aglietta (1979: 122) describes this situation as “a crisis of the reproduction of 
the wage relation, which affects methods and goals of production, as well as modes of 
life”. In particular, it was the slow down in the rate of increase in productivity that led 
to a rise in the real social wage, which in turn led to the crisis of Fordism. The full 
employment and the rising wages that were characteristics of the post war boom, 
which was also in part a consequence of the increase in productivity, led to the trade 
unions being quite powerful. Precisely, Aglietta (1979: 162) argues that the root of the 
crisis of Fordism was the intensification of class struggles at the point of production. 
Whereas, initially in the post war boom it was possible for wages and profits to rise 
simultaneously, at that time where the rate of increase in productivity declined, profits 
could only increase by decreasing wages or vice versa. If labour secured wage 
increases this would have an adverse effect on profits. But, the entrepreneurs would
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not easily accept this. At the end the crisis extended to the whole spectrum of relations 
of production, causing disturbance to the Fordism regime of accumulation.
As a result, during the 1960s the Fordist mode of production entered into crisis 
ending up to its collapse. The main reason for this was the crisis of mass production 
model, which took place at both micro- scale and macro- scale. According to 
Leborgne and Lipietz, the cause was not a new global “crisis” of underconsumption, 
or a problem of supply side. Mainly it was the succession of two destabilising events, 
i.e. the expression of “internal causes” (notably the crisis of the model of development 
itself, principally on the supply side) and “external causes” (notably the 
internationalisation of the economy, which jeopardised the national management of 
demand) (Leborgne and Lipietz, 1991:31, Dunford and Perrons, 1994: 164). In 
particular, since the early 1970s, rates of output and productivity growth in developed 
countries have been halved in comparison to the post- war golden age16. The increase 
in oil prices that took place in the early 1970s accelerated the crisis in the developed 
countries. In the vast majority of the western world (especially in the most developed 
countries of the western world) a decrease on the level of demand took place. But, 
output did not follow a similar trend. On the contrary, large amounts of money were 
engaged in stocks of goods and material, paying less attention to the quality. At the 
same time, mass unemployment and widespread social exclusion have appeared, and 
inequality has increased. The crisis created was so acute that even the Keynesian 
economic policies, contrary to the past, proved entirely incapable of putting an end to 
it.
This increase in oil prices, plus low growth in Western economies led to banks 
having large amounts of oil money seeking investment opportunities. As a result, 
many developing countries, especially from the Latin America, borrowed in order to 
invest in industry, with the intention of exporting in order to pay back the loans 
(Amin, 1997: 20). Towards this direction the developing countries had the support of 
international organisations and banks17. Thus, the collapse of Fordism in the late
16 According to the analysis provided by Eichengreen and Vazquez (1999:4), between 1950 and 1971 
the GDP of the twelve European Economies grew by 4.7 per cent per annum. Over the period from 
1973 through 1992, growth averaged 2.2 per cent per annum.
17 Because of this stance the international organisations and banks were criticised. For example, among 
the institutions, IMF was especially criticised because it merely organised the “rescheduling” of the
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1 81960s produced a new pattern of capitalist development . In particular, the large 
firms of the Western World in their attempt to raise productivity by expanding the 
scale of production, as well as to recover their profitability, started seeking refuge in 
the Peripheral Countries or Newly Industrialised Countries19, where ample cheap 
labour existed20, and where the organisational forms of Fordism would continue to be 
economically viable (Arestis and Paliginis, 1995: 226, Lipietz, 1987: 70, Hudson, 
1997: 468; Hudson, 1999: 45). But, in these Newly Industrialised Countries, only 
selected branches of production, or selected phases of the manufacturing process of 
one product were transferred. Organisation and control of production processes 
remained to the core industrialised countries (Antonopoulou, 2000: 38).
But in order for the large Western corporations to be able to invest directly, 
i.e. via FDI, in peripheral markets, they should overcome two obstacles. The first one 
was tariff barriers designed to protect local industries by foreign firms. Another 
problem was that certain socio-economic and political conditions should exist in 
peripheral countries. A very important condition for the expansion of the Fordist
mode of production to the peripheral countries was the existence (in the periphery) of
•  •  •  •  •  21political regimes whose ruling classes supported a “free” but “disciplined ”
workforce and was determined to use it. But, this was not a condition that existed in 
all countries. In all these peripheral countries the available labour force had only 
recently moved from land occupation and its transformation to an industrial worker 
was not an easy task. This was a difficult process that involved the mobilisation and 
stabilisation of industrial discipline.
Thus, the expansion of multinational corporations into the new markets and 
the changing nature of the economic, social and political conditions within these
debt without tackling its causes or the mechanisms ensuring its reproduction and expansion. According 
to Amin, IMF did nothing to prevent the excessive borrowing of the late 1970s, because the rising debt 
was very useful as a means of managing the crisis and the overabundance of idle capital (Amin, 1997: 
12-13,20).
18 According to Harvey (2001: 241) “periodic crises must in general have the effect of expanding the 
production capacity and renewing the conditions of further accumulation”.
19 The OECD classification uses two pragmatic criteria in order to define a country as a New Industrial 
Country (NIC): NIC is a country in which manufactured goods represent 25 per cent of GDP and at 
least 50 per cent of exports (Lipietz, 1987: 74).
20 This switch of production to less developed countries has been an important moment in the 
emergence of a new international division of labour (Hudson, 1999:45; King and Donati, 1999: 137).
21 By the term “disciplined” I mean that workers will not bring up for discussion demands that may cut 
the profits of firms. Such demands could be higher wages, better working conditions, etc.
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markets was named by Lipietz as “Peripheral Fordism22”. The characteristics of the 
markets of Peripheral Fordism include, among other things, the participation of 
middle class in the consumption of durable goods, exports of cheap manufacturing to 
the centre, and a negative balance of payments. In order to improve balance of 
payments, sources of finance were found within the ‘old’ division of labour23, from 
the promotion of raw materials exports and from borrowing24 from international 
capital and money markets. These loans were pledged against potential income from 
traditional exports (including tourism, petroleum and emigration), the promise of 
work, which in turn depended upon the profitable inauguration of new production 
processes in the developing countries, upon the existence of markets for their future 
production, and lastly the recycling of borrowed capital to buy capital commodities 
from the North . Another form of financing of the peripheral countries had been 
channeled through direct investment. But because the financing through direct 
investment was inadequate countries started to borrow from the international capital 
and money markets. In particular, between 1967 and 1980, the funds repatriated by 
emigrants, and tourism, accounted for 96 per cent of Portugal’s trade deficit where as 
for Greece was 52 per cent. The difference between Portugal and Greece was that for 
the former the main source of income was the repatriation of funds by the Portuguese 
emigrants, while for the latter was commissioning ships. On the other hand, Ireland 
had already initiated an aggressive policy of FDI attraction and development through 
exports. For all countries the rest of the deficit was covered through borrowing 
(Lipietz, 1987: 106-126; Arestis and Paliginis, 1995: 266- 267).
But according to Arestis and Paliginis (1995: 266- 267), peripheral Fordism as 
developed by Lipietz does not include regulation and accumulation, two fundamental 
features of Fordist era. More precisely, Fordist accumulation in the developed
22 “It is Fordism inasmuch as it involves intensive accumulation and mass consumption, especially of 
consumer durables. And it is peripheral in that some centres of manufacturing, mainly of “mature” 
products are now located in the periphery” (Arestis and Paliginis, 1995: 266).
23 Sayer and Walker (1992: 1) define the division of labour as “the system of work specialisation that 
runs through all human societies, from the most primitive to the most advanced”.
24 The core exports engineering and skilled assembly goods of the new division of labour in exchange 
for unskilled assembly goods from the periphery (Arestis and Paliginis, 1995: 266).
25 The deal was that a country had to use the borrowed money in order to buy products from the North. 
The money could not be used for other purposes (Lipietz, 1987: 107),
26 During the 1970s, roughly 25 percent of all direct investment by Multinational Firms took place in 
the Southern Europe. Between 1960 and 1980, the share of capital invested directly to the Southern 
Europe fell from 60 to 47 percent in the case of Japanese companies and from 40 to 25 percent in the 
case of American firms (Lipietz, 1987: 100).
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countries is the result of a historical process where the necessary institutional 
framework has already been put in place. This process had the support, at least in 
Europe, of a strong trade union movement, giving rise to the development of 
corporate philosophy of the western societies27. On the other hand, in the case of the 
peripheral European countries, production was dominated by multinational enterprises 
that were externally controlled and were not fully integrated into the national 
economies. Moreover, their institutional framework was either absent or ill- 
developed and the relations of the State, capital and trade unions were not the 
appropriate ones in order for the regulatory policies of the developed countries to be 
implemented in the European periphery.
The reason for this time lag with regard to the implementation of a common 
“regime of accumulation”, “mode of regulation”, “mode of socialisation” and the 
“role of the state” in economic development between the developed and less 
developed countries of the western world was that in the first years after the end of 
World War II, the economies of peripheral countries failed to understand the 
importance of an open economy in the international context. Of course by this is not 
meant that peripheral countries ought to have understood the importance of the open 
economy, as the majority of them did not have the experience (in terms of their 
institutional forms) for that. We should not forget the world economic and political 
conditions of that era where two different regimes were competing against each other 
and the poor and small peripheral countries had to balance between them.
As a result the role of international capital in economic development was 
ignored. In all countries of the European periphery (namely Southern Europe and 
Ireland) economic measures that made the entrance of foreign investors very difficult 
were initiated. Many of these measures were contradictory and were taken due to a 
political interest of the then party in power28. The main reason for this was the desire 
of countries for an autonomous growth. In Ireland, from 1932 to the late 1950s, high 
level of protectionism was introduced. In particular, according to the Control of 
Manufactures Act of 1932, Irish people had to control 51 per cent of the voting shares
27 As we shall see later, trade unions, for example in Greece, used their powers to pressure government 
towards different political choices.
28 This policy was also favoured by the economic recession during this period.
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in manufacturing firms. The aim of this Act was twofold: first, to protect the 
“primitive” Irish industry and second, to block UK firms from taking advantage and 
setting up companies in the protected Irish economy capturing by this way market 
share from local producers (Tavares, 2000: 2, Murphy, 2000: 8). This policy resulted 
to an almost negligent amount of export production and Irish industry became 
uncompetitive and weak, producing poor quality of products. The consequences of 
protectionism were revealed after 1960, when the first foreign industries were 
established in the country29. Also in Portugal, immediately after the end of the World 
War II indigenous capitalists looked to the state for financial support (e.g. via 
subsidies) in order to ensure freedom from external competition. Their aim was to 
create conditions that would allow them to make substantial profits. This aim was 
realized in 1945 with the introduction by the Portuguese government of a law30 that 
placed emphasis firmly on manufacturing industry, the continuation of protectionism 
and a concerted import substitution industrialisation strategy.
The same was the case for Greece. After the end of the civil war in 1949, there 
was a short period of weak governments that emerged from continuous elections. The 
first strong government emerged in 1952. The first measures for the restoration of the 
Greek economy were the lifting of many price and import controls, the drastically 
devalued drachma and reduced interest rates. This policy continued during the next 
years accompanied by investments in the infrastructure of the country, particularly in 
the road network. During the whole period, since the end of World War II and until 
the mid 1970s, Greek policy was characterised by increasing role of the State in the 
Greek economy and society. In particular, a large number of government agencies 
were created, union activity was heavily controlled and the banking system was 
strictly regulated. However, the role of the State still remained small (Alogoskoufis, 
Giavazzi and Laroque, 1995: 154). Additionally, during this period the Greek 
economy was characterised by an over- concentration of almost all economic 
activities in Greater Athens area that had as a result the relative underdevelopment 
and even backwardness in the rest of the country (Hoffman, 1967: 661).
29 Despite the Act many UK companies had been established before 1960.
30 The law was called: Lei de Fomento e Reorganizacao Industrial.
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When the crisis of Fordism started, Greece, Ireland and Portugal being next to
the European core were obvious places for the expansion of multinational
corporations. International capital was seeking places where it could produce and
distribute its products to the large markets in safety and rapidly. But, this expansion
could not take place without any preparation for the following reasons: first, since the
end of World War II Portugal and Greece had emerged with industrial and social
structures that were archaic compared to the (dominant) American model.
Furthermore, until the 1960s (when both Portugal and Greece had dictatorships) the
^ 1two countries had completely different historical experiences . Finally, contrary to 
Greece and Portugal, by the 1960s Ireland could not be characterised as a Newly 
Industrialised Country according to the criteria set by the World Bank as it was in a 
more severe economic and social situation than NICs .
Nevertheless, in Portugal, Greece and Ireland the processes leading to 
the development of “industrial discipline” had started since the mid-1950s, i.e. before 
the crisis of the Fordist period. In both Greece and Portugal, there was a significant 
economic growth during 1950s and 1960s. But, despite this economic growth mass 
emigration continued. According to King and Donati, emigration was seen as the 
causal factor behind economic growth. Additionally, cheap labour in Southern Europe 
favoured the attraction of FDI, especially in the manufacturing sector (King and 
Donati, 1999: 137). Nevertheless, the overall outcome for Portugal and Greece was 
the deterioration of the domestic economic situation, which was characterised by 
rising imports and declining exports. This in turn led to a deteriorating political 
situation, which was the result not only of the bad economic conditions, but also of 
the weak institutional forms33.
31 Since its independence in 1830, Greece tried to recover land from the Authoman Empire and at the 
same time to achieve a degree of economic development. After the end of the World War II, Greece 
had left with actually no industrial base and generally a devastated economy. Portugal had gained its 
independence from Spain in 1640 (a long time ago) and during the two World Wars kept a neutral 
stance, which did not result to the destruction of its industrial and economic base.
32 Until 1960s Ireland was characterised by a highly negative balance of payments, net emigration, 
domination of the agricultural sector, protectionism from foreign firms, declining industrial 
employment, especially during the 1950s (Sweeny, 1999: 35- 44).
33 Speaking in terms of the French Regulation approach, we could argue that at this time in Greece (and 
in Portugal) did not exist a dominant mode of regulation, i.e. in those two countries had not yet been 
formed strong institutional regimes and as a result it had not yet been established a specific mode of 
socialisation that would secured a consensus between the different social groups.
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At the same time, the 1960s was the decade where dictatorships emerged in 
the two countries. During the dictatorships in the two countries significant industrial 
expansion took place. The main reason for this was the new political conditions 
created with the emergence of the dictatorships. The leaders of the new regimes were 
keen to accept foreign investors in their countries, especially American ones, as this 
legitimised their regimes. But, this was not accompanied by a similar upgrade in the 
quality of life for the people of the two countries (and thus in their ability to consume 
more). For example, in Greece, prosperity that was previously resulted in a measure 
of tolerance for the dictatorship was questioned and the sudden fall in living standards 
stimulated civic unrest (Alogoskoufis, G., Giavazzi, F. and Laroque, G., 1995: 155). 
When the first democratic governments emerged with the collapse of dictatorships, 
the labour force in Portugal and Greece was really keen to accept the establishment of 
foreign capital in their land, often under dead-weight rules34. The result was the 
creation of an industrial economy, which had Fordist tendencies, even if it was not yet 
Fordist as such. In short, they brought into line with a European version of the 
American model (Lipietz, 1987: 116).
On the other hand, in Ireland, which was suffering from massive 
unemployment and massive emigration there was a national consensus for changing 
the model of development. Already, the coalition government of 1954-57 began to 
talk to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Despite the internal political 
situation, that for many decades the ideology of independence and self- sufficiency 
was the dominant one, Ireland had received nearly 150 million pounds in aid under 
Marshall Plan by 1950 (Sweeny, 1999:38). But, in comparison to Greece and 
Portugal, in Ireland there was no need for the establishment of a dictatorship for three 
main reasons: the first reason was the low social and economic conditions of the 
population as well as its poor industrial base leaving practically the Irish society with 
no other choice but to accept any new way of development process. Second, it was the 
close social and cultural connections with United Kingdom, a country that had no 
history of establishment of a dictatorship as a solution to social and economic 
problems. Third, Ireland did not have a socialist/ labour party. Neither of the two
34 For Portugal another reason for accepting foreign capital was the need for financing colonial wars.
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main parties was anti- capitalist35. Thus, in 1958, the Irish government initiated the 
establishment of a formal economic planning together with an official declaration of 
the abandonment of protection and import substitution policies in favour of export-led 
growth36. This date is considered as a turning point for the future development of 
Ireland . About one decade later this policy was principally geared towards trying to 
attract foreign multinationals into the country, by not only offering generous grants, 
but also export tax relief (Murphy, 2000: 8; Barrios, Gorg, Strobl, 2002: 6).
Thus, according to the World Bank classification in that era (end of 1960s) 
Greece and Portugal were considered as Newly Industrialised Countries, with higher 
growth rates, particularly in industry, than the “old industrial countries”. But, this was 
not the case for Ireland, which in 1960s was still far from being considered as a 
Newly Industrialised Country (although economic growth reached its highest levels 
ever). In particular, in the early 1960s Ireland was still a poor economy with limited 
industrialisation and low rates of economic growth. At the end of 1960s Portugal was 
already a ‘manufacturing’ country, whereas Greece still depended upon agriculture 
and less upon manufacturing than the average “middle income country”. In the case of 
Ireland, Perrons argues that the development of neo-Fordist techniques, i.e. the 
introduction of the more automated labour processes, based on electronic information 
systems with automatic feedback mechanisms, and in combination with the entrance 
of the country in the European Union38 (1973), improved the position of this country 
as a potential FDI location. Thus, since the early 1970s, Ireland started to attract an 
increasing number of branch plants of multinational enterprises. The production of 
these branch plants was (and still is) mainly export-oriented (Perrons, 1981:98, 1986: 
251; Gorg and Ruane, 2000: 216; UNCTAD, 2002: 172).
35 Their origins relate to the differences with respect to partition in 1922.
36 This policy put more emphasis to a nationally oriented approach, rather than focusing at the level of 
the region, which was the main policy so far. It provided grants for investment not only to designated 
areas, but also to non- designated ones (Barios, Gorg, Strobl, 2002: 6).
37 Ireland always had a form of democracy. The ‘unfinished’ nationalist campaign meant that the main 
political parties in Ireland were about to continue to be structured around the response to the partition 
of the country in 1922.
38 According to Diane Perrons, these two developments were simultaneous. In particular, the 
developments in the labour process in multinational corporations and more precisely the fragmentation 
of production with the ability to maintain control centrally was important in allowing firms to 
decentralise parts of their operations to countries without much of an industrial history.
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Summarising the developments in the world production processes and its 
effects in peripheral countries and more precisely in Greece, Ireland and Portugal, I 
argue that in the 1960s the three countries had different forms of integration within 
the international economy. The above arguments show that, in relative terms, Greece 
is closest to the “old international division of labour” as it was producing and 
exporting primary goods, whereas Portugal was characterised by a form of “primitive 
Taylorisation”, as it was exporting cheap industrial goods and has a weak domestic 
market. Moreover, Portugal since the beginning of 1960s witnessed a growing 
integration into the quickly expanding international economy. On the other hand, 
Ireland was closer to the New International Division of Labour39. This meant that 
some peripheral countries were no longer limited to producing just raw materials and 
food supplies for markets in the industrialised world or even manufactured goods for 
the domestic market, but have been further drawn into the framework of the world 
economy, not through interstate relations of colonialism, but in accordance with the 
exigencies of the framework of international co-operation. Within this New 
International Division of Labour, only specific manufacturing activities are 
decentralised. However, this is not a static situation and certain capital goods 
industries, e.g. iron and steel production, were expanding in these areas, although 
machine tool industries were still almost exclusively confined to the more mature 
industrialised economies. In particular, since the early 1970s American, European and 
Japanese firms located in Ireland large plants that were using "Taylorist and Fordist 
labour processes giving rise to the super-imposition of a more modem industrial 
system (Perrons, 1981: 87- 95,1986: 254).
1.2.2 Post- Fordism (1970s- 1980s)
With the collapse of Fordism a new stage of capitalism began to 
emerge in 1970s40. A unique definition of what post-Fordism is cannot be given, as it 
has been subject of discussion among many scholars. There have been different 
interpretations of what post-Fordism is, which respectively propose different 
scenarios of the future development of the global system. Thus, instead of referring to 
different scenarios of how the world transformed with the collapse of Fordism, a
39 According to Dickens, Stephen Hymer was probably the first to use the term “New International 
Division of Labour” in order "to explain the shift of production from the industrialised economies of 
the ’core' to the economies of the 'global periphery" (Dickens, 1992: 124).
40 However, the starting period of the post-Fordist era is subject to considerable debate.
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reference to some evident points of this change will be analysed. Thus, the post- 
Fordism world took the following form since the beginning of 1970s.
Thus, according to Aglietta (1979: 122, 127- 128), neo- Fordism is a new 
mode of production aimed to meet the crisis in such a way as to safeguard the 
reproduction of the wage relation. At the centre of this regime of accumulation is 
automatic production control or automation. Capitalism benefits from this because 
flexibility in the location of production units allows it to break up large working- class 
concentrations and create an environment that minimises convergence of struggles at 
the point of production. New systems of production, including contracting- out the 
manufacture of specialised commodities and services, and the ability to source 
supplies and services wherever they can most efficiently be provided, develop this 
flexibility (Bonacich and Appelbaum, 2000: 5). At these new conditions, workers are 
no longer subjected to a constraint of personal obedience, but rather to the collective 
constraint of the production process. Within this spectrum, trade unions that had 
become very powerful, due to the Fordist production processes, started to be 
considered as rigid and unworkable in the new flexible and more decentralised 
production system. On the other hand, Sayer and Walker (1992: 8) as well as 
Harvey41 (2000: 86- 87) argue that this transition to a new era does not indicate 
fundamental departure from known workings of industrial capitalism (i.e. Fordism 
industrial paradigm). Rather, they pivot on the shifting division of labour and new 
methods of industrial organisation. Fordism still persists over wide areas of industrial 
sectors despite the fact that it has not remained static.
As far as the new geopolitical conditions created with the crisis of the Fordist 
mass production regime, Lipietz (1997:15) argues that the post-Fordist world is 
organised into three continental blocs. The three blocks are Asia and the Pacific 
around Japan, the Americas around USA and in Europe around Germany. Within 
these blocs there are countries, which are very unequally developed (core vs. 
periphery). In particular, peripheral economies generally had in common a number of 
weaknesses, including infrastructure deficiencies, isolation from the core and marked 
regional disparities. Furthermore, their economic tradition can restrain development,
41 This is a point of Harvey’s disagreement to the Regulation approach (Harvey, 2001: 86- 87).
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such as the large-scale export of labour and the centralised and bureaucratised 
political structures. A characteristic of these blocks is their internal mobility, i.e. the 
power relations between countries can change at any time.
From the very beginning of the creation of this new spectrum, the large firms 
of the western world, as essential elements of the capitalist system, had to change 
their organisational structure in order to survive. The reason is that ‘capitalist 
enterprises’ have to act according to the fundamental norms of capitalism. The most 
fundamental of these norms is the profit motive, which is the essential element of 
capitalist activity. Other motives may be the increase of their market share, or simply 
making the firm bigger. Thus, these changes of capitalist system initiated a 
fundamental change for the organisation of large firms as well. The cause of this 
change was the engagement of firms in overseas production. But, this does not mean 
that all firms followed this pattern and changed their organizational structure to the 
one that will be described in the next paragraph.
More precisely, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the vast majority of the 
advanced capitalist countries responded to the first disturbances of the post- war boom 
by trying to reinforce the existing system of macro- economic control and mass 
production. Firms kept following the logic of mass production and tried to cut costs 
by increasing economies of scale: products intended for domestic sale were 
standardised for sale in world markets42. Production was re-organised to allow 
decentralisation of labour- intensive processes to low- wage areas (Sabel, 1996: 104).
In particular, there were two main corporate responses in the crisis of Fordism. 
One was conglomeration; i.e. large firms tried to avoid risks in their home market by 
diversifying their production or by taking over firms in different sectors. The second 
way was multinationalisation. The aim of multinationalisation is to attain economies 
of scale no longer obtainable through the extension of the domestic market. This aim 
is attained by producing a good that can be sold in many national markets at the same 
time (Piore and Sabel, 1984: 195-198). Multinationalisation was the typical response 
of American automobile corporations. An essential requirement of this strategy was
42 One such example was the “world car” introduced by Ford and General Motors.
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the extension of the operations of the firm into at least some parts of the developing 
world. At the same time they had to defend their market position in metropolitan 
countries.
Thus, conditions where firms operated within two decades changed 
substantially. Changes became more dramatic in the 1980s, particularly with the rapid 
improvement of the technologies and the increase in the welfare of the peripheral 
countries (in Europe, Asia and Latin America). As a result a large number of firms 
have initiated new management techniques in order to respond to these changes. The 
management started to be supported by computerised information systems and the 
tasks, which were performed by each person, were very clear. Additionally, there has 
been direct marketisation. The secondary departments of a business, such as catering, 
security, cleaning, etc, have been separated. Another element of the change in 
management techniques is that most of the departments are treated as separate 
businesses, often called business units.
Finally, initiatives like Total Quality Management (TQM) and Just in Time43 
(JIT) push more organisation members to confront customer requirements without 
these requirements being worked by a centralized order- receiving sector. The 
initiation of these techniques has also had a knock-on-effect on local companies 
supplying these multinational enterprises, which in turn have been encouraged to 
adopt JIT and TQM and other procedures, incorporating built-in quality and product 
design flexibility. The combination of all these marketisation methods indicates a 
swing from what might be called bureaucratic responsible autonomy towards market 
oriented responsible autonomy (Friedman, 2000: 71).
Conclusively, during the 1970s and 1980s the necessity by the large firms of 
the western world to maintain their market power inside peripheral (and not only 
there) countries and to respond immediately to the needs of consumers as well as to 
decreased production costs, changed the way they followed the locational decision­
making process. It can be argued that the crisis of Fordism in Europe created new
43 The “just-in-time” technique emerged in the post- war period and has been particularly applied by 
the Japanese manufacturing firms (particularly TOYOTA). It raises the total cost of transporting 
components because it requires flexible & punctual deliveries, but it encourages specialisation in terms 
of long- term relationships (Sayer and Walker, 1992: 170; Head, Ries and Swenson, 1995: 227).
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opportunities for a re- regionalisation of the economy and new developmental 
possibilities for peripheral countries (and regions). Indeed, a large number of firms 
were “forced”, most of which were dealing with modem manufacturing activities, to 
expand themselves into the European periphery and other Newly Industrialized 
Countries. These countries would offer the needed expanding margin of demand in 
order to achieve further economies of scale. But, one important precondition for this 
was the maintenance of the demand level for consumer goods in the advanced 
capitalist countries in high levels. This was the case especially with the American car 
corporations.
The choice of the large Western firm to expand their activities into the less 
developed countries had as a result, since the early 1970s, the serious exposure of 
European peripheral countries to multinational capital44. But, in order to remain 
competitive, especially as a low wage location for investment, in relation to the 
developed countries, they should maintain their relatively low cost living conditions 
(Arestis and Paliginis, 1995: 274). More precisely, as far as Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal are concerned, during this long and painful time period, they struggled to 
restore competitiveness, either by labour cost reductions or by innovations and 
quality45 (Boyer, 2000: 116).
Thus, beginning with Ireland, in the early 1970s there was an important 
change in regional industrial policy, with the adoption of the “Regional Industrial 
Plans for 1973- 1977”. This change coincided with the Irish membership in the 
European Union, which gave Irish products easier access to the European markets. It 
also increased the attractiveness of Ireland as a location for manufacturing investment, 
mainly for the firms outside the EU, characterised by cheap labour wages and 
proximity to the European markets (Gorg and Ruane, 2000: 406). The aim of these 
industrial plans was to ensure the maximum geographical dispersion of new industrial 
development, by the Irish governing body for industrial policy, the Industrial 
Development Authority (IDA). The same approach continued in the “Regional
44 More precisely, Arestis and Paliginis (1995: 274) argue that MNEs were considered as the substitute 
for the domestic capital and were likely to have a significant impact on the level of employment, output 
and the balance of payments.
45 This struggle for improving competitiveness was not only a phenomenon characterised the three 
mentioned countries, but the majority of the countries, developed and less developed ones.
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Industrial Plans for 1978- 1982”. Since 1982, there was a distinct change in Irish 
industrial policy. Their focus changed to trying to attract hi- tech foreign- owned 
industry into Ireland, while regional dispersion of these foreign firms became of 
secondary importance. This industrial policy has remained, with small changes, until 
today (Barrios, Gorg, Strobl, 2002: 6-7). Thus, these two decades were particularly 
important for Ireland as it was transformed to a really open economy in terms of 
international trade and started to attract the first multinational enterprises. But, as 
Sweeny (1999: 45) argues, the growth of the Irish economy since 1977 was based on 
massive public spending financed by borrowing. According to the same author, this 
was one of the greatest mistakes of Ireland in the whole 20th century as it took a long 
time to get public finances back on track.
The 1970s and 1980s were particularly important for Portugal too, as far as the 
changes in its policy towards foreign investors are concerned. After the 1974 
revolution, a significant number of companies, i.e. banks, public utilities, 
petrochemical, ship- building, etc., were nationalised46. The emerged regime opposed 
Western type development and introduced East- European type nationalisation and 
central planning. The April 1976 revolution, of Marxian inspiration, explicitly 
provided protection for a rapidly extended public sector. Thus, at the beginning of the 
1980s Portugal still remained a typical peripheral country of that era, i.e. having a 
high agricultural sector and an enormous state sector where price controls and state 
interference restricted considerably the functioning of the market forces. But, since 
the middle 1980s a change in policy took place, This coincided with the accession of 
Portugal to the then EEC. In 1986 the liberalizing investment code was initiated that 
relaxed the entry requirements and established the right to foreigners to locate their 
businesses on equal terms with natives in every sector open to private initiative 
(Corkill, 1999: 78). The aim of this policy was to win the trust of foreign investors in 
order to accelerate economic development. This started to take place by the 
establishment of FDI into the country and the privatization process. At the same time 
macroeconomic indicators were improving (Nagy, 1999: 194- 198, Pagoulatos and 
Wright, 1999: 626).
46 It was not the most profitable enterprises that were taken over by the “people” during the 
nationalisation process, but the bankrupted, or almost bankrupted, big non- competitive companies 
(Nagy, 1999: 197).
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Somewhat similar to Portugal was the case of Greece, during 1970s and 
1980s. Especially, certain, domestic and international, events of the 1970s and 1980s 
marked the development process of Greece. First of all, in 1974 the Greek 
dictatorship collapsed. But this collapse coincided with the occupation and loss by 
Greece of the northern part of Cyprus by Turkey. This led to an anti- American, and 
generally anti- Western, sentiment to spread all over the country. Additionally, the 
first world- oil crisis affected the Greek economy and society deeply and caused an 
extended post- 1974 period of crisis and restructuring (Kourliouros, 2003: 787). Thus, 
after the collapse of dictatorship, a nationalisation process took place. As a 
consequence, since the mid- 1970s, the entire Greek industrial sector had suffered 
serious decline. In that time most industries in Greece were small in size and unable to 
compete with international capital. The second world oil- shock (1978- 1979) 
accelerated the tendency of change. The situation became even worse after 1979, 
continuing this trend in the first half of the 1980s. However, it was not until 1981, 
when the Socialist party “PASOK” came into power that the public sector really 
matured. Contrary to the other Western countries, in Greece there was not a restrained 
union leadership willing to enter into negotiations with the State. Moreover, when the 
socialists came into power, one of their aims was to further expand their influence 
within the labour movement, and did this by continuing to support radical policies. As 
a result, there was an expansion of the public sector mainly by nationalising a host of 
unwanted bankrupted firms47. Thus, in the middle of 1980s, the Greek economy was 
characterised by high taxation, high inflation, a ballooning public deficit and a large 
public sector. Contrary to the rest of the Western World, restructuring and adjustment 
policies did not start to be applied during this decade (Pagoulatos and Wright, 1999: 
615- 624; Caloghirou, Voulgaris and Zambarloukos, 2000: 76- 77; Kourliouros, 2003: 
787).
The 1970s have been particularly important for Greece and Portugal. Apart 
from the collapse of dictatorships in the two countries, the 1970s have been marked as 
the time period where negotiations among the then EEC and Greece (firstly) and
47 In that time, 48 firms and their subsidiaries, with a total of 30.900 employees, were nationalised and 
placed under the control of the Organisation for the Readjustment of Firms (OAE). These provided 4,5 
per cent of total employment in manufacturing, but for certain sectors the percentage reached 30- 40 
per cent (Caloghirou, Voulgaris and Zambarloukos, 2000:77).
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Portugal (a few years later) took place allowing the two countries to become members 
of the European Community. By this decision Greece and Portugal stressed their 
willingness and support to become partners with countries that support democracy 
and free trade. On the other hand, according to Williams, the EEC was particularly 
keen to negotiate and accept as members these countries of Southern Europe mainly 
because Greece, Portugal (and Spain) offered important new markets for industrial 
goods of the existing Member States (Williams, 1996: 74).
Nevertheless, for the two countries of Southern Europe, notably Greece and 
Portugal, the post- war evolutions were characterised by three distinct features that 
remain so today. The first concerns the course of employment change. Contrary to 
Western Europe where there was a “horizontal” transition from the agricultural sector 
to the industrial and then to the service sector, in Greece and Portugal this transition 
was from agriculture straight to the service sector. Although there was a time- period, 
mainly during the 1950s and 1960s where employment in industry was increasing, 
Fordist assembly- line production and Taylorist work practices, never became 
dominant as in the Western European countries (King and Donati, 1999: 138; 
Kourliouros, 2003: 786). The second distinct feature is the markedly uneven 
development of Southern Europe between the 1960s and 1980s. In the countries of 
our interest, i.e. Portugal and Greece, a polarization of population and development 
around Lisbon and Athens, with subsidiary poles in Porto and Thessaloniki took 
place. Finally, despite the significance of a variety of policies and processes, such as 
foreign investment and EC regional aid, in the development of Portugal and Greece, 
most important has been the endogenous expansion of the informal sector. To these 
informal work practices was based the post- Fordist flexible accumulation regimes. 
(King and Donati, 1999: 138- 139; Kourliouros, 2003: 786).
Consequently, in a time period where large Western firms were looking for 
new countries, characterised mainly by cheap labour force, only Ireland had taken a 
clear decision for changing its policy towards a more open economy that would allow
Aftforeign investors to come into the country . Already, since the early 1970s, the new
48 The determination of Ireland towards the creation of a pro- investment environment is also evident 
by the investment of the Irish government in a state- of- the- art telephone system in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s (Sweeny, 1999: 90).
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foreign firms were contributing much to the economy of this country (Sweeny, 1999: 
43). Whereas in most countries FDI was related with oligopolistic competition, this 
was not the case with Ireland. On the contrary the foreign enterprises investing in 
Ireland were almost exclusively export- oriented (Mjoset, 1992:275). On the contrary 
in Portugal and particularly Greece foreign investors were confronted with suspicion 
and even negatively. Portugal started changing this stance from the mid- 1980s by 
rapidly opening its economy to foreign investors, and improving at the same time as 
its macroeconomic indicators. This change of the Portuguese stance coincided with its 
entrance as a full member of the then EEC. On the contrary, Greece, despite its early 
entrance to the EEC, the anti- Western sentiment remained strong (not only at the 
level of the population, but in particular at the level of the political leadership), which 
in combination with the geographical isolation and other economic problems resulted 
in keeping the inflows of the foreign capital low and what took place was mainly of 
an import- substituting nature (Arestis and Paliginis, 1995: 275). It was not until the 
end of 1980s, with the defeat of “PASOK”, that Greece tried to introduce measures 
for improving macroeconomic indicators and adopting policies towards a more open 
economy.
1.2.3 1989 -  Today: New Economy Era
The 1970s and 1980s had been a very hard period where States re-organised 
their regulatory framework and the large Western firms searched and found new 
locations in order to maintain high their levels of production. But, during the 1990s 
with the rise of new technologies (computers, telecommunications, electronic mass 
media, etc.) and the globalisation of business activities a new era, very often called 
information era or new economy, has emerged (Pohjola, 2002: 113) bringing further 
changes in economic and social preferences. Some authors (Harvey, 1995; Hudson, 
1997; Sternberg, 1999; Martin, 1999) consider the new economy as a sequence to the 
Fordist era. They argue that the roots of the information economy are found in the 
inherent deficiencies of the Fordist production regime, i.e. the expansion of State 
involvement in the economy and society of much of the western world. Industrial 
innovations, the bureaucratic and corporate organisation of society, as well as new 
demands for education and social services increased the need for rapid access to 
information, but also to alternatives to mass production processes (Sternberg, 1999: 5, 
Hudson, 1997: 467; 1999: 29). But, according to Boyer (2000: 113), the emergence
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and diffusion of information and communication technologies (ICT) meant the 
functioning of a totally new productive paradigm. This new productive paradigm was 
marked by the prompt perfection in the quality, combined with a respective decline in 
prices of ICT equipment and software, the convergence in communication and 
computing technologies, as well as the growth in network computing (Pohjola, 2002:
134). In that time there was an enthusiasm to the world media that was transferred to 
the public, because of the new opportunities that started to emerge with the internet 
and telecommunications in general. All this process became even more evident, and 
created huge expectations to investors and policy- makers in the late 1990s when 
stock markets boomed, powered by ICT and “dotcom” firms. At the same time, 
productivity and economy figures increased, with higher rates than the past 10 years, 
in the United States, followed by the European Union countries49 and the rest 
“developed” world.
Although this is partially right501 argue that the New Economy era would not 
be possible without post- Fordism. Some authors (Hudson, 1997; Sternberg, 1999; 
Martin, 1999) tend to describe a transition from Fordism to the New Economy era, 
without taking into consideration the time that States, organisations and companies 
needed in order to re- organise themselves and find a new regulatory framework. 
They do not refer to what period follows the crisis of Fordism, which led to the 
opening of national states, as well as to the search by companies for new locations. 
According to their argument these changes should have taken place during the Fordist 
period. But is this the case? I argue that this period of re- organisation of firms and 
nations is the so- called post- Fordist one (as does the Regulation approach). With the 
emergence of the New Economy era, a new institutional framework also created in 
which economic actions take place (Harms and Knapp, 2003:431). The relationship of 
powers between the State, capital labour and the consumers/ citizens changed in this 
new era, as it is going to be shown in the next lines.
49 Nevertheless, growth rates in the European Union remained lower compared to the Fordist era.
50 The above arguments are right as far as what New Economy is.
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But, contrary to the French Regulation School, which supports the idea that 
post- Fordism remains until today51, I argue that Post- Fordism has been the 
transitional stage for national and supranational states, as well as for companies in 
order to re- organise themselves. Besides, the post- Fordist era is far from being 
characterised as a prosperous period for the countries. I argue that the New Economy 
era started when national and international markets were stabilised, and as a 
consequence a new prosperity period began in which the needs of consumers and 
companies started to grow up (similar to the product life- cycle theorem ). Then new 
technologies started to become available to the masses (e.g. a significant drop in 
telecommunication prices, popularisation of the internet) creating new expectations 
for the companies that produced and served the world population. Companies in order 
to respond to the new demands as well as to remain competitive (e.g. they had to 
invest more and more funds to R&D) started to grow in size, either by continuing to 
invest in different locations all over the world, or by merging with other firms in the 
same or “relative” to theirs sectors.
In support of the just- mentioned arguments are the following words of Boyer 
(2000: 166):
“A recovery o f  growth has been frequently assumed to 
depend on the emergence o f a totally new growth regime: its 
characteristics would include cost and price moderation, 
increasing exports, spill- over to investment and consumption, 
recovery o f demand and accumulation o f  growth through 
interaction o f  competitiveness and domestic demand” .
Furthermore, Taylor, Watts and Johnston (2002: 6) describe the new global 
scale of activities as the collective reaction of capital to the economic stagnation of 
the world that began in the 1970s. This era, according to the periodisation developed 
in this thesis, is the so- called post- Fordist one.
51 For example, Hudson, R. (1997: 468) argues that globalisation is partly due to the problematic 
character of national mode of regulation. A few lines after, he comments globalisation as one more 
“post- Fordist” regulatory experiment.
52 According to Dicken (1999: 161- 162) the essence of the product life- cycle is that the increase in 
sales of a product follows a systemic pattern from initial innovation through a series of stages: early 
development, growth maturity and obsolescence. The product life- cycle theorem implies that all 
products have a limited life and that obsolescence is unavoidable.
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But what exactly are the most notable changes of the New Economy era in 
relation to the post- Fordist one, that justifies the argument of a new periodisation? 
The rise of ICT technologies has created a new situation where new business practices 
and economic policies are facilitated. As a result flows have become relatively 
dominant at the expense of places (Taylor, Watts and Johnston: 2002: 8; Harms and 
Knapp, 2003: 414). More precisely, the relative importance of the factors that interest 
major players of the global system, e.g. the multinational corporations that are the 
central focus of this thesis, have changed. Thus, the management and disposal of 
knowledge and innovation to different locations (via flows) have increased in 
importance in relation to the “old” characteristics of countries, such as low labour 
costs53. Moreover, for the time up to the 1970s new structures were being constructed- 
democracy, welfare states, decolonisation- to enable the world become a more equal 
place. Since the 1990s, to New Economy there is a turnaround in this tendency where 
capital has regained its lost powers. National states, are stuck in the old space of 
place, whereas capital can take full advantage of the new space of flows (Taylor, 
Watts and Johnston: 2002: 10).
Another notable change of the New Economy era is that national governments 
seem to lose pace in relation to other forms of governments at lower (e.g. region) or 
higher (e.g. international organisations) levels. More precisely, according to Sabel 
(1996: 103), there is a tendency of upgrading the region as an integrated unit of 
production. To this have contributed the successful examples of industrial districts in 
Italy (e.g. the case of the Third Italy), West Germany (e.g. the industrial districts in 
the Land of Baden- Wurttemberg), United States (e.g. with the cases of Silicon Valley 
and Los Angeles) and elsewhere in the world. If we take the examples of these 
successful regions into account we can see that local institutions become equally 
important with the central governments and institutions as far as the policies pursuing 
the attraction of FDI. At the same time, there is another tendency where central 
governments continue to give away some of their powers towards international 
organisations, such as European Union and NAFTA. By this way, particularly
53 This does not mean that such characteristics have lost their importance. On the contrary, currently it 
is easier for an ICT firm to know about and develop in low labour cost countries. But, only for certain 
operations e.g. call centres in India.
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developed nations have aggressively promoted globalisation and the opening of new 
markets to provide cheaper production inputs (Harms and Knapp, 2003: 414). 
Moreover, according to Castells (1996: 146) these international organisations have 
allowed some countries being progressively integrated into the global economy, 
usually through the dominant countries that are geographic regions. But, this does not 
mean that nation- states have become obsolete. There are other authors, such as 
Dicken (1993: 32, 40- 41), who argues that national states still remain key players in 
the contemporary global economy (Dicken, 1993: 32, 40- 41), and Porter who argues 
that the nation increases in significance because it is the source of the skills and 
technology that support competitive advantage. Moreover, the opening of borders, 
through globalisation, make nations even more important (Porter, 1990: 19, 30). In a 
similar way of thought, Harvey supports the argument that the nation- state is loosing 
power as a centre of authority in the age of globalisation is “a silly notion”. The 
reason is that currently the nation- state is more devoted than ever to creating a good 
business environment for investment especially against the labour movement, e.g. by 
cutting back the social wage. The only evident point where the national- state seems 
to have lost power is in its relations with capital. Its ability to regulate the mechanisms 
of allocation of international capital has overrun the national level (Harvey, 1995: 10; 
Harvey, 2000: 87).
Within this framework described above I argue that the role of the State 
remains delicate, towards both directions. It sounds more reasonable that capital can 
have an advantage against the State when the latter gives some of its powers towards 
sub- national or international forms of governments. Moreover, citizens very often 
prefer to be governed by a form of government in which may have easier access and 
can negotiate with more decisiveness, i.e. at a local or regional level rather than at the 
national level. At the same time, the citizens of a country may consider that decisions 
taken at international level may protect their main human and living rights better than 
when decisions are taken only at a national level. This might be more evident with 
countries with a past of human rights violation, such as Greece, Portugal and Spain. In 
this respect, the State has to balance the centrifugal tendencies of giving some of its 
powers against both directions. So far, it seems that the State tries to balance these 
centrifugal tendencies by giving some of its powers towards the lower and higher
53
level of governments, and by maintaining some powers that it considers essential for 
its survival (e.g. defence and regulation of the domestic investment environment).
In this respect the role of central government in attracting FDI still remains 
important, particularly when it still has the capacity to shape the institutional 
framework and domestic investment environment. Particularly, in the case of each 
individual country, e.g. in the case of Greece, to what degree there has been a handing 
over of powers to a lower level of government (e.g. regional or local level) is clearly a 
matter of domestic politics. And in the case of Greece these regulations that frame the 
investment environment of the country, e.g. laws, red- tape procedures, incentives, are 
still decided by the central government.
In any case, these processes of restructuring have had diverse regional 
development implications, reinforcing the position of some of Europe’s strong 
countries and regions, offering new growth opportunities in others and triggering 
decline elsewhere. This reshaping of the map of regional growth and decline has been 
associated with wider changes in the character of contemporary capitalism. As 
mentioned before, the crisis of Fordism “forced” companies to search for new 
locations where the organisational forms of Fordism would continue to be 
economically viable. At the same time, national States recognised that they could no 
longer maintain full employment via Keynsian policies. Hudson argues that this 
recognition of the limitations of State’s capacities to counter market forces led to a 
search for new neo- liberal macro- scale regulatory models. In Europe, for example, 
national States embraced the European Union as a supranational state, which 
simultaneously encourages globalisation and at the same time is a place of resistance 
to it54. In this way the EU can, in specific circumstances, influence corporate (dis) 
investment strategies and geographies of production. In other words, what Hudson 
argues is that globalisation is the result of a series of policy decisions by supranational 
and national states. Globalisation is based on their participation in changing the 
international regulatory framework via institutions, such as the IMF, the World Bank, 
GATT, etc. (Hudson, 1997: 467- 469; 2002: 264- 265). More precisely, as it will be
54 On the one hand EU adopts policies to promote globally competitive companies (via support for 
R&D, a permissive attitude to intra- EU M&As, etc.) and on the other hand seeks to promote social and 
spatial cohesion and equity within EU. These two policies have influenced corporate restructuring and 
patterns of territorial uneven development (Hudson, 1997: 468).
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argued below, globalisation is the process that allowed the New Economy to develop. 
Within this spectrum, the specific characteristics of places, as well as the territorially 
embedded institutions are of particular importance in determining competitiveness 
among states and regional development strategies.
On the other hand, the opposite pole of capital, labour has a different 
adaptation to this new era. One effect of the New Economy, via the decentralisation of 
manufacturing production world- wide, is a change of the world manufacturing 
activity relationship. According to Harvey (1995: 10) this evolution has more than 
doubled the labour force in less than twenty years. But, this labour force that has been 
created is “geographically dispersed, culturally heterogenous and therefore much 
harder to organise into a united movement” (Harvey, 1995: 10). But, an essential 
question is whether a new form of international division of labour is to be created. 
Castells (1996:147) has a clear- cut argument on that. He argues that there has 
emerged a new international division of capital, which is characteristic of the global 
economy. He calls it “Newest International Division of Labour”. For Casstells, this 
“Newest International Division of Labour” is constructed around four different 
positions in the international/ global economy: “the producers of high value, based on 
informational labour; the producers of high volume, based on lower- cost labour; the 
producers of raw materials, based on natural endowments; and the redundant 
producers, reduced on devalued labour. All countries are penetrated by the four 
positions, along a global structure of network and flows” (Castells, 1996: 147). In a 
more simple, two- position, analysis I would argue that the trend so far is towards a 
division of the world between a few countries mainly preoccupied with the economic 
management and control of the world capitalist system, and the production of 
knowledge and technology, and the rest of the world involved mainly in the raw- 
material s, agricultural and industrial mass production. On the other hand, another 
question raised is the kind of new relationship of power that is formed between labour 
and capital. According to Harms and Knapp (2003: 432) the new conditions have 
strengthened the position of capital, thus weakening that of labour. But, according to 
Sabel (1996: 103) trade unions, especially at the regional level, are co- operating in 
the management of the industry. By this way they come to defend worker’s interests 
through agreements in which the work-force accepts constant re- organisation of the 
work place in return for the right to take part and review the results of the strategic
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decisions that affect their destiny. But, this might not be always the case. There are 
regions that might not have organised labour, especially the less developed ones.
But, whether this trend will mature into a clear- cut division 
understandably depends on a number of economic, social and political factors and 
processes. A vital point is whether the labour masses in the peripheral countries 
succeed in organising themselves politically and claim better terms of remuneration 
and conditions of labour. But there are difficulties in this direction. The two major 
difficulties are the totalitarian regimes that still exist in many peripheral countries, and 
the widespread unemployment. On the other hand if workers in peripheral countries 
organise themselves and achieve better salaries this will diminish the “comparative 
advantage of the peripheral countries” (Antonopoulou, 2000: 42).
These changes as a consequence of the expansion of the new technologies has 
resulted in some authors to argue that a new working class indeed emerges. 
Antonopoulou (2000: 46) argues that in the traditionally developed countries a 
different working class emerges. This new working class emerges as a result of the 
new conditions created due to the expansion of ICT technologies. In particular, the 
primacy of services in western economies combined with the spread of new 
technologies, have led to a “new service class” and the “knowledge worker” or the 
“information worker” (Antonopoulou, 2000: 46). Moreover, persistent long- term 
unemployment, especially in Europe, combined with the dismantling of the welfare 
state since the early 1980s, have given rise to the marginalisaton of considerable parts 
of the population, the so- called “underclass”, the “new- poor”. Automation and the 
gradual shifting of manufacturing activity from the centre to the rest of the world 
(outsourcing), has also hit manual workers in the West severely. Additionally, the 
easing of social controls upon the labour market has led to the growth of a further new 
kind of worker, the disadvantaged labourers in part- time and temporary work, 
working under particularly insecure employment environment. Whereas there is a 
widespread belief for the benefits of ICT revolution, at the same time, the wages of 
labour are stagnated or slowly rise, workers work more hours, and more importantly, 
union participation rapidly declines (Antonopoulou, 2000: 51; Harms and Knapp, 
2003: 432). But, there is a debate of whether ICT expansion was a key (or the only) 
factor for appearance of this new “under- class”. As Pohjola (2002: 140) argues,
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income inequalities seem to have risen in the United States much before ICT 
investment had any visible impacts on the performance of the economy.
There are many different interpretations of the New Economy. Stiroh 
considers globalisation and computerisation as influential tools that reshape the world 
economy in a novel way. Although, globalisation and computerisation are found at the 
heart of New Economy theory, there is no consensus about what the New Economy 
really means or how it should be defined (Stiroh, 1999: 82). Nevertheless, the New 
Economy has three unique features: it is global, it favours intangible things55, i.e. 
ideas, information and relationships, and finally, it is extremely interlinked. These 
features result in the formation of a market and society that is rooted in omnipresent 
electronic networks. On the other hand, the IMF adopts a different definition of the 
New Economy. It argues that the main characteristics of this era are: firstly, a higher 
rate of productivity growth related to investment in IT; secondly, a rise in total factor 
productivity growth due to IT utilisation across the economy and resulting spillover 
effects (networking, increasing returns to scale); and thirdly, an increase in factor 
utilisation, e.g. a decline in the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (IMF, 
2000: 71).
As far as the research of this thesis is concerned and the reasons for analysing 
the New Economy, it is argued that there is a close relationship between the New 
Economy and FDI. This is because the rise and establishment of the New Economy 
resulted in a new, more intense competition, for FDI. There were several reasons for 
this. First, the large demand for products linked with the New Economy, something 
that reassured the success of such an investment and second, the attraction of such 
investment was considered essential for any ‘modem’ or “modernising” country. In 
particular, the ability of a country to create, supply and exploit knowledge and 
information seems even more significant and is often regarded as the single most 
important aspect underlying economic growth and expanding the quality of life. 
Third, and equally important, the New Economy created the conditions for a
55 In USA between 1990 and 1996 the number of people making tangible things decreased by 1 
percent, while the number of people employed in providing ‘services’ (intangibles) grew 15 percent 
(Kelly, 1998: 7).
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relocation of production not only within Europe, which is of particular concern in this 
thesis, but also to the other two major world macro- regions (America and Asia).
But, the emergence of the New Economy would be very hard without 
the globalisation process56. This process has been greatly boosted by the liberalisation 
of markets, the gradual removal of all sorts of “restrictions” upon the free movement 
of capital and commodities worldwide57 (Antonopoulou, 2000: 40). Globalisation is 
important because one aspect of it is the rate of growth of FDI, which has been 
exceptional58. For this reason globalisation is discussed in more detail. Thus, 
generally speaking globalisation is a word, or a phenomenon, which lacks a precise 
definition. Globalisation encompasses every aspect of life, social, economic and 
spiritual. Additionally, authors define globalisation according to their way of viewing 
the world. Thus, according to Martin (1999), globalisation is a process that has not 
started recently, but it is a process beginning since 1960s. Several factors have 
contributed to the globalisation process. On the one hand, the governments of most 
countries have given rise to a larger economic integration by opening their markets. 
This move followed after national governments decided to change the international 
regulatory framework by participating in institutions such as IMF, the World Bank 
and the GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs). For Europe, the Single 
Market of the European Union implies greater liberalisation for the Member States. In 
this respect inward investment into the EU became an increasingly important 
influence on the organizational and territorial mode of production (Martin, 1999: 69, 
Hudson, 1997: 468; 1999: 29).
On the other hand, Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton (1999) argue that 
globalisation contains features such as the stretching of social, political and economic 
activities across frontiers, i.e. an interconnection of activities across frontiers that is
56 Globalisation is a loosely defined term. Generally, it has the notion of a rapid growth of international 
transactions. Nevertheless, for the needs of this essay the term globalisation is defined as “the process 
by which markets and production in different countries are becoming increasingly interdependent due 
to the dynamics of trade in goods and services and flows of capital and technology” (Eurostat, 1997: 3).
57 In chapter 3 are referred in details the changing trends of countries towards the adoptation of policies 
that promote the openness of the markets.
58 According to OECD (1998) FDI flows have reached record levels growing faster than merchandise 
trade and representing the most important form of foreign capital inflows for many developing 
countries. Moreover, as I explained in the previous chapter, when the World FDI trends were 
presented, 1996 has been a mark point as FDI, for a first time, has overtaken world exports. And in 
1999, FDI surpassed the one- trillion dollar mark.
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characterised by regularity. Furthermore, these global interconnections speed up as 
the technology improves. Finally, there is a deepening of the world as the impact of 
distant events is magnified or the other way around local events can have a global 
effect. Thus, these four authors define globalisation as “a process (or set of processes) 
which embodies a transformation in the spatial organisation of social relations and 
transactions- assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact- 
generating transcontinental or interregional flows and network of activity, interactions 
and the exercise of power” (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton, 1999: 15-16). 
Moreover, Sweeney (1999: 128) adopts two definitions of globalisation. One, which 
says that globalisation, is “the process by which the markets and production in 
different countries are becoming increasingly interdependent due to the dynamics of 
trade in goods and services and flows of capital”. The other one says that 
globalisation is “the result of the removal of rules, regulations, quotas and barriers to 
trade, which has resulted in the freeing up of movement of goods, services and, 
particularly, capital between countries. It has happened because governments have 
decided to open up, or have been forced to do so by mobile capital”. Finally, Sugden 
and Wilson (2001: 5) suggest that globalisation is a multidisciplinary process in which 
new geography and new technologies imply changes in activity and behavior. 
Already, we witness some new stances of the multinational corporations in order to 
compete to the new globalised environment. We see the production and/ or R&D 
facilities moved offshore through direct investment. This time, multinational 
corporations try to invest far further the periphery of the developed world59, in the 
continent of Asia. As a result, new places, not necessary in the developed world 
(China, India, Pakistan), emerge as suitable locations for the establishment of the 
production units of the large multinational corporations. Differently from the 1970s 
and 1980s, i.e. the post- Fordism period, this time together with some labour- 
intensive production processes, are also transferred knowledge- based functions, such 
as R&D, logistics, telephone centre services. Thus, we have the phenomenon where 
some less developed countries, e.g. China and India, to supply the developed world 
with products, e.g. cars, or computers, once being produced only to the developed
59 As a periphery of the developed world I characterise Latin America (i.e. periphery of USA) and 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (i.e. periphery of Europe).
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countries. Someone could argue that globalisation is a situation, which benefits 
multinational corporations60, in particular, resulting in increased FDI.
Within this status all small economies, like Ireland, Portugal, Greece and 
others have little choice in the era of globalisation but to encourage a policy that 
favours the attraction of FDI. In any other case, they face the risk to being placed in 
the margin of the world. Unemployment in recent years has become, probably, the 
number one problem for the majority of the countries all over the world. In this 
respect, FDI is a major vehicle to battle unemployment. The whole analysis gives 
evidence that the world, during the last fifteen years, is moving towards one single 
direction, which is the liberalisation of the national economies, especially the small 
ones. This seems to be true. According to OECD (1999:5), industry in small countries 
is much more globalised than that of larger countries. On the other hand, there are 
major disparities between these countries. These could be attributed to differences in 
industrial development.
Within this spectrum countries that have spent long periods pursuing 
interventionist and even nationalist economic strategies in order to restore their 
competitiveness have, to varying degrees, acknowledged the need to break out of the 
narrow domestic market and seek economies of scale in the larger international 
marketplace. This new neo- liberal macro- scale regulatory model further eroded 
national state’s limited powers. This model was also inserted in the Eastern European 
countries as a form of “shock- therapy”, which conditioned the way in which they 
were accepted into the wider global economy and redefined the map of locational 
possibilities for production within Europe (Hudson, 1997:468; 1999: 30; 2002: 265).
This new growth model is associated with the increased mobility of capital, 
goods, services, commodities, information, people and communications across 
national frontiers, combined with labour- market flexibility, price stability, and credit 
to sustain consumption in high levels. Within this spectrum, the capacity of each
60 According to OECD, firms which export and which invest abroad or are affiliates of foreign firms 
have higher and faster growing labour productivity, create more jobs, pay their employees higher 
salaries and generally expand more rapidly than comparable firms which export or invest abroad to a 
lesser extent. Also, because of their size and the fact that they are located in a number of countries, 
such firms have easier and lower-cost access to raw materials, technology and the most varied goods 
and services, all which enables them to achieve appreciable economies of scale (OECD, 1999:6).
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country to adopt and implement such a developmental model would be a determining 
aspect in macroeconomic performance and would place the country in a hierarchical 
world economy governed, as Boyer (2000: 116) argues, by the diffusion of a 
financialised growth regime.
For Ireland, Greece and Portugal, all small economies, and members of the 
European Union, globalisation is a very important phenomenon. This is because all 
three countries are potential hosts for direct investment from multinational 
corporations. Within this context of globalisation, national economies are more and 
more constituted out of three interacting, but empirically unique modes of integration 
into the world economy. The first one discussed earlier is that of attracting FDI and to 
a limited degree embedding it in the local economy. The global goes local. The 
second, and most surprising in the context of Irish economic history, and Greece to a 
lesser extent, is the appearance of a local network of native firms that have become 
increasingly integrated into international business and technology flows and have 
been highly successful in international markets. The local goes global. Third, a series 
of national neocorporatist social partnership agreements, in all three countries in 
question, since the mid-1980s have generated a stable macroeconomic and financial 
environment that has underpinned industrial transformation, while mediating the 
relationship of unionised workers and welfare recipients to the global economy (O' 
Rian, 2000:184).
During the 1990s, Greece, Ireland and Portugal in different ways managed to 
take advantage of the new conditions created by the expansion of globalisation. In 
particular, Ireland profited most from this situation, as it became a major software 
producer, as well as a major location for investment in pharmaceutical sector and 
especially in biotechnology61. Portugal also managed to attract important investment, 
e.g. in the automobile sector. On the contrary, Greece, despite its efforts to adjust the 
productive capacity to market competition (Caloghirou, Voulgaris and Zambarloukos, 
2000: 79), failed to attract significant amounts of FDI, but on the contrary its position 
deteriorated, as described in the introduction. The spread of globalisation coincided 
with a very important evolution within the European Union. This evolution took place
61 At least 8 out of 10 worlds’ largest Multinational Firms have located some of their activity in Ireland 
(Report of the Hellenic Embassy in Dublin- Office of Commercial and Economic Affairs, p. 13).
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from 1992 when the Single European Market became fully effective, removing many 
non- tariff barriers between EU Member States and abolishing all capital control 
within the European Union. In practice, among other things, this meant that the 
peripheral countries of the EU were even more open to international competition. 
Additionally, they were better able to use the comparative advantages they had, or had 
not, created all these years in order to attract FDI. For “outsiders” but also for 
“insiders”, Ireland, Greece and Portugal, would be considered just as a location for 
investment targeting the whole EU market and not just the local market of a specific 
country. Additionally, since the collapse of Communist regimes in 1989, much of the 
attention of the European Union was focused on Eastern European countries. This 
also resulted to a redefinition of relationships with Mediterranean countries 
(Hudson, 1999: 9).
Due to the changing of the world balance, the New Economy has both 
supporters and critics. The former, who are usually found on the right side of the 
political spectrum, view this new era as offering great possibilities for growth and 
creativity and argue that in this new development the governments should stay away. 
In their rhetoric the supporters of the New Economy tend to ignore the social 
problems this new period might create. On the other hand, the critics of this new era, 
who are usually found on the political left, claim that the New Economy represents a 
threat to economic justice and social cohesion. Technology and globalisation are 
blamed for downsizing, stagnant wages, growing inequality and environmental 
destruction (Atkinson, 2000: 54). As Harms and Knapp (2003: 435) argue, “the best 
way to view the New Economy is as an ideological construct supporting the interests 
of capital”.
Conclusively, globalisation, deregulation and computerisation are all 
components of the transition process towards a single world market characterised by a 
new global economic culture, i.e. free trade and perfect competition. The new 
evolutions caused by the New Economy affect the countries of the European 
periphery as well. It is highly debatable whether less powerful countries have the 
option to follow a different economic policy than the one, which is predominant and
62 Which among others include Greece and Portugal.
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promotes the openness of the national markets, the deregulation of the labour market, 
etc. If they do so, they face the risk to become marginal, not only in terms of 
economics but also in terms of politics. In this respect, countries like Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal, which participate almost in every Western alliance and are integral part 
of the western world probably have only one economic policy option: the one that 
favours the openness of their national market. How quickly each country adapts itself 
to the new conditions, and how it decides to soften the negative effects of 
globalisation, which definitely exist, is also a national political decision, which of 
course also requires a wider social acceptance.
In this section I have discussed the changes in economic restructuring in the 
twentieth century from the perspective of European peripheral countries, notably 
Ireland, Greece and Portugal. In particular, I tried to show how the changes in 
industrial organisation affected and still affect the economic development of these 
three peripheral countries, and as a result how the three countries are currently 
positioned in relation to their ability to attract FDI. For this purpose I have argued that 
economic restructuring since the end of the World War II can be divided in three 
broad periods: the Fordist one, including peripheral Fordism, the post-Fordist period 
and the New Economy period, including globalisation. The discussion so far shows 
that Portugal and Greece, mainly due to political reasons, were always late developers 
as far as adapting themselves to changes in the way capitalism is organised. On the 
contrary, Ireland since 1960s adapted a coherent policy towards attracting FDI, which 
remains until the present. This early adoption of a policy favouring the entrance of 
foreign investors had as a result Ireland being considered a “success story” on this 
field. Since the 1980s, the entrance of Greece and Portugal into the European Union, 
together with the effects of globalisation, has meant that they no longer are late 
adopters of the economic policies that predominate in the rest of the developed world. 
Greece and Portugal during the last few years have made a great effort to catch up 
with the economic and living standards of the large countries of European Union. But, 
despite this improvement in state economics, only Portugal tried to attract significant 
amount of FDI. On the contrary Greece only in the early 1990s started to focus its
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• • • 63policy towards the creation of a favour environment for foreign investors , but so far 
it has managed to attract only limited amounts of FDI.
By describing the evolution of Ireland, Portugal and Greece in the context of 
the world economy, I argue that national characteristics and experiences have been 
important in determining the pace by which a country adjusts itself to world changes. 
A similar conclusion has been drawn by Caloghirou, Voulgaris and Zambarloukos 
(2000: 88), but their analysis mainly concerned the domestic industrial restructuring 
policies of Greece and Spain, and little attention was given to the similar 
developments in the world context64. On the other hand, I disagree with the argument 
of Caloghirou, Voulgaris and Zambarloukos (2000: 89) that in the long- run 
international developments narrow the options of individual governments and lead 
towards the liberalisation and openness of their national markets. Even in the current 
world this is above all a political decision and it is closely connected with the 
international field that a government has decided to place itself. That is why different 
varieties of capitalism continue to exist with important implications for the degree of 
economic regulation and labour market institutions65. Thus, for Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal, which have decided to be members not only of the European Union, but also 
of NATO and other, mainly Western originated organisations, their choice towards 
the liberalisaton and opening of their market was (and still is?) mainly one- way. But, 
the important thing, I believe, for these countries, that have decided to be part of the 
Western World, is how fast and how effectively to proceed and adjust their economies 
to the world conditions.
So far our analysis is based on the principles of French Regulation School. 
Nevertheless, this is not the only approach, which is based on the periodisation of the 
world as a way to explain the capitalist evolution. A similar approach is that of the 
long wave theory as developed by C. Freeman and F. Louca (2001). The basic 
common place with the French Regulation School is the use of the concept of regime 
of accumulation in the wider sense of loose overall political and legal co-ordination
63 It is highly debatable whether these policies have been successful or not. Of course the figures show 
that they were not successful at all.
64 They are mainly concerned with the pressures exercised by the economic and political environment 
of the European Union, but this also in a very general context, as far as the restructuring of the Greek 
and Spanish industrial restructuring is concerned.
65 See for example the cases of Venezuela and Brazil.
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and control. But, its use places greater emphasis specifically on the regulation of new 
technologies within the regime (Freeman and F. Louca, 2001: 364). And this is their 
basic point of difference. Whereas the long-wave theorists argue that it is technology 
that leads and frames social change, the French Regulation School argues the other 
way around, i.e. that the growth of productive forces -  even the shape of that growth -  
is nothing but the expression of a definite set of social relations in every aspect of 
human life (Lipietz, 1987). In other words, production relations determine productive 
forces, and not the reverse.
My reference at this point to another approach, similar to the one that my 
thesis is based on (French Regulation School), has no intention of contestation. On the 
contrary, the intention is to show that there is a variety of approaches, which their 
analysis is based on the periodisation of the capitalist world. It is questionable 
whether the important point of these approaches is the exact periodisation dates (and 
how these periods are named), or the causes of each crisis. And if the important point 
is the causes of crisis, then is there a single cause, whether this cause is the formation 
of social relations within states or the advancement of technological changes? Surely, 
the point is how well these different understandings provide an insight of the present 
economic and social context within states and in terms of the relations between them. 
If I follow the “philosophy” of my thesis probably is a combination of both. More 
precisely, there might be a capitalist period where the crisis is caused by the 
controversy of social relations and the next (or previous) capitalist period emerges or 
collapses by the technology advancements.
Thus, at this point I want to make clear that the analysis of my thesis has no 
intention to follow the exact periodisation of the French Regulation School or any 
other approach. Besides, in my thesis I have already stated differences between the 
French Regulation School approach and my periodisation (Fordism, post- Fordism, 
New Economy). This effort tries to give “flexibility” and to avoid the “stiffness” of 
any approach that is used as the basis for the development of an analysis.
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1.3 Summary
A major task of this chapter was to document the processes of economic and 
political restructuring within the context of changing institutional arrangements in 
relation to Greece (in particular), Portugal and Ireland, in order to establish the 
context for the empirical research. Within this evolution the development of 
multinational corporations was also described, i.e. how (mainly) large Western Firms 
reacted to changes of economic and production processes that took place in major 
national economies of the world. Moreover, how and to what extent, Ireland, Portugal 
and Greece were affected by these changes and whether they took advantage or not of 
the new situation that was created. And of course how finally these three countries are 
currently placed in this new era.
Changes in the world economy and production processes allowed large firms, 
mainly from the major economies of the world, to expand their activities by the form 
of direct investment to other smaller in size countries (and economies). These changes 
had two major effects. First, some countries found opportunities to develop their 
economy and become more important players in world level (e.g. South Korea, 
Ireland etc.) and second, FDI became the major way of capital transfer.
Within this spectrum only Greece did not manage to improve its position in 
relation to Ireland (that benefited the most) and Portugal (that also performed well). 
Whereas Ireland, primarily, and Portugal, secondarily, started their economic reforms 
relatively early (1970s), on the contrary Greece only in the 1990s started to focus its 
economic efforts towards the creation of an investment environment that will favour 
the attraction of FDI. However, it is highly debatable whether these economic reforms 
had the desired result for Greece.
Thus, Ireland in the 1990s had already managed to become a major host 
economy for multinational enterprises (mainly originated from USA) and as a result 
so much improved its economic performance (mainly when referring to GDP 
increase) that became an example for other small countries66. Moreover, Portugal also
66 In this point we have to mention that the remarkable performance of Ireland in GDP increase is 
inconsistent with GNP increase. Since Ireland became a major host country for MNEs, the gap between
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managed to attract some major multinational enterprises, especially in the car 
industry67.
Consequently, from the analysis of this chapter it is evident how Ireland and 
Portugal, which are used in this Thesis as a kind of benchmark to Greece, have 
advanced a more sophisticated understanding of the dynamics of capitalist 
development and therefore been able to identify and give preferential assistance to 
growing sectors (e.g. IT sector). Portugal and Ireland very early realised the 
importance of FDI as a key element for the development of their economy and 
followed a consistent policy in favour of FDI. On the contrary, Greece has not 
managed yet to develop a long term strategy in favour of FDI as the different political 
parties that have come into power have adapted different policy stances towards 
foreign investors.
Having presented the major economic and industrial changes since 1945, the 
next chapter (chapter II) reviews how these changes influenced the major theories of 
trade and location. In particular, there will be in a chronological order, a presentation 
of the theories of the industrial location and trade, their critics and how they have 
been evolved as a result of the world economic and social changes that were presented 
in the current chapter.
GDP and GNP becomes bigger and bigger. Suggestively I refer that this gap that was 13,9 per cent in 
1993 reached almost 19 per cent in 2002 (Report of the Greek Embassy in Dublin, 2002: 7). This is 
because not all the wealth produced in Ireland stays there. On the contrary, there is a net capital export 
outside Ireland. This capital is mainly the repatriation of profits by Foreign Firms established in 
Ireland.
67 During the 1990s, in Portugal were established companies such as Cofap Europe (that produced car 
parts), the Continental Mabor (that produced tyres), the Neslte Oy (that produced polypropylene), etc. 
(Corkill, 1999: 80).
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CHAPTER II
Location of FDI- Theory and Reality
2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we described the main economic and industrial 
changes that took place mostly in the developed world and had important effects in 
the location of western firms. But, how have these changes in the location of firms 
influenced the relevant theories? In this respect, the second set of contextual literature 
I draw upon in order to answer the main research question of this thesis, i.e. is why 
Greece has underperformed in relation to Ireland and Portugal, is the location theory 
literature. In this analysis I will then be able to consider the factors influencing the 
location decisions of firms. In particular, this chapter will provide us with the 
theoretical support necessary to evaluate some of the factors that influence particular 
types of FDI, or those from particular countries, which will take place in a later 
chapter.
Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to review the predictions of locational 
theories. Chapter II begins by stating some fundamental location theories (among 
others, the traditional location theories, New International Division of Labour theory, 
product life cycle theory, etc.) and how these theories evolved due to the changes in 
the world economic conditions as described in the previous chapter. Throughout this 
chapter a comparison between the different theories takes place, identifying 
similarities and differences between the various schools of thought. These theories, 
despite their weaknesses, give some basic explanation on the behaviour of the firm, 
under certain circumstances. Moreover, any attempt to evaluate the factors that 
influence particular types of FDI, which will take place in chapter IV, or those from 
particular countries, may need to draw upon more specific theories.
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2.2 Theoretical Predictions of the Location Decision- Making Process
The significance of production location has long ago been recognised. 
Actually location theory was first developed at the beginning of the 19th century. In 
this respect there is a discord about who the “father” of the location theory is. In 
chronological order, it was Ricardo who first introduced in 1817 the most basic 
concept of international trade theory that of the principle of comparative advantage. 
This theory of international production, known sometimes as “classic”, or “pure” 
theory, is based on the conventional model of two countries producing and trading 
only two goods in a perfectly competitive environment68. A few years later Johann 
von Thunen (in 1826) with his work “The Isolated State” demonstrated the optimal 
locations based on (according to his arguments) ring- shaped zones. But, two very 
important scholars, Schumpeter, in the History of Economic Analysis (1997: 466) and 
Alfred Marshall, in Principles of Economics (1961: 442)69 considered that von 
Thunen's work is more important than that of Ricardo and thus it is von Thunen who 
should actually be considered as the “father” of location theory. Additionally, A. 
Marshall was the first scholar who introduced and emphasized the advantages of 
spatial concentration by firms. In particular, he argued that the advantages gained by 
industries are from a pool of skilled labour; the presence of knowledge spillover 
effects, i.e. “if one man starts a new idea, it is taken up by others and combined with 
suggestions of their own, and thus it becomes the source of further new ideas”; and 
finally, the specialization of production, i.e. “for subsidiary industries devoting 
themselves each to one small branch of the process of production, and working it for a 
great many of their neighbours, are able to keep in constant use machinery of the most 
highly specialized character” (Marshall, 1961: 271). What in practice A. Marshall 
demonstrated was the value of localization economies, as well as the advantages of 
having different industries in one location. According to Schmutzler (1999: 357), 
Marshall’s arguments were particularly suitable for explaining small- scale 
concentration of firms within specific industries. In particular, the Marshallian model 
of industries consisted of a plurality of small, single plant, single product firms.
68 According to Harvey (2001: 47), Ricardo was not an empiricist and built an abstract model of 
economic allocation through the market mechanism that had little need for an empirical base. The 
usefulness of this model was to provide a tool for analysis that would both explain and predict change.
69 His original work was written in 1890.
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For almost two decades location theory has been rather stagnant. It was not 
until 1919 when the work of two Swedish economists, Eli Heckscher and Bertil 
Ohlin, advanced the principle of comparative advantage previously developed by 
Ricardo. Their work is most known as Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) theory of trade. In 
short, according to this theory, countries or regions, with abundant supply of labour 
should export labour intensive products while capital abundant countries should
7ftexport capital-intensive products . In 1929, Alfred Weber with his work “Theory of
71the location of industries ” revived the interest for the location theory. Alfred Weber 
introduced the so- called least- cost approach. The aim of Weber was to identify the 
optimal location of a plant firm. He argued that overall location is determined by four 
sets of factors, but at the end he concentrates only in two: the general or special 
factors, i.e. transport costs, labour costs, rent and the regional factors, i.e. forces of
77agglomeration or deglomeration (Weber, 1929: 20- 21) . For him the most important 
factor for the choice of optimal location of a plant was transport costs and thus, the 
most important task should be to minimise transport costs (ch. Ill, p. 41).
This rebirth had as a result a few years later another important scholar, August 
Losch, with his work “The Economics of Location73” to put the foundations for two 
other disciplines, notably regional science and economic geography (R. Martin, 1999: 
66). Losch (1954: 10) pointed out the importance of agglomerations74, but his most 
important contribution has been the “profit maximization” approach, which mainly 
supports the idea that the optimal location is one where the revenues for the enterprise 
are maximised. More precisely, he argued that “if we disregard all locally 
conditioned priceless utilities, the entrepreneur will choose the location of greatest 
real profit” (Losch, 1954: 17). By this approach, Losch disagreed with Alfred Weber 
who supported the “least- cost approach” arguing that “Weber's effort to find the
70 The H- O model was expanded in 1948 by Samuelson. Since then this model is known as H-O-S 
theorem and focuses on the disparities in relative factor endowments between countries as the single 
most significant cause of trade.
71 Actually, his work was first published in Germany in 1909 and translated into English as the Theory 
of the Location of Industries in 1929.
72 The two other factors, which have not attracted much attention from the scholars, are the natural and 
technical factors, i.e. advantages gained by industries due to natural conditions, as well as the social 
and cultural factors, i.e. the consequences of particular economic or social conditions of a certain 
civilisation (Weber, 1929: 21-22).
73 In 1940 Losch wrote the book “The Spatial Structure of the Economy” and was later (in 1954) 
published in English under the title “The Economics of Location”.
4 Losch also stressed that there is interdependence among producer and consumer (1954: 5).
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optimal location via seeking the place of lowest cost is not satisfactory, as equally 
important are sales possibilities” (Losch, 1954:28).
Although, these theories75 seem not to give a full view on the location 
decision-making process, nevertheless, they help us to understand some basic rules of 
the location behaviour. Additionally, they make an initial attempt to account for broad 
trends and to that extent have been relatively satisfactory. Finally, their reference to 
geographical distance, reflected in movement costs, still influences the spatial pattern 
of economic activities on a world scale (Dicken, 1998: 77). Nevertheless, these 
theories still seem to be characterised by certain limitations. According to Dicken 
(1998: 77) the above theories have tended to be static, whereas the world currently is 
increasingly volatile. Moreover, the way these theories deal with the role of the 
markets, the way firms behave in the absence of perfect competition, and the nature of 
production (and hence factor demand) is not sufficiently analysed. The role of 
agglomeration economies is also treated in a rather limited way as their main benefits 
derive from cost- minimisation rather than revenue maximisation on the output or 
demand side (Schoenberger, 1985: 242, Dickens, 1998: 75, Hamilton and Linge, 
1981: 58). Finally, the traditional location theory refers solely to production units, and 
therefore is not applicable to modem manufacturing firms that frequently consist of 
spatially separate, but locationally interdependent administrative, research and 
development, sales and production units. In other words traditional location theory 
cannot give a satisfactory interpretation to the changes of international competition 
that have taken place since 1945 (Pred, 1967: 81, Eckaus, 1987: 120, Porter, 1990: 2).
But, the real issue of “inadequacy” of traditional location theory to explain 
modem conditions had mainly to do with the fact that it referred to the plants rather 
than firm. Economic restructuring resulted to two main, interrelated issues. First, the 
changing nature of the firm, and second, the changing context in which the firm 
operates. A new type of firm has started to emerge, that the traditional theory had not 
predicted: the multi- plant firm. Also, the conditions, political and economic started to 
differentiate. Governments had started to accept foreign capital in the form of direct
75 There are also theories which try to explain changes in industrial production that adopt a leftist 
approach such as Marxist interpretation and path- dependence theory. But these theories have 
developed their arguments in relation to the entrance of Multinational Firms to the countries of Latin 
America and Asia, which are not relevant to this study.
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investment and the increasing purchasing power of the population in developing 
countries resulted in the need for increased production, which could not be satisfied 
by the plants located in the industrialised world.
Thus, the conditions created with the crisis of Fordism resulted also in the 
crisis and renewal of traditional locational theories. Firms started to transfer their 
production activities to developing countries of Latin America, Asia and Europe 
contributing by this way to the need of most developed countries to increase their 
exports of manufactured goods, the profit maximising behaviour of the firm, as well 
as the greater “freedom” that the firms started to enjoy from the governments of the 
industrialised world. As a result, firms started becoming multinational by locating 
their production units in a range of different countries. Within this new framework, 
theories concerning industrial location process started to be transformed and depart 
from traditional location considerations. In particular their new aim was to integrate 
these multinational corporations in their theory and answer two particularly important 
questions: why do firms go abroad as investors? Why do firms choose to enter foreign 
countries as producers rather than as exporters or licensors?
A new such theory, which was developed as a result of 1970s diffusion of 
industrial activity from the core industrial countries to the peripheral less developed 
countries, as well as the growth of international trade in manufactures, was the 
product life cycle theory identified by Vernon (1966). The theory gives less emphasis 
upon comparative cost and more upon the timing of innovation, transport costs, trade 
barriers, the effects of scale economies, and the role of uncertainty in influencing 
trade patterns (Vernon, 1966: 190). More precisely, according to this theory a new 
product (or process) will be developed in one of the technologically advanced 
countries and at the beginning the whole production will be made within easy reach of 
the innovator’s R&D facilities. Growth in demand then leads to mass production and 
hence to a standardisation of the technology involved . This in turn allows 
manufacturing facilities to be diffused to other countries, usually beginning in a few 
that are already technologically advanced but spreading to others, which are still 
acquiring industrial know- how. Ultimately, the stage may be reached in which the
76 According to Vernon (1966: 196) in such conditions the need for flexibility declines and economies 
of scale through mass production are achieved.
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bulk of world demand is supplied by countries with relatively low- skilled (Vernon, 
1966; Hamilton and Linge, 1981: 20-21; Dicken, 1999: 161- 162). According to 
Hamilton and Linge (1981: 22) the product life cycle theory provides a model of the 
dynamics underlying the continuous process of spatial and structural adjustment 
taking place to industry at an international level.
Additionally, another theory that developed exactly as a result of introduction 
of Neo- Fordist techniques is the New International Division of Labour. In particular, 
this theory argues that certain parts of modem manufacturing activities have been 
decentralised to selected “Third- World” countries and to the peripheral regions of 
Europe (Perrons, 1981: 87). According to Dunning (1993: 477- 478), market trends 
and unilateral political action have been the major shapers of the New International 
Division of Labour. Other important shapers of the changing nature of labour have
• 77  •been multilateral action, e.g. efforts for economic integration in the EU or in East 
Asia (ASEAN), and finally certain activities by multinational corporations, e.g. the 
way multinational corporations internalise cross- border transfers of intermediate 
commodities between their subsidiaries located in different countries. In this way 
several countries of the periphery are drawn into the international market as industrial 
producers of certain manufacturing activities, e.g. components, whereas the economic 
management and the production of knowledge and technology still remains in the 
“hands” of few developed countries, notably in the home countries (Schoenberger, 
1985: 243, Antonopoulou, 2000: 41).
But, according to Martin, R. (1999: 79) the conceptual framework of the 
work of economic geographers on the renaissance of regional economies has not been 
the symmetry location theory or growth theory, but instead approaches that put 
emphasis on the political, economic, institutional and social bases of regional 
development and industrial agglomeration. Whereas classic trade and location 
theories tried to incorporate space into economic theory by focusing on the role of 
geographical distance in shaping the location pattern of industry (Dicken, 1999: 75), 
some other schools of thought, such as French Regulation School, worked in a
77 Especially in the case of the European Union, an important role was played by the free movement of 
labour and capital. These, changed the relationship between workers themselves (skilled vs. unskilled 
workforce), but also between labour and capital (capital strengthened its position towards labour as it 
could now transfer its production from one place to another easier).
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complementary way by explaining the changes in the production (and social) modes
n o
of regulation, i.e. by emphasising the social (including labour) relations with respect 
to changes in production patterns. When such changes occur, then the importance of 
location also changes. A first work of great influence was that of Michael Piore and 
Charles Sabel in 1984, called “Second Industrial Divide”. In this work the two authors 
argued that the observed emergence of a new industrial- technological paradigm is 
based on flexible specialisation. In other words, the significance of the two authors, in 
contrast to the industrial location theorists that I have been discussing so far, is that 
they have recognised that the pattern/ nature of production was changing, moving 
from mass production to flexible accumulation. The emergence of this new paradigm 
(flexible specialisation) was considered by French Regulation School (another school 
of thought) as the transition from Fordism to post- Fordism, i.e. the transition from 
mass production to smaller organisational units that produce customised goods and 
have increased flexibility. The main representative of this school is considered Amin 
(1994). According to Harvey (1995: 3) Amin, and hence the French Regulation 
School, supplemented on how capitalism has arranged its geography in a more 
synthetic account of accumulation on a world scale. On the other hand, according to 
Dicken, Forsgren and Malmberg (1994: 29) the emphasis of the French Regulation 
School on an abrupt political transition is one of the basic causes of the critique of this 
thought. In particular, there are doubts whether it is possible to identify an 
indisputable shift from Fordism to post- Fordism. Such doubts are two- fold: do post- 
Fordist forms of production really dominate the collapse of Fordism? Were Fordist 
forms of production really hegemonic in the past? (Dicken, Forsgren and Malmberg, 
1994: 29).
The work of Ricardo and Heckscher & Ohlin with regard to the theory of 
comparative advantage further enhanced in 1990 by M. Porter with his book “The 
Competitive Advantage of Nations”. Porter, in relation to the other two authors, 
focuses not on the economy as a whole, but on specific industries and industry 
segments. He uses the firm as the basic unit of analysis. In particular, in his book he 
tries to answer the following question (Porter, 1990: 18): “why do firms based in 
particular nations achieve international success in distinct segments and industries?”
78 For example capital- labour and labour- labour relationships.
74
He tries to find these characteristics of a nation that allow to its firms to create and 
keep competitive advantage in particular fields. According to his arguments (Porter, 
1990: 19) “the competitive advantage is created and sustained through a highly 
localised process. Differences in national economic structures, values, cultures, 
institutions and histories contribute profoundly to competitive success”. There are two 
basic and one secondary type of competitive advantage: lower cost and differentiation 
in the first place, and the competitive scope, i.e. the breadth of the firm’s goals within 
its industry, secondarily.
The most recent development is a new type of research/ theory called the 
“New Economic Geography”, which appeared at the beginning of 1990s by Paul 
Krugman. This theory tries to give an explanation of the location chosen by firms, 
which at the end leads either to convergence or divergence between different regions. 
In order to develop this perception he took into account three factors: increasing 
returns of scale, transport costs and imperfect competition. In particular, Krugman 
developed a simple model designed to explain “why and when does manufacturing 
become concentrated in a few regions, leaving others relatively undeveloped? What 
we shall see is that it is possible to develop a very simple model of geographical 
concentration of manufacturing based on the interaction of economies of scale with 
transportation costs” (Krugman, 1991: 484). The most important impact of 
Krugman’s model was that it stimulated new discussions among scholars and further 
models emerged that tried to answer the question previously mentioned. The “New 
Economic Geography” is concerned with both the characteristics of the industries, as 
well as the characteristics of the countries where these locate. The emphasis is now 
upon the importance of market-size effects, as well as price- index effect, in 
generating linkages that encourage geographical concentration, on one side, and the 
opposing force of immobile factors (i.e. competition between firms for a local market) 
working against such concentration on the other hand (Krugman, 1991: 491- 492; 
Krugman, 1998: 9-10). Thus, how the relationship between core- periphery will end 
up, i.e. whether there will be a divergence or convergence, depends on three factors: 
the home- market effect79 and the wage index80, which drive towards divergence, and
79 Other things equal, the wage rate will tend to be higher in the larger market.
80 Workers are interested not in nominal wages but in real wages, and workers in the region with the 
larger population will face a lower price for manufactured goods.
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the degree of competition for the local market , which drives towards convergence. 
The question raised is which forces finally will dominate (Krugman, 1991: 491- 492).
Thus a number of models that tried to assess the impact of liberalisation in the 
world economy were developed. These models can be differentiated into static ones 
(e.g. Krugman, 1991; Krugman and Venables, 1995; Venables, 1996; Puga, 1999) and 
dynamic ones (e.g. Baldwin, 1999; Martin and Ottaviano, 1999). In particular, the 
basic (two-region) model of “New Economic Geography” theory, developed by P. 
Krugman in 1991, tries to explain which factors have influenced and continue to 
influence the geographical distribution of economic activity. More precisely, 
Krugman argues that increasing returns of scale are likely to foster geographical
O'}
concentration of production of each good . When transportation costs are important, 
attractive locations for production are those that are close to markets and suppliers, 
other things being equal. Moreover, the concentration of production in some locations 
tends to attract the mobile factors of production, such as the employees who, in this 
case of concentration of production, have better jobs and consumption opportunities. 
The resulting concentration of the labour force leads to more demand for consumption 
goods in that location, which in turn makes this region more attractive for producers. 
Once a region has a high share of production, this pattern is likely to bolster itself: a 
so-called second nature advantage83 for the dominant region develops, that is, the 
region becomes attractive for companies because so many other companies already 
produce there (Krugman, 1991).
When comparing the above arguments of Krugman with the earlier location 
theorists (traditional location theory), e.g. Marshall and Weber, we see that their 
theories have a lot of similarities. In fact, Krugman’s ideas are much more similar to 
traditional location theories rather than the “New Economic Geography” linked with 
cultural turn. More precisely, Marshall, Weber and Krugman try to give an
81 Workers in the region with less manufacturing working force will face less competition for the local 
peasant market than those in the more populous region. In other words, there is a trade- off between 
proximity to the larger market and lack of competition for the local market.
82 In a similar way, Michael Porter has also argued that the degree of geographical clustering of 
industries within a nation is a key determinant of that nation’s international competitiveness (1996: 85)
83 A first-nature advantage is when a region, in comparison to other regions, has natural resources, or 
transportation facilities such as rivers or harbour. Furthermore, in a broader sense such advantages 
could also arise from regional differences in governmental policies, e.g. in taxation, subsidies, etc. 
(Schmutzler, 1999: 356, 375).
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explanation about the factors that influence the location of a firm. Their conclusion is 
a common one, i.e. that firms tend to locate in certain locations than others. But, the 
difference between traditional location theorists and Krugman, is that Krugman, apart 
from emphasising the characteristics of the industry that are important for the 
concentration of firms in one specific place, moved one step further by incorporating 
the characteristics of the countries (e.g. market- size effects) in the decision of a firm 
about where to locate its plant (s).
In 1995, Krugman and Venables tried to incorporate the effects of 
globalisation and real national incomes in “New Economic Geography” theory. A 
main cause for the development of this model was the emergence of a New 
International Division of Labour that had made its appearance since the end of the 
1980s, characterised by increasing mobility as a result of new world economic 
conditions84 and technologies. Thus, this model tried to explain the linkages between 
economic geography, international trade and distance costs in a non- technical way. 
Additionally, the two authors, as a result of the implementation of the European 
Common Market, tried to predict its effects on spatial distribution of industries 
between two regions of different development level. Thus, this model tried to analyse 
whether the different comparative market access of the Southern European countries 
and the core EU Member States may affect possible gains from economic integration 
(Karsten, 1999: 11-13, Amiti, 1998: 45). As a result, Krugman and Venables (1995: 
858) developed a model where the world economy is organised into a core- periphery 
pattern and tried to interpret the degree that increasing globalisation, i.e. the closer 
integration of world markets, influence the real incomes of core and periphery 
nations. In their conclusion (1995: 876), they argued that it is the scale economies and 
transport costs that cause regional differentiation (i.e. differentiation between core and 
peripheral countries). After a certain degree of integration among nations, 
differentiation starts to emerge. When differentiation becomes a reality the rise in core 
income is partly at peripheral expense. But, as integration is further developed, then 
the advantages of the core are eroded and the resulting rise in peripheral incomes may 
be partly at the core’s expense.
84 An important new economic condition was the implementation of the Single European Market in 
1992 among the European Union countries, and/  or the increasing demand for IT personnel by the 
developed countries that had as a result the import of labour force from developing countries such as 
India, Pakistan, China to United States and Europe.
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Thus, we could argue that Krugman’s writings could be separated in two 
distinctive ways. On the one hand, Krugman tries to account for the spatial 
concentration of economic activity, referring to the balance between centripetal and 
centrifugal forces. But, unlike the location theorists of the past, whose work he draws 
upon, he allows for imperfect competition and the effect of increasing returns to scale, 
and tries to combine trade and location theory.
In 1996 Venables developed a new model in order to analyse the effects of 
economic integration on the geographical concentration of production. In particular,
85he answered the following question: “if economic integration reduces trade costs , 
will it lead to agglomeration and consequently to divergence of regional economic 
performance, or will it facilitate dispersion of industry in response to wage 
differences, this leading to convergence of regional income levels?” (Venables, 1996: 
342). In essence, Venables incorporated traditional location theory (especially that 
one expressed by Marshall) into the new European economic conditions, and tried to 
see how economic integration will affect the different countries that participate in it. 
According to the findings presented by Venables the answer depends on the strength 
of vertical linkages and the level of trade costs. If vertical linkages are strong and 
trade costs are high then economic integration leads to divergence (i.e. industries are 
concentrated in one location at the expense of others). If linkages are weaker and 
transport costs are low then integration may lead to convergence (i.e. industries will 
disperse to different locations) in response to wage differences (Venables, 1996: 342). 
Another issue that was raised by Venables was that of an “industrial base”. In the 
model he developed, firms want to locate closer to other firms, where there is an 
industrial base of suppliers and customers. This presence of a strong industrial base 
enables a location to support relatively high wages, whereas a location with a weak 
industrial base makes this location less attractive to industries. In general, this model 
established that agglomeration can be generated equally well by the interaction among 
the location decision of industries that are linked through an input- output structure. 
Thus, even with no labour mobility, there may be forces that lead to the 
agglomeration of an activity at particular locations in an integrating region (Venables,
85 By trade costs Venables means all the costs associated with supplying different locations.
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1996: 356). In this respect, Venables gave an interpretation on how industrial 
localisation economies are formed.
In 1999, Puga also contributed to the development of “New Economic 
Geography” school of thought. In particular, he answered to the following two 
questions: “as economic integration lowers barriers between regions and dissolves 
national boundaries, will industry become more or less agglomerated in space? And 
what will be the associated changes in the spatial distribution of income?” (Puga, 
1999: 327). According to Puga, the answer to these two questions depends greatly on 
whether workers move across regions (or countries in an international context) or not, 
in response to income differentials. In either case, when trade costs are high, industry 
spreads across regions to meet final consumer demand. On the other hand, when 
transport costs are low this leads to the agglomeration of increasing returns activities. 
In this respect agglomeration of firms tends to raise local wages. In case that these 
higher wages attract more workers, then due to the high supply of workers, wage 
differentials between the workers, in a particular locality, will be eliminated. If, on the 
other hand, workers do not move across regions, then wage differentials, in a 
particular locality, will remain. In this case the connection between integration and 
agglomeration is of one direction, i.e. reductions in trade costs make firms more 
sensitive to wage differences and results to the spread of industries across regions (or 
countries when referring at international level).
In 1999 two other authors developed their models of firm behaviour in 
conditions of trade liberalisation. These models were characterised by Ottaviano
(2003) as dynamic ones. The first such model was developed by Baldwin who
• 86hypothesised that agglomeration is driven only by demand- linked circular causality . 
As trade liberalisation becomes greater between symmetric nations (e.g. developed 
nations) eventually this produces the core- periphery patterns. Thus, according to 
Baldwin, contrary to the standard claim in the growth literature, integration will lead 
to divergence in real capital income levels (Baldwin, 1999: 255- 256). On the other 
hand, the model developed by Martin and Ottaviano in 1999 examines how growth 
influences the location decisions of firms and hence how it affects geography and the
86 According to Baldwin (1999: 255) under these circumstances firms are associated with a particular 
unit of capital and neither capital, nor entrepreneurs are internationally mobile.
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dynamics of spatial distribution of economic activities. It also explores how the rate of 
technological progress is determined by the location decision of firms (Martin and 
Ottaviano, 1999: 283). In particular, the two authors analyse the relation between 
location and growth in two different contexts: in the first context, the spillovers in 
R&D are global. This means that the invention of new goods affects negatively the 
future cost of R&D and the discount rate has an impact on income differentials 
between North and South and therefore on the location of firms. Consequently, in this 
case high growth rates and high transaction costs are associated with FDI from North 
to South.
In the second context, R&D spillovers between industries are local, which 
means that the R&D cost is lower in the location with a high number of firms 
producing differentiated products. In this case, all R&D activities agglomerate in the 
North where firms are more numerous and the growth rate is higher because of the 
concentration of industries. This results in a positive link between trade integration 
and growth, because a decrease in transaction costs through trade integration would 
lead firms to concentrate, but not in all cases, in the location with the R&D activity 
and because of local spillovers, it also stimulates an increase in the growth rate. In this 
respect, the two authors show that high growth rates and high transaction costs are 
associated with FDI from North to South. They also show, in contrast to the literature 
of the “New Economic Geography”, and because of the introduction of endogenous 
growth, that welfare in the South can improve when industrial concentration in the 
North increases, if transaction costs are significantly low. The reason is that the 
increase in the rate of innovation that comes from spatial concentration also benefits 
the South. This location framework is different from the “New Economic Geography” 
because cumulative causation mechanisms, such as migration or vertical linkages are 
kept out (Martin and Ottaviano, 1999: 283- 285). In other words, in their model 
Martin and Ottaviano give a different scenario than the previous mentioned authors of 
“New Economic Geography. They argue that agglomeration of economic activity in 
the core countries cannot be catastrophic for the economic development of the 
periphery, if trade costs are low.
Summarising, the “New Economic Geography” theory focus on the behaviour 
of firms and the mechanisms of cumulative development in order to explain the
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geographical clustering of economic activity. Emphasis is placed on the measurable 
relations between economies of scale and transport costs in order to be able to develop 
and estimate formal models (Perrons, 2001: 209). Thus, according to the theory of 
“New Economic Geography”, large markets are more likely to attract manufacturing 
production, due to economies of scale87. In other words, external economies of scale 
are developed. Krugman's home market effect, as well as price- index effect, shows 
that strong demand for a particular set of goods in a country would lead that country 
to be a net exporter of those goods. In traditional model of comparative advantage, an 
unusually strong demand for a class of goods would imply exactly the opposite, i.e. 
that the country (or region) would become a net importer of these goods (Amiti, 1998: 
51). Finally, new economic geography theory suggests that agglomeration effects 
could happen as a result of a decline in trade barriers, with firms concentrating in 
regions where activity is already high in certain sectors (Commission, 1998: 2).
Practically, what the “New Economic Geography” theory suggests is that large 
companies, tend to concentrate in regions where already other firms (preferably small 
in size) exist, rather than establishing themselves in an isolated location. Due to this 
location proximity between firms it is very likely that forward linkages to be created. 
On the other hand, being located in a cluster with a lot of backward linkages, a firm 
benefits by obtaining its intermediate products cheaper, e.g. because of lower 
transport costs, or because it gains from the variation of differentiated inputs, or the 
intense competition between the companies that produce these intermediate product. 
The result of these forward and backward linkages is the creation of a clustering of 
vertically related industries. Moreover, the higher the demand for intermediate goods, 
the higher the level of geographical concentration of these industries. The process is 
the same for a region within a country, specially the larger ones, such as USA, UK, 
Italy, Germany and France. A firm may choose a developed region within a 
developed country. Then other firms may join the cluster, which may continue to 
grow as a consequence of external economies, labour policies, etc.
87 As described in the next lines there are two kinds of economy of scale: first, external economy of 
scale due to the market size and second, internal economy of scale due to the presence of related 
industries and lower costs.
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This analysis, mainly expressed by “New Economic Geography”, also 
indicates the changing conditions created by globalisation and the opening of the 
markets to foreign investors. Whereas, in the 1970s and 1980s, firms (post- Fordism 
era, according to the description of chapter I) were moving away from developed 
regions, in the 1990s (the new economy era, according to the description of chapter I) 
with the appearance of new economy features, this tendency seems to have been 
reversed. Thus, the above analysis also indicates how capital (mainly expressed by 
firms) has the ability to continually change its behavior patterns in order to survive. 
This is another indication that New Economy (as described in chapter I) is a 
completely different period from post- Fordism. This was also mentioned before by 
stressing the familiarities between traditional location theories and “New Economic 
Geography”.
The above presentation of “New Economic Geography” models (and new 
trade theories in general) can be completed by the analysis of Ietto-Gillies, who 
argues that the theory of Venables and Krugman (in particular) cannot explain direct 
production in other countries, by multinational corporations. In defence of this 
argument she supports that new trade and economic geography theory consider 
location in terms of core and periphery, as well as that all the relevant forces act in a 
harmonious way at the micro and macro level. In new trade theories, nation states are 
defined in terms of extra costs, barriers to factors and product mobility imposed over 
and above the costs of operating at the inter- regional level. Her objection is that there 
are wider differences between nations that are relevant to the understanding of MNCs 
activities. The main difference concerns what a nation state is. Thus, she defines 
nation states in terms of their regulatory regimes in relation to taxation, currencies, 
customs and labour regimes. Her argument is that “if there are external economies of 
agglomeration and the internal economies are plant economies, then it can only make 
sense to produce in one location/country and supply other markets through exports. 
There is a basic conflict and tension between a theory that predicts clustering of 
production activities and a reality of companies that spread their activities in space- 
sometimes horizontally, sometimes vertically, sometimes both ways”. She also claims 
that the multinationality of firm, i.e. their ability to plan and organise activities across 
different regulatory regimes gives the multinational corporations extra advantages 
over the other players of the economic system, notably the governments, trade unions,
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consumers and of course rival firms88. Consequently, “the forces leading to 
multinationality cannot- or not always- be assimilated into centripetal or centrifugal 
forces and the core- periphery pattern, because they favour the spread across nation­
states and thus regulatory regimes (Ietto-Gillies, 2000:414- 423).
What in practice Ietto- Gillies argues is that MNCs do not produce directly to 
different countries due to forces that are external to them (as new trade theories 
argue). On the contrary, such a way of operating (i.e. spread of operations to different 
countries) gives MNCs certain advantages in relation to the nation state (which try to 
control firms and not only by regulation) and other factors that affect the production 
(e.g. labour unions). Thus, equally important are the strategic decisions that 
(multinational) firms take in order to overpass different obstacles that try to affect 
their production processes. This focus of Ietto- Gillies to the actual structure of 
contemporary firms and multinational firms in particular, makes her approach more 
resonant with the topic of this thesis. In particular, one crucial question this thesis tries 
to answer is what particular strategic decisions have made MNCs invest in Greece? 
These strategic decisions concern evolutions to the broader political and economic 
environment around Greece, e.g. political and economic turbulence that often used to 
happen in other South- Eastern European countries, or have to do exclusively with the 
domestic situation in the country (domestic market oriented investment)?
2.3 Summary
This chapter, together with chapter I, which dealt with the development of the 
world economy since 1945 and all its effects in multinational corporations and the 
countries under investigation, notably Greece, Ireland and Portugal, allowed us to put 
the theoretical foundations in order to answer the main research question of this 
thesis, i.e. why Greece has underperformed in FDI inflows.
But, before the analysis of the questionnaire, which will allow us to examine 
more thoroughly the causes of this poor performance of Greece with regard to FDI, an
88 Ietto Gillies reckons four advantages of the multinationality of MNCs: First, is the ability to 
minimise their world wide taxation liabilities. Second, they are dealing with a fragmented labour force, 
third MNCs acquire knowledge of multiple local markets about prospect investment opportunities, 
labour, wages and government behaviours. Finally, by that way MNCs reduce the risk to halt 
production, due to social or political or other disruptions in one country.
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analysis of the changing nature of the multinational corporation is needed. In other 
words, the different organisation forms the large firms adopted in order to face the 
changing world economic conditions described in chapter I will be analysed.
Thus, in the next chapter the main organisational structures that multinational 
corporations have adopted since 1945 in order to deal with new economic and 
political developments described in chapter I, are presented. In particular, the 
theoretical understanding of the organisation structure is presented, which then leads 
to the production of models (typologies) of different organisational forms of 
multinational corporations that explain the decision making process of multinational 
corporations.
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CHAPTER III 
The Organisational Forms of 
the Multinational Corporation Since 1945
3.1 Introduction
In chapter I, I drew upon French regulation theory in order to understand the 
development of the European economy and the differential positioning of states, 
paying particular attention to the ideas relating to peripheral Fordism. I then turned to 
the location theory literature (chapter II) in order to consider the factors influencing 
the location decisions of firms. In this chapter I draw on the literature relating to 
multinational corporations in order to identify their evolution and the specific factors 
influencing their locational decision making.
Thus, the first part of this chapter is to present a brief historical overview of 
the MNE, since 1945. In particular, I will present a number of writers who have 
analysed the structure of multinational organisations (theory of the multinational 
corporation) and their changes over time. Then, I will indicate some authors that have 
formalised the discussion of multinational enterprises and developed typologies of 
different types of multinationals- some relating to sectors and some relating to 
changes over time (i.e. the main models of multinational enterprises and a critical 
appraisal of them). Then, for the purpose of this thesis, I am going to draw one 
framework in order to help understand why different types of multinationals will be 
attracted by different kinds of locational factors. Finally, having looked at the 
structure of multinational corporations in the context of the evolution of the economy 
I advance a hypothesis about the types of firm that may be attracted to Greece.
In chapter one, I analysed how the world economy evolved since 1945, how 
the large firms of the developed world grew in size by expanding themselves in new 
markets and of course how Greece, Ireland and Portugal were placed in the new world 
fixation. But, very few things were mentioned about the evolution of the nature of the 
firm itself. Especially, in the current globalised world where firms may have more 
options about their location, but also more risks as far as their survival and expansion 
are concerned. Within this context several questions are raised, such as: how the firms
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of the developed world changed their organisational forms in order to be able to 
expand and effectively control their new units outside their home country? What 
particular organisational forms were developed in order for a firm to be called an 
“international”, “multinational” or “global” one? Do these particular organisational 
forms affect the location decision of the firms? These are the questions that this 
section will try to answer. In this chapter too, focus is on the multinational corporation 
being active in manufacturing industry.
3.2 MNE’s Brief Historical Overview
According to Massey (1995: 25) organisational structure has probably been 
the focal point of most recent analysis in geography. In particular, industrial 
organisation theory has been limped from the beginning by the dominance of the 
neoclassical view in economics (Sayer and Walker, 1992: 108). According to the 
neo- classical economic theory, profit maximisation is the key for explaining the 
behaviour of the firm. Although, this assumption provides enough structure to be a 
useful theory, nevertheless, it is not able to explain the actual evolution and 
performance of the firm (De Canio and Watkins, 1998: 276). During the 1990s, there 
has been a great effort from a large number of authors to develop new or improved 
theories of the firm, its nature, reasons for existence, behaviour (actual/ optimal), 
differences and effects (Grandstrand, 1998: 467).
Since the very beginning of this thesis it was quite obviously mentioned that 
the evolutions in the world economy influenced the cross border organisation and 
management of multinational corporations. In chapter one the way the conditions 
changed with regard to the national policies towards the multinational corporations 
was presented. Additionally, how, in their turn, multinational corporations developed 
their management and production policies towards the nations in order to maintain 
and then strengthen their market power, were also presented. The result is that 
currently, according to King and Sethi (2001:202), multinational corporations have 
created a business environment that combines global integration and local 
responsiveness, i.e. how best to meet the local demand while taking advantage of 
multinational corporations’ competitive advantages on world- wide scale.
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In addition to firms there are governments that have some powers to regulate 
the economy and firms within it. But, States have weakened, partly by choice, via the 
creation of intergovernmental organisations such as the European Union or NAFTA, 
leading and proclaiming the virtues of neo- liberalism. These virtues have to be 
followed by other States that chose to be part of the global economy. More precisely, 
the contemporary era is more competitive due to the fact that action takes place in a 
global rather than a national or local arena. This context is shaped by firms, which 
adopt a variety of strategies to remain and become more competitive. Their behaviour, 
in turn, shapes the competitive environment. In this respect, Carpano, Raahman and 
Roth (2003: 156) argue that the institutional context (e.g. government regulations) is 
particularly important in explaining competition among firms. In the case of Greece 
for example, the Greek institutional framework has been argued to be excessively 
bureaucratic (Kritsantonis, 1992: 623).
According to the traditional industrial organisation theory in order for firms to 
expand abroad, they should possess better assets that can generate a comparative 
advantage in relation to local firms. Such comparative advantages may include the 
brand name of a product, possession of special marketing skills, economies of scale, 
high emphasis on R & D etc (King and Sethi, 2001: 201- 202; Carpano, Rahman and 
Roth, 2003: 155). But, in order for large firms to exploit their comparative 
advantages, they should deal successfully with one of the main problems of industrial 
organisation, i.e. how to bring together labour, materials and machinery. In this 
respect a number of writers have analysed the structure of multinational organisations 
and how and in what ways they have changed over time.
The structure of multinational organisations may change due to diversification 
of production. A concept that has been linked, positively, to the growth of the firm by 
diversifying its production is economies of scope89. A firm enjoys economies of 
scope when it can undertake different but related activities. It benefits from the 
common inputs, e.g. common raw materials or physical equipment, which uses for the
89 There are two kinds of economies of scope. The product level economies of scope, which take place 
due to reductions of unit cost attributable to firm’s diversification into several products produced in the 
same plants, e.g. chemical products. The plant level economies of scope, which take place due to 
reductions of unit cost attributable to firm’s diversification into several products produced in different 
plants, e.g. airline hub.
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production of different outputs. In this respect important are the spatial economies of 
scope derived when these related activities have to be co- located, resulting in this 
way to agglomeration economies effect (Pontes and Parr: 3). According to Helfat and 
Eisenhardt (2004: 1230) economies of scope allow a firm to benefit when exit 
markets with declining opportunities in order to take advantage of new opportunities 
in other markets. Thus, for Krugman (1990: 277) economies of scope is the key for 
understanding both domestic and multinational modem firms. Each firm that can 
experience economies of scope will find that expanding into new markets gives it a 
strategic advantage over local firms. This leads to the multinationality of the firm. 
Thus, economies of scope can give us a simple and easy theory of the multinational 
firm.
On the other hand, Belis- Bergouignan, Bordenave and Lung (2000: 41- 42), 
give us a rather different view about the reasons why firms go multinational. 
Precisely, they argue that during the last decades multinational corporations have 
developed an evolutionary perspective with regard to the way the world, political and 
economic conditions change. In this respect, multinationalisation can be regarded as a 
learning process that makes firms follow a certain succession of configurations. If this 
is the case, then the transition to more complex forms of organisation depends on each 
company’s own specific experiences (path- dependency90). The multinationalisation 
of the world economy results in changes as far as the location determinants are 
concerned. But, this time location determinants do not concern only the multinational 
corporation as a whole, but on the contrary each single division of the Multinationals.
In particular, the theory of path dependency assumes that original decisions 
are open to revision, but from a certain point in time onwards, decisions taken more 
and more restrain present and future choices. The classical model of path dependency 
is based upon rational choices taken by individuals or, in our case, firms. From an 
economic stance, according to the neoclassical perspective, path- dependency theory 
has been deemed as a marginal anomaly. Moreover, the role of resources is of 
particular importance in path dependency theory. Especially when agents have 
enough resources and/or are able to mobilise a critical mass to overcome persistence.
90 Path- dependence theory, which adopts leftist arguments, was developed in relation to the entrance of 
Multinational Firms in Latin America and Asia.
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The allocation or reallocation of resources is usually an important and effective means 
to initiate and implement organisational changes. (Sydow, Schreyogg and Koch, 
2005:6,23).
Moreover, according to Morgan, Rosemary Sharpe, Kelly and Whitley (2002: 
1025) changes, due to the internationalisation process, involve a more complex set of 
calculations concerned with the location of different parts of the production process. 
Even more precisely, they are concerned with the nature and type of integration and 
learning between production sites and other facilities, such as R&D. For example, 
how internationalised are activities of multinational corporations such as their R&D 
departments? Have they followed similar patterns to the production facilities? 
According to Gerybadze and Reger (1999: 256- 263) large firms continue to 
decentralise, but at the same time they try to remain as hierarchical and integrated as 
possible. In this respect, their most important R&D activities tend to remain located at 
one pre- eminent center, whereas less advanced business activities tend to be 
transferred in less important, for them, locations.
Another (complementary to the path dependency approach, as it will be argued 
later) approach to the firm is the value chains approach, which examines whether 
firms chose to participate in all stages of the value chain or whether they simply 
manage the chain and allow the production of different elements to be carried by other 
firms. In particular, the value chains approach tries to identify the various ways in 
which global production and distribution systems are integrated. As a result, each 
strategy a firm decides to follow has implications to the industrial location choice. In 
this respect the important issue is how firms, usually small and medium sized firms91, 
will be upgraded within the value chain. But the upgrade of a firm is related to the 
kind of commodity produced, the nature of the relationships between the firms in the 
chain and the relations between the countries involved (Perrons, 2004: 74; Gereffi, 
Humphrey and Sturgeon, 2005: 79).
91 Value chain analysis developed in response to the continuing dominance of large- scale producers in 
already industrialised countries and the increasing complexity of their relations with suppliers (Perrons, 
2004: 72).
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A key issue in the value chain approach is the ability to maintain control 
centrally in an environment that demands fragmentation of the production process on 
behalf of the firm in order to maintain its competitiveness. This also determines the 
relationship developed between the two parts. If the product is simple, it can be 
customised easily and the depiction is provided by the buyer, then an arm’s length 
market relation is developed. This means that the efforts for co-ordination and 
monitoring of the supplier are very easy. This also implies that buyer’s demands could 
be met by a large number of firms, something that weakens the position of the 
supplier. In this respect the upgrading of the supplier mostly depends on its own 
capacity and performance. On the other hand, if the production of a commodity 
demands a more complex procedure then co- ordination and transaction costs 
increase. The reason is that separate processes are required to be better co-ordinated in 
order to synchronise the flow of commodity materials through the chain. The main 
cause is the need of the buyer for a closer monitoring of the whole production cost 
(the buyer needs to monitor what is to be produced, how and when). This increase in 
the interaction between the buyer and the supplier makes the valuation more complex 
and increases uncertainty about the future. This is the so- called networks value chain 
relationship. As the commodity’s production becomes more complex the degree of 
relationship between the supplier and the buyer becomes even closer. In the quasi­
hierarchy relationship the buyer exercises a high degree of control over other firms in 
the chain. In particular, it gives specific details with regard to the characteristics of the 
products to be produced. In such a situation the buyer may discourage any upgrade of 
the supplier. Finally, in the hierarchy value chain relationship the large firm (or the 
buyer) may own some operations in the chain. Any upgrade totally depends on the 
desires of the buyer (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002: 1023; Perrons, 2004: 75; Gereffi, 
Humphrey and Sturgeon, 2005: 80). In other words, the more complex the production 
process of a commodity, the higher the degree of control that the large firm exercises 
over the supplier.
Thus, of particular importance to the value chain approach has been the nature 
and content of inter- firm linkages and the power that regulates value chain co­
ordination, particularly between buyers and suppliers. For the scholars of the value 
chain approach, local and national structures as well as institutions have an important 
role into the determination of these relationships (Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon,
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2005: 98). In this respect, it could be argued that the value chain approach follows the 
thoughts of path- dependency school of thought. In particular, it seems that the value 
chains approach functions in a complementary way to the path- dependency theory. 
Whereas, the path- dependency approach argues that multinationalisation is the result 
of a learning process that makes firms follow a certain succession of configuration, 
the value chain approach analyses the organisational forms that a firm may adopt in 
order to remain competitive. In other words, the value chain approach specialises in 
the theory of path dependency.
But, in order for the large Western firms to expand themselves in new markets 
and effectively control their subsidiaries, two prerequisites are necessary, i.e. 
technological advancement and the openness of the world markets. In particular, it 
was the technological advancements in transport and communications that were of 
significant importance. It is a question whether large Western firms could develop 
today’s complex global structures without technological progress in these two fields. 
As Massey (1995: 32) argues, technological change contributed to lower costs of 
production and increased the degree of control by management over the production 
process. Currently, the technology factor is more and more attended to in economic 
theorising (Grandstrand, 1998: 471). Taking technological developments (in transport, 
communications, etc.) as a fact, then how are the large firms organised in order to 
effectively co- ordinate their production chains within and across nations? Moreover, 
the openness of the markets, as it was described previously, allowed firms to integrate 
their activities on regional or world- wide scales. According to an analysis by 
UNCTAD (2002: 121) this evolution increased competition, not between individual 
factories or firms, rather between entire production systems, developed by 
multinational corporations.
The advancements in technology and the openness of the markets enabled 
multinational corporations to spread their different facilities (e.g. production plants, 
R&D departments, headquarters) depending on how they considered the best suitable 
location for each such activity. For example, they could consider that their production 
plant should be located in a country where there was a cheap and abundant labour 
force. Or they could consider that their R&D activities should be located in a 
developed country where there is abundant highly skilled scientific labour force and
91
high quality universities. But, all these departments, being located in different parts of 
the world, could be managed as well as being located in a single area due to 
technology advancements. Moreover, due to the above mentioned evolutions, the 
managers of the multinational corporations had more location options to chose from 
about where to locate their different departments, which also strengthened their power
• 92(economic and political) against the national governments, but also against labour . 
As a result there is the current phenomenon of less and more developed countries to 
compete between each other offering a vast range of incentives to the multinational 
corporations in order to convince them to locate in their country, or at least not to take 
away, their different departments.
Thus, a number of evolutions, at a world scale, have been associated with the 
rapid growth of the multinational corporation. These evolutions are the rise of new 
technologies and products, the emergence of a new wider international division of 
labour, which allowed the simultaneous concentration of management powers and the
Q -}
decentralisation of the manual operations (Perrons, 2004: 65), and the greater 
integration of production and services across countries. As Cantwell (1991: 15) 
argues, the multinational corporation is representative of the type of international 
economy that has grown since 1945. Of course, this rapid growth of multinational 
corporations has led to changes in their organisational forms. De Canio and Watkins 
(1998: 290) argue that organisation and information processing (an essential element 
of the multinational corporation in order to co- ordinate the activities of its division to 
different parts of the world, but also to keep gathering information concerning 
evolutions in its field of activity and thus to remain competitive at world- scale) are 
related. This sounds normal if we take into account the spread into different locations 
of establishments that produce only parts of the same products. Besides, as it was 
argued before in the analysis of the value chain approach, what kind of organisation
92 Through the historical development of industry whole sectors have changed location to break away 
from well organised labour force, managing in this way to both lower labour costs and re- establish the 
controlling power of capital- over labour (Massey, 1995: 55-56).
93 As explained in Chapter II, the theory of New International Division of Labour, argues that certain 
parts of modem manufacturing activity have been decentralised to selected “Third- World” countries 
and to the peripheral regions of Europe. The main shakers of this tendency have been market trends, 
unilateral political actions, efforts for greater economic integration among countries of the same region 
such as the EU and NAFTA, and finally certain actions of Multinational Firms, such as the 
internalisation of the production process.
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type and information processing procedures a firm will decide to perform, will depend 
on the type of commodities this firm produces.
A firm, in order to keep producing such commodities by maintaining the same 
quality, as if producing them in the same manufacturing plant, has to be aware all the 
time about the production process. A break in the information of the production 
process may be fatal for the quality of the product. Moreover, these products, of 
which different parts are produced in different locations, have to be evolved in order 
to remain competitive. It is far more difficult to evolve a product produced in different 
parts of the world, than a product produced in a single location. In these terms, a 
detailed knowledge of the components of these products is demanded, together with 
an up- to- date knowledge on the evolutions that take place from the competitors. 
Then, these two “components of evolution” of a product have to be, at any time, 
disposable in the form of knowledge in case the management of the firm wishes to 
change (or evolve) these products. Thus, the efficiency of the firm to remain 
competitive varies with the processing power of its agents within it. In the case where 
the firm has spread its production operations to different locations, but at the same 
time has not managed to organise its information- processing structures in such a way 
as to be capable to respond quickly to changes from competitors (or just even to 
evolve) this may limit the competence gains of the firm.
But, the organisation structure of the MNF depends on certain distinctive 
features. A first set of such features may be related to the parent group as a whole, 
such as the sector(s) in which the firm is active, nationality, size, etc. A second group 
of characteristics may be related to the subsidiary, such as the host country, size, age, 
performance, etc., or to the nature of links (ownership, interdependence), between the 
parent company and the subsidiary. Moreover, host- market situation, competition, the 
role of technology (in particular communication and transport technology) and the 
role of host government policies are also important. But, apart from these factors, 
other more intangible characteristics are of equal importance. Such characteristics are 
related to the firm’s specific history, which includes the features that derive from its 
home- country embeddedness and its culture and administrative heritage in the form 
of accepted practices built up over a period of time (OECD, 1987: 55, Dicken, 1998: 
202).
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These features that may affect the organisational form of the multinational 
corporation will become particularly evident when the American, European and 
Japanese firms are to be analysed. In other words, a firm being, for example, in the 
automobile sector will develop a different organisational form in relation to a firm in 
the chemical or food sectors. And even within the same sector firms may be organised 
differently94. Nevertheless, my argument is that the development of these different 
forms of organisations will be developed at a later (secondary) stage of 
multinationalisation of the firm, and only when the foreign firm has become familiar 
with the new economic environment. In this respect Sachwald (1998: 210) argues that 
at the beginning firms that are little internationalised, e.g. this was the case during the 
1980s for the Japanese and French firms, will choose to follow a management practice 
that favours control over foreign units.
As previously mentioned, pioneers in the expansion to new markets have been 
large American firms. American firms changed during the 1950s and 1960s their 
organisational structure from a functional form, where a firm is subdivided into major 
functional units (e.g. production, marketing, finance, etc.) into a divisional form 
(either product based or area based). This form allowed American firms to give to the 
new branches located outside homeland an autonomy in areas such as production and 
marketing, but they used to keep under the control of the parent company the finances 
of the branch (Dicken, 1998: 202). Although this divisional structure allowed 
American firms to acquire greater control over their increasingly diverse product 
environment, nevertheless, it did not solve all the problems related to the co­
ordination and control. Thus, one way for the firms was to organise themselves either 
on a product- based system, or an area- based system.
Nevertheless, the extent to which a firm decides to separate its divisions and 
locate them at different places mainly depends on the actual strategy that has been 
adopted and pursued by the firm. A rather new strategy that has been developed
94 According to Belis- Bergouignan, Bordenave and Lung (2000:42) American car makers were the 
first to be multinationalised thus developing a path that clearly leads towards globalisation. Similarly, 
Japanese car manufacturers tried to enter the new global environment by increasing their 
internationalisation of production, but they followed a different route. Finally, European car makers, 
continue to operate in a mono- regional environment, which reflects the difficulties they have faced in 
integrating themselves in this new globalisation environment.
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during the last two, or so, decades by an increasing number of large producers who no 
longer produce any of their products through their subsidiaries, but they rather allow 
other smaller firms to do this job for them. But, the quality standards remain equally 
high because the large manufacturers closely organise their supply chains to guarantee 
reliability and quality, together with compliance with the different ethical codes of 
conduct (Perrons, 2004: 72).
As mentioned above (the value chains approach), this organisational structure 
is possible due to the evolutions in ICT, which allows close tracing of the production 
process. NIKE for example, does not produce anything, but some clothing firms 
similar organise a whole set of sub- contracting arrangements without buying 
anything. In general, the apparel industry has been a pioneer in contracting out its 
production. According to Bonacich and Appelbaum (2000: 12), this method could be 
characterised as an instance of flexible production. Subcontracting allows industries 
to deal with fluctuations in fashion and seasons by hiring contractors when they need 
them and letting them go when they don’t. Manufacturers, not only use local 
contractors, but also conduct their offshore production through contracting rather than 
through ownership of subsidiaries. Their main advantage is that in this way they do 
not possess any fixed- assets allowing them to move production wherever they can get 
the best deal in terms of labour cost, taxes and tariffs, environmental regulation, etc.95 
that may have an effect on the cost and quality of the final product. Nevertheless, in 
practice, manufacturers may form long- term partnerships with a core group of 
dependable contractors, attempting to ensure that they receive steady work (Bonacich 
and Appelbaum, 2000: 12). This development makes much more complex the issue of 
FDI. The question is whether the practice of an increasing number of multinational 
corporations, which subcontracts96 its products to small firms located around the 
world, such as NIKE, is considered as FDI. On the other hand, the influence of 
multinational corporations remains high due to their purchasing strategies.
95 The contracting system provides at least five major advantages to industries (mainly those that 
consider cost as their main location factor for the establishment of production, e.g. apparel industry): it 
extemilises risk, it lessens the cost of labour, it allows manufacturers to evade moral as well as legal 
responsibility for violation of labour laws and it helps to hinder unionisation (Bonacich and 
Appelbaum, 2000: 136).
96 Sayer and Walker (1992: 130) argue that “the term subcontracting is the source of some confusion. 
Literally it means undertaking some portion of work that has already been contracted for, implying at 
least a three- tier hierarchy; but it is also commonly used with respect to contracts drawn up between 
relatively equal firms- what we call simply buyer- supplier contractual relations”.
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But, which are the main divisions of a large firm that can be allocated at 
different parts of the world? And what is their role in the overall organisation of the 
firm? Before formalising different typologies of multinational corporations, it is better 
to give a description of their main operational units. In particular, three major 
divisions of a multinational corporation are to be presented, notably the corporate and 
regional (when in existence) headquarter offices, the R&D facilities and, of course, 
production units.
The first and most important division of a firm is its corporate and regional 
(when in existence) headquarter offices. In a large firm the corporate headquarters is 
the location of overall control for the entire firm (in terms of financial, administrative 
and production control), which is responsible for all the major strategic investment 
(and disinvestment) decisions that affect directly the whole firm. They also operate as 
the intermediaries (e.g. as far as knowledge is concerned) among the different units 
and subsidiaries of the firm (Massey, 1995: 68; Dicken 1998: 208).
On the other hand, regional headquarter offices, constitute an intermediate 
level in the corporate hierarchy influencing a number of countries, usually located in a 
certain geographical region (e.g. South Eastern Europe). A regional headquarter might 
also be established due to the creation of a regional economic union, such as the 
European Single Market or NAFTA. For example, partly as a response to the creation 
of Single European Market in 1992, Japanese firms97 have begun to establish 
European headquarters for their operations in Europe (Oliver, Morris, and Wilkinson, 
1992: 203; Morgan, Rosemary Sharpe, Kelly and Whitley, 2002: 1033). Once created, 
their role is to co- ordinate and control the activities of the firm’s affiliates within the 
particular region. Subsidiaries generally report to these regional headquarter offices, 
in which in turn report to the corporate head office. Finally, regional headquarters are 
regarded by host countries as an important operation to attract. One of the striking 
elements of the geography of corporate headquarter offices is that very few, if any 
multinational corporation, has moved its ultimate decision- making operations outside
97 For Japanese Firms location started being considered of significant importance as a way of getting 
behind the tariff barriers put by the European Union and accessing its markets (Morgan, Rosemary 
Sharpe, Kelly and Whitley, 2002: 1024).
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its home country. On the other hand, there is quite a lot of evidence that multinational 
corporations relocating major divisional headquarters overseas (Dicken, 1998: 209- 
210; UNCTAD, 2001:80).
Another important division unit of a large firm is its R&D facilities. 
According to Gerybadze and Reger (1999: 254) it was in the mid- 1980s that a trend 
towards investing in R&D sector in foreign countries was recognised. Generally 
speaking, multinational corporations spend more R&D than other firms, in order to 
continue to be competitive and profitable at world level. Innovation of new products 
or new processes (knowledge- specific advantages) is critically important for such 
firms in an increasingly competitive world economy (Dicken, 1998: 211). But, in 
relation to other units of a multinational corporation, R&D operations are harder to be 
relocated abroad. The main reasons are the large communication and transaction costs 
involved, because of the need by the multinational corporations to closely control 
each aspect of those activities. R&D activities can be very costly for the multinational 
corporation in order to generate the final product that will be sold to the market. 
Moreover, due to the nature of R&D, which in essence gives to the multinational 
corporation the necessary innovation and knowledge in order to maintain its 
competitive advantage against their competitors, there is a need for constant 
monitoring of those activities as well as a need for rapid decisions, which makes 
constant communication between the headquarters and the R&D department vital. 
Another reason for making the relocation of R&D department very difficult are the 
strong synergies developed between corporate R&D and the science and production 
system around it. In this respect, US and Japanese Firms have been more hesitant to 
internationalise their R&D activities in relation to European multinational 
corporations (UNCTAD, 2001: 80- 81). Nevertheless, many large firms have decided 
to engage in R&D activities outside their home country. Why is this happening? 
According to Gerybadze and Reger (1999: 261- 262) there are several reasons for this. 
First, R&D is located close only to their most dynamic markets, where a large number 
of their products is purchased. Moreover, there are countries where regulatory 
conditions, licensing procedures and standardization agreements are less strict and 
thus their new products can relatively fast be tested. Third, for a number of new 
products a close link between R&D, advanced manufacturing and efficient supplier 
network is important. Finally, it is important an R&D activity to be located in an area
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where there is abundant high- skilled and scientific personnel. Usually, such places 
are where prestigious universities are located.
However, all these reasons are mostly related to strategies followed by 
multinational corporations that aim at the global market, not separating individual 
countries. Thus, I would argue that another reason for multinational corporations to 
engage R&D activities outside their home country is local customisation. Adopting 
their product to particular national customs is very important, mainly for large 
markets. But, regardless of the strategy of the multinational corporation, the 
preconditions just mentioned seem to limit the extent to which R&D activities are 
decentralised. Depending on the aims and needs of the multinational corporations, but 
also from the policies (e.g. policies towards liberalisation) and market conditions (e.g. 
size of the market or purchasing power of the population, or even geographical 
location) of countries, different places, in different time periods are qualified as 
suitable for the location of R&D activities.
Equally important for a large firm is its production unit(s). The production unit 
is the earliest, after sales, operation to be established outside home countries. It is also 
geographically more dispersed than the functions previously analysed. As it will be 
mentioned in chapter four there are several factors that may influence the location of a 
production unit. Moreover, which and in what ways production units will be located 
abroad depend on the specific sector of a company. For example, a large firm may 
perform a globally concentrated production strategy where the whole production is 
concentrated at a single geographical location (or at least within a single country) and
go
exports to foreign markets via overseas marketing and sales network . Moreover, 
during the 20th century resource- based investment has gradually been displaced by 
import- substituting investment in other developed countries, resulting in the 
significant change of the sectoral distribution of international production. This 
evolution is also related to the increasing share of trade between developed countries. 
(Cantwell, 1991: 23; Dicken, 1998: 215; UNCTAD, 2001: 84- 85).
98 This strategy used to be followed by Japanese firms, in their first steps during their 
internationalisation.
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3.3 Models of MNE’s- A Critical Appraisal
Having presented a brief historical review of multinational corporations, at this 
point I will present the different types of multinational corporations that have been 
developed since 1945- some relating to sectors and some relating to changes over 
time. The models that are to be mentioned were developed on the basis that the 
divisions of a multinational corporation can be located in different parts of the world, 
away from their headquarters. According to Markusen and Maskus (2002: 695), this 
approach is referred to as the “knowledge- capital model” because it assumes that 
knowledge is geographically mobile and a joint input to multiple production facilities. 
Moreover, the models presented here were developed when globalisation era and its 
consequent influence to the academic community, and elsewhere, has been 
significant.
Thus, in chronological order, this analysis begins with that of Dicken (1998: 
204- 205) who argues that so far three major organisational forms of multinational 
corporations have emerged and one more is in the process to emerge. In particular, 
Dicken describes the transformation of the multinational corporation, since the inter­
war period to the present era. He gives an explanation why large firms (particularly of 
USA and large European countries) had to expand abroad by direct investment, and 
what particular organisation forms they developed in order to exploit their advantages. 
But, he places emphasis on the organisation forms the multinational corporation has 
developed in order to respond to changes in world economic conditions and not to the 
causes.
In this respect, Dicken has developed four models of multinational 
corporations, the so- called “multinational”, the “international”, the “classic global” 
and one which is on the emergence process named as the “complex global”. Before 
the analysis of each model it has to be noted that despite the fact that each model 
developed during specific historic periods, nevertheless, there is no suggestion that 
one model was successively replaced by another.
The first organisation model called “multinational” emerged during the inter­
war period as a consequence of the desire of the large firms to take advantage of
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national market differences of that era. These firms were organised at a world-wide 
scale as a portfolio of national businesses. But, because their primary aim was local 
domestic markets, subsidiaries had a significant degree of autonomy. This method of 
expansion was particularly popular among large European firms. Thus, these firms 
usually locate their subsidiaries in countries with a large population and strong 
purchasing power. Moreover, depending on the type of multinational corporation, 
they could establish subsidiaries in areas where there was availability of raw materials 
or friendly political regimes.
The second organisation model is the “international” one, which first emerged 
during the 1950s and 1960s when large American firms expanded overseas in order to 
capitalise on their firm- specific assets of technology and selling expertise. This is the 
period where Fordism collapses. As was mentioned in Chapter 1 the large western 
firms, and particularly the American ones, had to expand to new markets in order to 
keep their production levels high. These new markets were mainly in the less 
developed countries, including Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Thus, in the political and 
economic conditions that this model had to involve, there developed a management of 
far more formal co- ordination and control by the firm’s headquarters over the 
overseas subsidiaries.
Thus, apart from the domestic markets that remained important for the 
multinational corporations, new potential markets started to be created for their 
products. Domestic markets remained important because it was discovered that the 
population had a consumption mentality and of course a strong purchasing power. 
Besides, as stressed in chapter 1, one precondition for the multinationalisation of large 
western firms was the maintenance of the demand level for consumer goods in the 
advanced capitalist countries in high levels. On the other hand, new potential markets 
started to emerge in the countries where the multinational corporations expanded. The 
population there would start to familiarise itself with new products, now produced in 
its own country. Moreover, the purchasing power of those countries would start to 
increase as a result of increased investment and improvement to their economies. Of 
course, nothing could take place if it was not supported by the national governments 
of European core and periphery. In this respect there was a respective action by the 
multinational corporations and national governments of both developed and less
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developed countries of Western Europe towards an increase of consumption by the 
populations.
The third organisation model is the “classic global” one, which was first used 
by Ford in early 1900s and revived only in 1970s and 1980s by Japanese firms, which 
started their international operations. It is based upon a strict centralisation of assets 
and responsibilities in which the role of subsidiaries is to assemble and sell products, 
as well as to implement strategies already decided by the centre. In other words, 
subsidiaries have almost no ability to develop new products and strategies or modify 
existing ones. The main strength of this model is the effective use of scale economies 
and of central knowledge and expertise. This management technique ignores local 
market conditions and the ability of local learning. As mentioned in chapter 1, the 
development of this organisation model was backed by the rapid improvement of 
technology and the welfare of peripheral countries (in Europe, Asia and Latin 
America). The management started to be supported by computerised information 
systems and the tasks, which were performed by each person, were very clear.
Finally, the model that is the most recently developed one, mainly due to the 
fast and important advancements in IT sector, is the so- called “complex global” one. 
More precisely this type of multinational corporation is associated with the emergence 
of globalisation era, and it is an effort for multinational corporations to respond to the 
changing conditions of globalisation. Its main characteristics are the use of an 
integrated network organisation process, as well as of an ability to develop flexible 
co-ordinating processes. These abilities apply both internally to the firm, as well as 
outside the firm through a complex network of inter- firms relationships. This type of 
multinational corporation is more prepared to subcontract out local repair services, 
and segments of research activity in new technologies not central to its operations 
(Dicken, 1998: 203- 205).
Dickens’ analysis seems to be based on the same concept with the value chain 
approach. As argued above, for the value chains approach, a firm might develop 
certain organisational forms in order to remain competitive, depending on the type of 
commodities it produces. Dickens identifies four organisational forms that a firm may 
adopt due to the competition with other firms. Moreover, Dickens identifies the ways
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a multinational corporation organises its production and distribution processes, as 
well as the importance of local and national structures as well as institutions in the 
development of multinationalisation by the firms. In a similar way, value chains 
approach develops a similar concept in order to explain the causes of competition 
between firms.
Similarly, Belis- Bergouignan, Bordenave and Lung (2000) developed a 
typology of different forms of multinational corporations that currently operate at 
world- scale. Although their typology has many things in common with the typology 
that was developed by Dicken, on the other hand the main difference is that the 
analysis of Belis- Bergouignan, Bordenave and Lung is based on spatial homogeneity. 
According to this argument, the greater the degree of homogeneity, the greater the 
degree of hierarchical control.
More precisely, they divided the types of multinational corporations into three 
categories. The first type of multinational corporation was named “World- wide 
company”. This type of multinational corporation is both homogenous and 
ethnocentric. When such a firm invests abroad, at the beginning it duplicates the 
original company’s organisational structure. In this way the firm presents an 
homogenous form across different nations. But, as the firm is further integrated into 
the foreign countries, it develops an international division of labour. As mentioned in 
chapter 2, this means that, where international capital expands, new countries are no 
longer limited to standardised tasks (usually supplying raw materials) for the 
manufacturing of products for the developed world. On the contrary, they are further 
drawn into the framework of the world economy, not through interstate relations of 
colonialism, but in accordance with the exigencies of the framework of international 
co-operation". This evolution reinforces the position of multinational corporations 
against countries and labour, as it creates new locations for establishing 
manufacturing operations, but also new locations for consuming their final 
commodities.
99 In this respect, Sayer and Walker (1992: 7) are correct when they argue that the division of labour is 
an integral part of economic change as it is one of the basic forces of production, along with 
mechanisation, technical knowledge and capacities of workers.
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The second type of multinational corporation developed by Belis- 
Bergouignan, Bordenave and Lung is called “Multidomestic Company”. In this case 
the parent firm gives some autonomy to its subsidiaries that are located in different 
countries. They produce products that have great local influence. Nevertheless, this 
type of firm maintains important competencies, such as technology and know- how, at 
the centre. A third type of Firm is the “Multiregional Company”, which is organised 
into different, interrelated regions. The particular feature of this type of Firm is that 
the principal economic functions are decentralised. Finally, the “Transregional 
company” where activities are integrated across the world. More precisely, different 
regions are considered to be spaces of specific competencies and efforts are made for 
their co-ordination in order to work as one unit, but at a global scale. A world- wide 
set of products is produced and sold in various markets (Belis- Bergouignan, 
Bordenave and Lung, 2000: 42- 43).
On the other hand, King and Sethi (2001: 203- 205) developed a taxonomy of 
multinational corporations, mostly based on the targets set by their management. 
More precisely, a first type of such firms is the so- called export- oriented firms. Such 
a firm serves international markets via export department. The emphasis is on 
marketing and distribution efficiency. This type of multinational corporation has a 
highly centralised management structure, because the parent company controls all 
resources and decision- making processes. Another type of multinational corporation 
is named by the two authors as the parent- child configuration. This type of firm is 
characterised by a greater management experience on international markets and 
positive returns on exports. Marketing and/ or manufacturing subsidiaries are being 
developed in one or more countries outside the homeland. Management develops a 
structure of low centralisation because the operating departments of the subsidiaries, 
particularly finance, marketing production and logistics, operate independently of 
each other, as well as of the parent company. The third type is the “global firms”. 
These firms target international market without distinguishing between countries. 
Centralisation of management activity is not only high, but also vital for the success 
operation of the firm. All foreign operations are controlled and co-ordinated by the 
parent company. However, decision making is fairly decentralised. Finally, the last 
but not least type of multinational corporation, is the “portfolio management” one. 
This type of firm has approached the international market by focusing on a specific
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region, especially for production facilities. But, marketing and distribution activities 
are performed globally. Like the previous type of firms, their manufacturing activities 
are highly centralised as far as their management is concerned.
3.4 A Model for an Analysis of the Locational Determinants of FDI
But, for the purpose of this thesis, at this point, I am going to draw one 
framework in order to help understand why different types of multinationals will be 
attracted by different kinds of locational factors. In particular, instead of 
distinguishing multinational corporations to three or four types depending on the 
hierarchical control they want to exercise to their affiliates, we will adopt a simpler 
two- type organisation model of the multinational corporations. This kind of 
organisational model divides multinational corporations into “vertical” integration of 
production and “horizontal” one. This is probably the oldest and most common way 
of identifying the types of multinational corporations. Krugman (1990) in his article 
where he presents a history of the evolution of the multinational corporation since the 
end of 19th century, divides Multinational Firms to traditional (pre- 1940) ones, and 
modem ones. The traditional multinational corporation is basically the vertically 
integrated one, whereas the modem one appears to have a more horizontal 
organisation. Nevertheless, as Krugman argues (1990: 269) even in the modem 
multinational corporation someone may find many more vertical aspects than 
someone should expect.
More precisely, multinational corporations subcontract and brand their 
commodities through their subsidiaries, or other firms, in different locations all over 
the world (i.e. decentralise their operations), whereas at the same time maintain a 
vertical integration of control. Such examples are NIKE, which does not produce any 
sportswear and DELL, which does not manufacture computers. At the same time, 
other firms do not produce their commodities any more because they can make more 
profit from branding and marketing products (Perrons, 2004: 70). Of course any kind 
of management organisation a multinational corporation may choose will depend on 
the type of product it tries to make profit from. Thus, for products with a short life 
cycle, such as clothing, many firms prefer to buy the inputs they need from other, 
sometimes, native small firms, rather than establishing subsidiaries in different parts 
of the world in order to produce these commodities (Perrons, 2004: 71).
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Moreover, Grossman and Helpman (2004: 238) relate the process of vertical 
specialisation with the growth in international trade of intermediate inputs, 
components and specialised producer services. Indeed, “vertical” integration of 
production network at a world- wide scale started to (re) emerge since the mid- 1960s 
when large American electronic firms expanded overseas by establishing assembly 
operations into East and Southeast Asia as well as in Mexico. In essence it was the 
expansion of sales function of the investing firm. This relocation of production 
stimulated the development of a second industrial divide, which was related to 
flexible accumulation and the importance of cluster, that was analysed by Piore and 
Sabel in 1984 (Dunning, 1974: 22; Dicken, 1998: 217).
The main characteristics of the vertical division (i.e. internal division) of 
production include the shifts up and down the value chain (e.g. Nissan has set up 
engine assembly operations in the UK100), as well as the geographical specialisation 
by process or by semi- finished products. A third feature is an increase in the 
proportion of components acquired locally. The main purpose of such an 
organisational form is to advance or to protect market shares. The developments in 
transportation and communication technologies allowed the enhancing of flexibility 
into geographical location of the production process. More precisely, due to these 
developments, by the vertical division of production process multinational 
corporations can take advantage of production related differences between nations, or 
large regional markets such as European Single Market and NAFTA. Such differences 
may include low trade costs, stages of production that differ in factor intensities and 
countries that differ significantly in relative factor endowments (e.g. a country with 
abundant skilled labour in comparison to a country with less skilled, low waged, 
labour for final assembly). In other words, a classic New International Division of 
Labour model is described. Finally, firms, which export their production back to the 
home country of the parent company, are probably vertical investments. (Dunning, 
1974: 22; Dicken, 1998: 217; Markusen, 1998: 736, 738- 739; Oliver, N., Morris, J. 
and Wilkinson, B. 1992: 203; Ekholm and Markusen, 2002, www.econ.ku.dk. access 
date: September 2005).
100 Nissan has been in Sunderland since mid 1980s.
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The other type of multinational corporation organisation is the “horizontal” 
one, which in essence apply the opposite results. The horizontal type of organisation 
included subsidiaries located in several countries where roughly the same products are 
produced and there are positive trade costs. These subsidiaries may or may not be 
harmonized with each other or with domestic activities. They might also increase their 
product range (e.g. a local car plant starts manufacturing a new car model). Most 
common investment is of high technology or intermediate technology. This purpose 
of investment primarily targets the will of the multinational corporation to meet the 
demand of the local overseas markets, without the loss of an integrated organisation 
form. The sources of location advantages that are important for horizontal MNEs are 
trade costs (moderate to high), and a large domestic market. Finally, these horizontal 
operations attract great interest by both the host and home countries (Dunning, 1974: 
22; Markusen, 1998: 738, 739, Venables, 1999: 936; Oliver, N., Morris, J. and 
Wilkinson, B. 1992: 203, Ekholm and Markusen, 2002, www.econ.ku.dk, access date: 
September 2005).
In this respect the horizontal type of multinational corporation is mainly 
buyer/ producer driven. A multinational corporation decides to locate in one country, 
either to improve its trade costs, or to correspond effectively to the increasing demand 
for its commodities in this location. It tries to do that without easing their full 
hierarchical control against their subsidiaries. Additionally, this type of organisational 
form seems to match the arguments of the value chains approach, that examines the 
nature and content of inter- firm linkages and the power that regulates value chain co­
ordination (in this respect, how a horizontal firm arranges its relationships with its 
affiliates, keeping at the same time full control of the affiliates’ production and 
decisions taken?). Similarly, in order for a horizontal type multinational corporation 
to expand in new locations, very important is the role played by the local and national 
structures as well as institutions of the country that the investment is going to take 
place. How important is this role, and how local and national structures, as well as 
institutions, affect the decision of a firm to expand abroad, is examined by the value- 
chains approach.
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3.5 The Organisation of Multinational Corporations that Greece May Attract
Having looked at the structure of multinational corporations in the context of 
the evolution of the economy it is now possible to advance some hypotheses or 
expectations about the types of firm that may be attracted to Greece. Usually, high 
trade barriers that lead to moderate to high trade costs encourage (horizontal) direct 
investment between countries that are similar in size and in relative endowments, but 
discourage (vertical) direct investment between countries that are dissimilar in relative 
endowments. The latter because the HQ country needs to be able to import the final 
product at relatively low cost (Markusen, 1998: 753). Thus, having this conclusion by 
Markusen in mind, I suggest that Greece is preferred by horizontally organised 
MNEs. The reasons are that Greece nowadays is considered as part of a large regional 
market, that of the European Single Market. At the same time, geographically, Greece 
is located far from the large European markets and consequently trade costs are 
considered moderate to high, depending on the nature of industry activity. Thus, any 
multinational corporation that desires to have a strong presence in the Greek market, 
is highly likely to prefer the solution of establishing a subsidiary in Greece that will 
produce the same or roughly the same products as in the other large European 
Markets. This subsidiary will also include a strong marketing and sales department, 
essential for keeping and expanding its market share in the local market, but it will not 
include an R&D department as the research for developing new products takes place 
elsewhere. Finally, local management may have a moderate to high degree of 
autonomy in decisions that concern the domestic market, but relies on the parent 
company as far as the transfer of knowledge and expertise related to marketing and 
sales techniques, which are to be followed. In that sense, Greece should not be 
appropriate as a location for producing semi- finished products as part of a world­
wide production chain, and thus discourages “vertically” organised multinational 
corporations for choosing the country as a potential investment location.
The just mentioned hypothesis can be partially supported by Venables (1996: 
341- 342) who argues that the location decision of a firm depends on the interaction 
between production costs and easy access to the markets. More precisely, firms will 
tend to locate close to the large markets (in relation to locations that firms have higher 
trade costs) where high wages exist and thus attract more population. This further 
enlarges the market and creates agglomeration forces for the firms, i.e. attract more
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firms. Thus, firms in the downstream industry will have lower costs if they locate 
where there are relatively many upstream firms because in that way they can save 
trade costs on their intermediate inputs. Nevertheless, Greece fails to attract vertically 
integrated industries for the reasons just mentioned in the hypothesis that is to be 
tested is this thesis.
3.6 Conclusion
The patterns of FDI have been changing due to the changes in the organisation 
forms of multinational corporations (UNCTAD, 2001: 85). On the other hand, it is 
highly likely that technological and organisational changes will lead to more cross- 
border cooperative forms. In the era of globalisation, multinational corporations 
possess a competitive advantage, which considers that the convergence of industrial 
structures is not only inevitable, but also desirable. For this reason the idea that the 
evolution towards a single model of industrial organisation is the aim should be 
rejected. On the contrary, as Belis- Bergouignan, Bordenave and Lung argue (2000: 
51) it is necessary to adopt a wider theoretical framework, which integrates different 
forms of spatial organisation.
As far as Greece is concerned, I argue that horizontally organised firms are 
most likely to invest in the country. If this is true (something that will be shown by the 
results of the questionnaire), then the number of multinational corporations that could 
invest in the country decreases a lot. Only firms that aim to the benefits of the 
domestic market (e.g. local resources or maintain or increase their market share) could 
probably come and invest. But, Greece being in the EU Single Market, and having in 
mind the developments in technology (i.e. in telecommunications and transport), then 
another equally or even more developed country (e.g. Italy) could get the investment 
and then Greece being serviced by this multinational corporation via exports.
Besides, as it was analysed in the introductory part of this thesis the majority 
of investment goes from one developed country to other developed ones. According 
to Markusen and Maskus (2002: 695) this indicates that horizontal investment is much 
more important in the world economy than vertical. The reason is found in the 
characteristics of the horizontal investment in relation to the vertical one, as they were 
analysed in the previous lines. This argument implies that horizontal investment is the
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kind of investment countries should desire. From that point of view, in the case of 
Greece, if it is finally shown that the country attracts mostly horizontal investment 
then it could be argued that Greece benefits much more than the numbers by 
themselves (i.e. FDI inflows per year) display. Greece gets significant advantages for 
its economy (e.g. technology and management transfer), which are also very hard to 
be quantitatively measured, than it should get if only the country was a destination for 
vertical investments.
Equally it is very difficult for Greece to compete with Eastern European 
countries (since 2004 most of them are full Member States of the European Union and 
in 2007 Bulgaria and Romania also expect to join it) in order to attract vertically 
integrated multinational corporations. Usually, such firms target low waged countries 
in order to establish their subsidiary as part of an integrated production system. In 
other words, for vertical investments, factor endowment variations are of particular 
importance (Markusen and Maskus: 2002: 695; Ekholm and Markusen, 2002, 
www.econ.ku.dk, access date: September 2005). But, how much such an investment 
contributes to the increase in capacity of management capital of a country? In other 
words how beneficial is such an investment for the overall development of an 
economy? These are questions that should be answered in the case of Eastern 
European countries that attract a large number of vertical investments, mostly as a 
result of their cheap labour factor.
In the next chapter there is an analysis about the factors affecting the decision 
for investment by multinational corporations. It is shown that factors, and their 
relative importance in influencing the decision of a MNC to invest in one country in 
relation to another one, depend on the type of the firm/ product. In the last section of 
the next chapter the role of incentives in attracting FDI is presented. Currently the 
competition between countries to attract foreign investors has brought to the fore the 
importance of incentives.
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CHAPTER IV
Factors Affecting the Location of Multinational Corporations
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter the factors that currently affect the location decision- making 
process of multinational corporations is going to take place. In particular, having in 
mind the theories of location developed in chapter II, as well as the changing nature of 
the world- economic conditions, especially since the spread of globalisation that was 
explained in chapter I, as well as the nature of the multinational corporations analysed 
in chapter III, we will try to give the current importance of certain location factors in 
the decision- making process of a multinational corporation. After this analysis we 
will be able to match in a table different factors with different types of firms 
(depending on their activities and commodities produced). In the second part of this 
chapter, special attention will be given to the role of incentives provided by 
governments in order to attract FDI. The reason is that since countries have become 
more vulnerable to competition by other countries, they have devoted a lot of 
resources (in the form of subsidies, investment promotion agencies and laws) in order 
to convince multinational corporations to invest in their territories. This section will 
allow us to identify how important these efforts have been by the countries in order to 
become a more attractive location. The last section of this chapter will refer to another 
(not locational factor) that its analysis may give some hints regarding the low 
performance of Greece in FDI attraction. As we referred a little above, the changing 
nature of the world- economic conditions was also a result of the collapse of the ex- 
communist regimes. In this respect a lot of native Greek, and foreign firms located in 
Greece, started to invest in the neighbouring countries, as the Greek entrepreneurs 
offered the advantage of being more familiar with the mentality of the people in the 
south-eastern Europe, in relation to other European countries. As a result, since 1990, 
Greece became among the top outward FDI investors in South- Eastern Europe, i.e. 
Greece is not any more just a recipient of FDI, but on the contrary, like most of the 
mature western countries, has a very good performance in outward FDI.
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4.2 Which Factors Affect the Decision for Investments by the Multinational 
Corporations?
In this section focus is going to be on the conditions created in the world 
economy and their effect on the behaviour of enterprises. In particular, globalisation 
and the lift of economic barriers in a large number of countries have changed the 
behaviour of firms. Consequently, the “demands” of a firm to invest in a country have 
also altered. These “demands” became more specialised depending also on the type of 
investment and the produced commodity101. The changing economic and business 
conditions is obvious that have also made somewhat superannuated some of the 
location theories, as it was criticised in chapter II previously.
Location theories seem to explain satisfactory the location decisions taken by 
multinational corporations. But, most of them tried to explain the behavior of firms in 
a perfectly competitive environment102. The reason is that the theories of location do 
not take into consideration limitations imposed by countries to FDI. Moreover, 
location theories do not take into consideration incentive packages that countries 
currently offer in order to attract foreign firms. In particular, no scholar of the 
traditional location theory seemed to have taken into account the case of incentives 
provided by a national state in order to compensate an investor for the competitive 
advantages of another location. All factors contributing to the optimal location of a 
firm were related to the characteristics of the area and the firm. In this respect, Alfred 
Weber’s theory with regard to the optimal location of a plant, for example, could be 
supplemented by regarding one more factor, apart from the natural, technical, general 
or special factors, that of the government factor with regard to the determination of 
the optimal location. It is evident that the addition of one more factor will distort the 
balance of Weber’s theory. Nevertheless, it is questionable the degree to which the 
factor of government incentives would affect differently the conclusions of Weber. 
The reason is that, as it will be argued in the last part of this chapter, even today, there 
is a lot of discussion about how much in account we should take the factor of 
investment incentives when regarding the location- decision making process of the
101 Besides, as Massey (1995: 13) argues, locational requirements themselves are an outcome of the 
characteristics and ever- changing demands of industry.
102 See the analysis about Ricardo, Heckscher and Ohlin, Weber and Losch in chapter II.
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firms. Thus, the purpose of this section is to explain how multinational corporations 
“behave” in the globalised world we live. What factors and to what extent might 
influence the decision of a firm to invest in one country in relation to another one? 
This is the first step to explain the behaviour of the multinational corporations.
In the contemporary world there is a whole list of factors that shape the 
decision for investment in one country. All countries seek the right incentive package, 
which attracts FDI. This concern is higher for the peripheral countries of the European 
Union. Factors such as the size of the market, economic and fiscal policies, labour 
characteristics, infrastructure, political conditions, etc. still remain influential on the 
decision of a multinational corporation to invest. European integration has changed 
the comparative advantages of countries and highlighted the role of national 
institutions and capabilities in location decisions (Barrell and Pain, 1999: 925). But, 
these factors in isolation cannot play an important role in the decision of a firm to 
invest in one country. On the contrary this decision is the result of a mixture of 
factors, depending also on the type of investment.
In the following analysis, the factors influencing the decision-making process 
are divided into two large categories: first the host country factors, which include the 
market characteristics, employment and resources characteristics, and second the 
multinational corporations’ factors, which include transportation, linkages and 
strategic decisions characteristics. This division has taken place depending on two 
criteria: first, on which side each factor is closer related, i.e. the formation of the 
market characteristics are primarily a responsibility of the host county, while the 
strategic decisions are primarily a responsibility of the multinational corporation. 
Second, the differentiation will take place on the basis of internal and external 
benefits or losses, i.e. those positive or negative effects on the production capabilities 
of a firm, which are the result of the firm’s own decision-making and thus controlled 
by its own managers (internal benefits or losses). On the other hand, external benefits 
or losses exist when the effects of a decision taken by the firm’s managers are 
independent of their action, e.g. time losses in transport resulting from adverse 
weather conditions, or bad transport network).
112
There are many factors influencing the location of a firm or plant. The relative 
significance of each of these factors depends on the type of the firm carrying out the 
investment. The factors shape the profile of a country or region. The first such factor 
is the market size and its relevant absorptive capacity of the host country, i.e. the 
extent to which a country can adopt the new foreign technologies and alternative 
management methods “imported” by a multinational corporation. According to 
Dunning (1993: 58), such markets will have been serviced previously by exports 
firms, either because of tariff or other cost-raising barriers imposed by host countries. 
When conditions change then these firms are established in those large markets and 
produce locally. But, Dunning seems to neglect the significance of multinational 
corporations developing off shore plants in order to reduce costs. On the other hand, 
the adaptive capacity of the host country mostly depends on institutional factors, such 
as legislative framework and political stability and scale factors, such as balance of 
payments limitations and the size of the internal market for the goods produced via 
FDI (de Mello, 1999:134).
Secondly, a very important factor is agglomeration (or external) economies. 
As mentioned in chapter II, this concept, which was first introduced by Alfred 
Marshall in 1890s, but was also analysed by Weber, Losch and the New Economic 
Geography scholars who analysed the current effects of agglomeration economies, 
mirrors the geographical proximity between firms performing different, but linked, 
operations in the production chain. Agglomeration economies rarely occur at the 
international level. Mostly they are an interregional or interurban phenomenon 
(Guimaraes, Figueiredo and Woodward, 2000: 116). They result from the spatial 
concentration of existing economic activity.
From the time of Marshall and Weber, as analysed in chapter II, the benefits of 
agglomeration economies have been stressed. In particular, the purpose of such a 
geographical proximity is the minimization of transaction costs involved. Firms 
operating in the same or linked economic activities draw on a shared pool of skilled or 
unskilled labour and specialised input suppliers. Additional benefits derived by the 
geographical proximity of firms are face- to face contacts, social and cultural 
interaction, and development of knowledge and innovation (Guimaraes, Figueiredo 
and Woodward, 2000: 122, Dickens, 1998: 11, Braunerhjelm and Svensson, 1996:
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834). In other words, agglomeration economies take place because in a large local 
market it is easier to find the needed quantity of intermediate goods for the final 
product, resulting to lower production costs.
Additionally, a concentration of a certain sector in a market (e.g. financial or 
IT sector) has the advantage of sustaining a crowded specialised local labour market, 
because in such an “economic environment” employers may find easier recruits and 
vice versa (Krugman, 1998: 8). Nowadays the source of external economies derives 
from supplier’s network, sub-contractors, university, research centres (depending on 
the nature of the firm), etc. Agglomeration economies are important for both market- 
oriented and export oriented firms. As mentioned in chapter II, Marshall (1961: 271) 
and Weber (1929: 20- 21) identified the importance of agglomeration economies with 
regard to the plant firm. But, in relation to the current multinational corporation, 
researches that have taken place during the last two decades have shown that 
agglomeration economies are particularly important for foreign firms, especially if 
laws, customs, and so forth are less familiar for the foreign investor (Schoenberger in 
1985, Braunerhjelm and Svensson in 1996, Guimaraes, Figueiredo and Woodward in 
2000). In such a case agglomeration economies can offset these costs. Ireland and 
Portugal are typical examples of it. Having the advantage of being close to the large 
European markets, Ireland and Portugal offset the disadvantage of being small and 
relatively unknown economically and politically countries. Moreover, both countries 
have managed to create conditions of agglomeration economies by creating clusters of 
small businesses that mainly produce intermediate goods for the multinational 
corporations that have been located in the country (Gorg and Ruane, 2000: 224, 
Guimaraes, Figueiredo and Woodward in 2000: 124). According to the findings of 
Gorg and Ruane (2000: 233) linkages seem to increase over time, i.e. new firms 
attracted to Ireland start off with relatively low linkages, which however increase over 
time. This is of particular importance because multinational corporations, mainly in 
the high-tech sector, which apply Just-in-Time techniques, continuously require 
adequate stock supplies in order to cope with competition. Of course, the nature of the 
linkages would vary depending on the type of product.
103 Despite the fact that indigenous firms in the electronic sector have higher linkages with domestic 
suppliers than foreign firms, nevertheless, the gap between these groups has narrowed over time (Gorg 
and Ruane, 2000: 224).
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A third factor is political stability. This factor used to be taken in great 
consideration by multinational corporations during the years of Cold War. In 
particular, American Firms were, and probably still are, very sensitive in terms of 
political stability in a foreign country. Although this is the same with the European 
multinationals, the latter have a history where have taken more entrepreneurial risks 
than their American counterparts. On the contrary, Schoenberger (1985: 253) argues 
that for an American multinational corporation the previous policies of a State 
towards multinational capital, and especially the likelihood of nationalisation or 
control of the investment decisions taken by the firms, can have some bearing on, 
even slightly, the location decision.
In addition, both the traditional location theory and the New Economic 
Geography suggest that the key factors leading to the spatial concentration of activity 
are: economies of localisation, economies of agglomeration and the presence of a pool 
of skilled labour. These factors continue to be important in shaping firm’s decisions 
even when recognising the contemporary multi- plant firm. But, in relation to the 
general factor of skilled labour mentioned by these theories, the contemporary 
structure of the firm pays attention to other labor features such as its costs and 
existing unionisation. Again the relative significance of any of the characteristics 
(general or specialised ones) of the workforce that might affect a location decision 
depends on the specific character of the firm and its broader strategy. For example, an 
assembly production plant is unlikely to be established in an area where there are high 
labour wages. Of course this cannot always be the norm. According to US managers, 
their main concern is not high wages, but rather issues such as work rules, flexibility 
and management control over production (Schoenberger, 1985: 254). Additionally, 
Devereux and Griffith (1998) have expressed doubts whether countries with a low 
wage labour force will definitely be a magnet for investment104. Like Vernon105 
(1966) Devereux and Griffith (1998: 336) argue that the choice is more likely to 
depend on the demand for different kinds of labour during the different production
104 This is also verified by the research of Devereux and Griffith. They found that although in theory 
marginal unit labour costs and average unit labour should be important in determining the level of 
output in a given location and the choice of location respectively, in practice these two units cannot be 
distinguished; and the measured used does not play an important role in any of the strategic choices 
(Devereux and Griffith, 1998: 363).
105 See chapter II
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stages. More precisely, some firms may chose low wage areas to establish routine 
production stages, whereas medium wage areas to establish more value adding 
production. Other firms, which have extensive R&D projects or increased 
administrative demands, are more likely to be located in areas with abundant highly 
paid scientific labour force. Nevertheless, in practice low wages and transport costs 
often lead to opposing decisions. Usually, low wages are found in less developed 
countries106, whereas low transport costs are found in most developed countries in 
which the markets are more likely to be107. The reason is that, as Krugman (1991) 
argues, for firms that produce commodities with high transport costs, attractive 
locations for production are those that are close to markets and suppliers. 
Nevertheless, how companies trade off these opposing choices depends on the nature 
of the product and the general strategy of the firm, something that makes theoretical 
generalization difficult.
Equally important is the ample supply of labour. It can be argued that a 
country, which has excess supply of labour, will be an attractive location for 
investments. The reason is that high unemployment rates make people lower their 
values as far as their ideal job and wage are concerned. On the subject of labour 
unionisation, although the‘logic dictates that a country with resilient unions will deter 
multinational corporations from investing there, this is not always true. On the 
contrary, high levels of unionisation might have a positive effect on the decision to 
invest. This can be explained by the argument that a union membership boosts the 
morale of the workers, which in turn increases their productivity, which sequentially 
attracts FDI. In other words, unionisation is anticipated with higher wages and higher 
productivity, so the effects also vary by the type of firm. However, unionisation is not 
always welcomed by multinational corporations. According to Schoenberger (1985: 
254), many American companies have shown an aversion to any form of unionisation. 
As these companies have explained, the reason is not the possible higher wage levels, 
but rather issues such as employment rules, flexibility and management control over 
production, i.e. they are cautious with regard to hidden labour costs rather than the
106 One important factor behind the recent periphelisation of production (within countries, but also 
internationally) is often argued to be the release of industry from ties to traditional labour, and its 
acquisition thereby of a new geographical flexibility (Massey, 1995: 31).
107 However, in some industry sectors transport costs may not be relevant at all, e.g. software 
production.
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price of labour. In United Kingdom, in some cases, multinational corporations 
negotiate a one union presence in order to avoid dealing with several unions. 
Nevertheless, even these companies, which were averse to unions, did not consider 
unionisation as an adequate reason to deter further investments from their side. 
Moreover, it worth pointing out that level of unionisation has been falling, at least in 
the European Union.
From the very beginning of the location theory has been pointing out the 
importance of the availability of certain resources by the host country on the decision 
of a firm about where to invest. In particular, in the traditional location theory, 
Ricardo (1817) with the principle of comparative advantage, as well as Heckscher and 
Ohlin (1919), who advanced the principle of comparative advantage, but also in the 
new trade theory Weber (1929) when referred to the regional factors that are 
important for a firm and Vernon (1966), and finally the scholars who represent the 
New Economic Geography though (in 1990s) all have referred to the importance of 
having the host country certain resources available. These resources include adequate 
infrastructure and a certain degree of urbanisation. By adequate infrastructure is 
meant the existence of good transport facilities (road, rail and air), availability at a 
low cost of facilities such as telecommunications, energy and water, the accessibility 
to sites and premises for buying or renting by the multinational corporations, as well 
as the existing of environmental regulations and procedures (Christodoulou, 1996: 
24). These service agglomeration and urbanisation economies potentially bolster 
productivity and attract more firms in a locality. A high degree of urbanisation means 
a concentration of consumers and labour force, something that is to the benefit of the 
firm, assuming it is intending to supply the local market.
Although technology has significantly contributed to the decrease of transfer 
time and distance, nevertheless, both still may affect the decision of some 
multinational corporations. In the theory of New International Division of Labour the 
decentralisation of certain production activities in peripheral countries or continents 
would not be possible without the decrease of distance via minimisation of transfer 
times. The significance of transfer time and distance varies according to the type of 
industry. At our time, distance is important due to the supply of transferable inputs,
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the demand of transferable outputs108, or both. But, in the current extremely 
competitive environment, apart from geographical distance, equally important is the 
reliability of supply. The importance of distance and reliability of supply is 
highlighted by Schoenberger (1985: 252) when she argues that the highly competitive 
environment of modem world means that a product might not be sold at all if it cannot 
be provided when it is wanted and according to certain specifications. Thus, the worry 
is not that the additional transportation makes the product more expensive, hence less 
competitive in the market. For example, distance is a very important constituent for a 
purely export-oriented company or a firm that apply Just-in-Time techniques. In the 
latter case, a firm might increase its transportation cost because of the need to provide 
flexible and punctual deliveries (Head, Ries and Swenson, 1995: 227).
Furthermore, it is argued that network linkages109 can be an important 
determinant at the choice of location by a multinational corporation. The reason is that 
linkages (with local firms) can contribute to the enhancement, maintenance or the 
restoration of a company’s position to the market. Chen and Chen (1998: 445- 449) 
argue that this is particularly relevant with firms, which enter for a first time a market, 
as well as with the high-tech industries where linkages are of particular importance. 
Furthermore, linkages are important for entering a “primitive” market, in contrast to a 
“mature” one where institutions that smooth the progress of internationalization are 
still absent. In other words, in a “primitive” market a multinational corporation is 
almost certain that is going to need the knowledge of local services in order to offset 
the lack of institutions that facilitate the establishment of foreign firms.
Finally, strategic decisions can play a significant role for investment in a 
country. Decisions such as the need on the part of the foreign company to preserve 
existing foreign markets and foreign investment against encroachments by 
competitors110; the desire to maintain or even to expand a foothold in a protected
108 Transferable inputs/ outputs are products such as fuels, materials, some kind of services, or event 
information that can be moved to a given location from wherever they are produced (Hoover and 
Giarratani, 1999, ch.2: 9).
109 Chen and Chen distinguish between two kinds of network linkages: the internal (intra-firm) ones 
and the external (inter-firm) ones. The latter is separated into strategic and relational linkages (Chen 
and Chen, 1998: 445-449).
110 A reason to this might be that the initial investment of the company resulted to the speed up of the 
plans by other competitors.
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market; either to gain or maintain a source of supply that in the long run may prove 
useful; the need to develop and sustain parent-subsidiary relations; the desire to 
induce the host country into a long term loyalty to a particular type of technology and 
know-how; the advantage of complementing another type of investment (Petrochilos, 
1989: 12-16). Moreover, a new investment in the market can aim to the improvement 
of the speed of response to orders, the increase of responsiveness to local demand 
patterns and the improvement of after sales support (Christodoulou, 1996: 60).
The above discussion ends with two major conclusions. The first one is that it 
is not possible to assess the significance of different factors in isolation, according to 
theories based on conceptual ideas, having also in mind the analysis of chapter II. On 
the other hand, empirical analysis considers how these analytical tendencies intersect 
in particular instances. In particular, the empirical analysis provides an indication of 
the determinants of industrial location and how they vary by the type of firm. The 
scale and nature of FDI is subject to all or some of the above-presented 
characteristics. Nevertheless, even if a country has all or the majority of the above 
factors, or it adopts policies towards this direction, this does not guarantee the 
attraction of FDI. This is a very complicated process depending on a variety of 
factors, such as the international circumstances, the multinational corporations 
business plans and of course the long-term (economic, political etc.) conditions of the 
country in question.
Whether it is a dependent/ development firm (Turok), whether it has a world 
product mandate, whether it is a cost sensitive firm (Amin), all these three writers 
discuss different types of firm with respect to their likely development impact on the 
region. But, the categorisation in Table 4.1 is also useful for thinking about their 
differential locational requirements. Thus, the Table below identifies the importance 
of different variables for the different types of firms in relation to the regional 
economies of European Union111.
111 In order for the reader to understand the changing importance of the different variables for the 
different types of firm in relation to Ireland, Portugal and Greece, he or she must also have in mind the 
analysis of the socio- economic characteristics of the three countries that took place in the first chapter.
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Table 4.1- Relation between type of firmJ product and factors
Type of firm / product
Factors High Tech - 
just in time
High Tech - 
Research
Export Oriented Routine
Manufacturing
D om estic
Oriented
The size of the host market Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Absorptive capacity of the 
host country
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
A good base o f related and 
supportive industries
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Previous governmental 
policies towards MNE
Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Availability o f certain 
resources
Yes No Yes Yes No
Characteristics o f the work 
force
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance (transportation 
costs)
Yes No Yes No No
Network linkages Yes Yes Yes No No
Strategic decisions Yes No No No Yes
Understanding the decision- making process of a multinational corporation is 
not an easy task. In today’s globalised world it is necessary to re-evaluate the way 
firms compete between each other, but also the way regions see the prospect of a 
foreign investment being established in their land. Furthermore, what makes a 
multinational corporation choose one location against another one has to be examined 
in the context of the multi- objective nature of most facility location decisions. Thus, 
for example, a multinational corporation that seeks to invest in a market and create a 
production unit solely for export- oriented products, will probably, among other 
things, examine the absorptive capacity of the potential country (i.e. how fast the host 
country will be able to adopt the new technology and management techniques the 
multinational corporation is going to import) if there is a good base of related 
products, the previous governmental policies towards multinational corporations, the 
availability of certain resources which will be necessary for the production of its 
commodities, as well as the transportation costs and network linkages. Moreover, this 
kind of firm will be interested in the characteristics of the labour force in the area as 
well as for the size of the host market (see also Table 4.1). Finally, in such a firm, the 
impact of tax rates is going to be higher than a firm that aims at the internal market 
because in a number of surveys, the managers of these firms have responded more 
positively to tax incentives. The reason is that export oriented firms operate in highly 
competitive markets with very thin margins. Moreover, these firms are often highly
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mobile and more likely to compare taxes across alternative locations (Morisset and 
Pimia, 2002: 10-11).
It is evident that factors differ according to the type of the investment as well 
as the commodity produced. But, as it was previously said, certain characteristics by 
themselves are not a sufficient element for the attraction of FDI. Countries may also 
provide investment packages in order to tempt firms to prefer them in relation to 
another country with more or less similar features. But it has to be made clear that 
rarely can incentives turn a poorly developed location into an acceptable one. “What a 
good incentive package can do is to represent a decisive factor among roughly equal 
alternatives. Incentives should be combined with other factors as part of a ‘big 
picture’ comparison of contending sites” (Donovan, 1999: 1).
4.3 The Role of Business Facilitation Measures (Incentives)
Location factors are one aspect for the attraction of investment in one country. 
Nowadays, the advancement of technology, as well as the opening of the markets, has 
forced countries to become more competitive in order to attract foreign investment. 
One way for the countries to increase their competitiveness is the initiation of policy 
measures aiming to the facilitation of investment. These measures may include 
investment promotion, incentives, after-investment services and improvements in 
amenities and measures that reduce the "hassle costs" of doing business. While these 
measures are not new, they have proliferated as a means of competing for the 
attraction of FDI. This competition has as a consequence, business facilitation 
measures to become more sophisticated, increasingly targeting individual investors, 
even though this involves high human capital and other costs (UNCTAD, 1999:10).
According to UNCTAD, differences in FDI performance between countries 
can be explained by three factors, which play a part in the choice of firms as regard 
foreign investment locations and determine where they invest abroad. These factors 
are: the policies of host countries (including the core regulatory framework for FDI), 
the proactive measures that countries adopt to promote and facilitate investment and 
the characteristics of their economies. All three factors undergo changes brought 
about by the process of globalisation (UNCTAD, 1999:2). To these three factors I
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would add one more, that of the nature of the multinational corporations. In the 
previous chapters we analysed how the firm was developed during the periods of 
world economic crises in order to survive. In each such crisis there were new 
locations that have benefited. Moreover, according to the type of the firm, there are 
locations that are more appropriate for the establishment of a firm in relation to 
others. For example, a firm that bases its success on innovation of its products and 
thus spends each year a large amount of money in R&D will prefer to locate in 
countries with abundant scientific personnel.
On the other hand, host countries usually maintain considerable discretion in 
the use of incentives, allowing them to differentiate investment by industry, size and 
location (UNCTAD, 2003: 123). But, it is very difficult to refer ourselves to every 
single type of incentive and its effects to the attraction of FDI. In general terms a 
government has four administrative instruments with which they may encourage a 
firm, whether domestic or foreign, to make an investment that would not otherwise 
do: regulation, tax incentives, subsidy and reduction of uncertainty (Robinson, 1987:
3).
A first such measure is the regulation initiated by a government. Since the 
beginning of 1990s more and more countries have initiated regulatory changes 
towards greater liberalisation of business practices. On the contrary very few 
countries have moved towards the opposite direction. This process has also been 
facilitated by the expansion of globalisation. According to Table 4.2, over the period 
1993-2001, indeed, the vast majority of changes in the regulatory FDI regimes of 
countries were in the direction of liberalization. For example, in 2001, 71 countries 
initiated changes in their economic environment. Thus, from a total number of 208 
countries, 194 had regulatory regimes characterized as liberalized, where as just 14 
had a controlled economy.
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Table 4.2: National Regulatory Changes, 1993- 2001
NATIONAL REGULATORY CHANGES, 1993- 2001
ITEM 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
N um ber of countries 
that introduced 
ch an g es  in their 
investm ent regim es. 57 49 64 65 76 60 63 69 71
N um ber of regim es 102 110 112 114 151 145 140 150 208
Of which
In the  direction of
liberalisation or11?promoting 101 108 106 98 135 136 131 147 194
In the  direction of 
control113 1 2 6 16 16 9 9 3 14
Source: UNCTAD, 2002:7.
This trend towards greater liberalisation has as result investors currently facing 
a wide range of investment opportunities. This wide range of investment opportunities 
is divided into two kinds of incentives: legislated and discretionary ones. The first 
ones are “on- the- books” and available to any firm that meets certain governmental 
standards. The second ones are customised and provided only for specific projects 
(Robinson, 1987: 9; Donovan, 1999:1). The latter are often met in very large 
investments (e.g. establishment of a car plant in a country) that need special 
negotiations between the government of the interested country and the multinational 
corporation planning the investment, or it might be the result of a trade treaty between 
two or more nations. Incentives target both new and expanding businesses, but they 
sometimes target one of the two. The new investment law (L. 3299/ 2004) in Greece 
for example gives 5 per cent higher subsidy to new investments in relation to existing 
ones. Incentives may also favour small firms over large ones, or vice versa. In the new 
investment law of Greece again, small and medium enterprises are granted 5 per cent 
higher subsidy in relation to larger firms. Also, incentives normally depend on a 
variety of factors including the needs and priorities of a country. Nevertheless, the 
vast amount of incentives are found in less prosperous areas114, unless the project is 
viewed as highly desirable by local authorities or the central government, e.g. the 
establishment of R&D facilities. Normally, the result is that declining areas are more 
likely to offer attractive packages for the attraction of investments.
112 Including liberalizing changes or changes aimed at strengthening market functioning, as w ell as 
increased incentives.
113 Including changes aim ed at increasing control as w ell as reducing incentives.
114 According to Brewer and Y oung (1997: 185), incentives are regarded within the European U nion as 
an instrument o f  regional policy.
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A second mode used by governments in order to attract investments is tax 
incentives. These usually imply a tax reduction from what normally is imposed on 
inputs, outputs and/or financial results, provided the firm satisfies certain 
circumstances (Robinson, 1987: 4). Thus, low taxation is generally considered a very 
important incentive for the attraction of a foreign firm. For example, Head, Ries and 
Swenson (1999: 209) argue that high corporate taxes have a negative effect on the 
decision of Japanese firms to invest in a foreign country. Moreover, according to 
Barrios, Gorg and Strobl (2002: 3), as well as to Stopford (1987:79), Ireland’s tax 
policy, which is characterised by generous tax relief, has been generally recognised as 
a key factor in its success to attract international investors over the last two decades. 
But, the impact of tax policy may differ greatly depending on the features of the 
multinational enterprise. Foreign investors often have at their hands several 
alternative methods of structuring and financing their investments and of course 
returning profits to themselves. Additionally, a tax incentive can be applied only after 
a firm has started its operational activities. This is because according to Robinson 
(1987: 8) tax incentives in anticipation are rarely effective in stimulating the 
development of new projects.
4.3: European Union 15 Member States Tax Rates
European Union 15 Member States
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Austria 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 25 25
Belgium 40.17 40.17 40.17 40.17 40.17 40.17 40.17 33.99 33.99 33.99 33.99
Denmark 34 34 34 32 32 30 30 30 30 28 28
Finland 28 28 28 28 29 29 29 29 29 26 26
France 33.66 33.66 41.66 40 33.66 35.33 34 33 34.33 34.33 33.83 33.33
Germany 59 57.5 56.6 52 3 51.6 38.36 38.36 39.58 38.29 38.31 38.34
& e 35 40 40 40 40 37.5 35 35 35 29
Ireland 38 36 32 28 24 20 16 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5
Italy 53.2 5.2 41.25 41.25 41.25 40.25 40.25 38.25 37.25 37.25 37.25
Luxembourg 40.29 30.34 37.45 37.45 37.45 37.45 30.38 30.38 30.38 30.38 30.38
Netherlands 35 35 35 35 35 35 34.5 34.5 34.5 31 5 31.5
Portugal 396 39.6 37.4 374 37.4 35.2 33 33 27.5 27.5 27.5
Spain 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
Sweden 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
United Kingdom 33 31 31 31 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
Source: www.kpm.com, access date: 28*December 2006
In spite of the “spread” of globalisation, the competition between countries to 
attract FDI, and in our case, the completion o f the Single Market, there are still great 
differences in the tax rates between countries. Characteristic is the example between
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Greece and Ireland, which are in the forefront of our analysis. In Greece the profit of a 
foreign firm is taxed with 29 per cent115, where as in Ireland only with 12.5 per cent. 
Common sense would dictate that Greece with great difficulty would attract firms that 
target an important percentage of profit. This is also true with export- oriented firms. 
These prefer a policy by the government, which includes tax holidays and tariff 
concessions. On the other hand, theoretically speaking, this high level of taxation 
gives Greece several options to reduce corporate taxes to more competitive levels. 
But, any such attempt will have negative results for the State revenues. In this case 
the argument might be that lower taxes might attract more investors and thus increase 
the tax base in the long run and so compensate for the initial losses, but this again is a 
risky precognition116. On the other hand, a market penetration firm would prefer 
incentives that protect the market, such as tariff and quota protection (Rolfe, Ricks, 
Pointer and McCarthy, 1993: 338). This is also a more appealing method on behalf of 
countries. This is because tax incentive schemes may minimise the initial effect on the 
budget of a country. Furthermore, differences in taxation levels between the host 
country and the home country may influence the flow of FDI. According to Clegg and 
Scott- Green (1999: 601), if the taxation levels in the home country are higher than in 
the host country, then there will be a flow of FDI from the former to the latter.
Of significant importance is also the interaction between the home and host 
countries’ taxation regimes and its resulting effect on FDI flows. More precisely, 
currently, home country corporate income tax levels and norms, about how taxes paid 
in the host country are considered at home should influence FDI. First, this influence 
was recognised long ago by the bilateral agreements that were signed to avoid double 
taxation of income between countries. In U. S. A. for example, the foreign tax paid 
by U. S. enterprises can be claimed as a tax credit on the U. S. tax liabilities (up to a 
rate of 35 per cent). Similar tax credit systems are used by Japan and U. K. where as 
other countries such as Canada, France, Australia, Germany, exempt more or less any 
profits earned abroad from home- taxation (Morisset and Pimia, 2002: 17).
115 Until recently tax rate in Greece was even higher. Only since 2005 this rate was diminished, first at 
32 per cent and in 2006 at 29 per cent.
116 Lower tax rates will not definitely result in attracting more foreign investors. The reason is that, 
nowadays, countries have more similarities than differences and attracting FDI does not only depend 
on taxation levels. For example, a country with higher taxation levels could provide to international 
investors better infrastructure or access to a larger market in relation to a country with lower taxation 
levels.
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Another form of investment promotion is subsidy. According to Robinson 
(1987: 4) a subsidy is the provision by a government to a firm of specific services or 
other inputs at below market prices. The aim of the government might be the transfer 
of funds by the firm for doing research and development in a specific locality, or for 
maintaining employment at a given level, etc. Usually, a country may initiate a range 
of incentives only after it has decided the type of investments that wishes to attract. 
Thus, if a country has decided to attract firms, which produce heavy industrial 
commodities and consequently demand large space for their establishment it will 
initiate a policy, which promote, for example, cheap land costs.
In this globalised world there are still many countries, which are relatively 
unknown with regard to the economic, cultural and institutional framework they 
operate. Thus, these countries may have a relative disadvantage in relation to other 
more “known” countries as far as the attraction of foreign investment is concerned. 
Thus, in order for the governments of such countries to diminish or eliminate this 
disadvantage to prospect investors implement certain measures that might be 
addressed to a specific investor that wants to start an investment into the country or 
generally to all the prospect investors. Such measures are a) a commitment by a 
government to purchase part or all of the commodities of a project at a known price; 
b) to ensure a measurable market by prohibiting further entry; c) to render local 
agreements enforceable under international law by permitting binding by external 
arbitration; d) to enter into international agreements in respect to the payment of 
compensation in event of expropriation of assets or breach of contracts; e) to 
participate in international conventions for the protection of proprietary rights (trade 
marks, patents, copyrights, etc.) (Robinson, 1987: 5). These kind of measures are 
taken by the majority of countries, even the most developed ones. But, firms pay more 
attention if such measures are valid to these countries, which have a past of political 
instability, and where the investment environment might not be stable for the long 
run.
But, when someone is looking to the range of incentives a government offers, 
what it has to take into account of, is the number of these incentives that can be 
utilised from the very first moment a company is established in a country. Thus, for
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example, a start- up firm cannot utilise all, or sometimes any, of the tax credits being 
offered, because it is not yet profitable. Equally important is the timing a government 
provides the incentives to the firms planning an investment. According to Robinson 
(1987: 7, 10- 11) a host government is better not to offer a subsidy at the start of the 
discussion of a project, but only when it is perceived that a subsidy might be critical 
for the completion and success of the investment. Additionally, often governments 
link investment incentives and performance of firm, e.g. export of the majority of the 
commodities a firm produces, (Brewer and Young, 1997: 180, 184). Consequently, 
although a country might wish to attract a whole range of different kinds of FDI, 
nevertheless every kind of these investments demands a specific incentive policy.
On the other hand, a major “task” of investment incentives is to contain the 
operational costs of multinational corporations generated by the domestic regulatory 
and other institutional frameworks of a country. More precisely, facility location 
decisions may be exposed to external environmental, social, economic and other costs 
and benefits. For example, they may create pollution and traffic congestion, create 
jobs, and influence property values as well as tax revenues. These impacts may be 
multiplied if the decision of one firm to locate in an area influences those of other 
firms. These externalities are distributed spatially. In other words, they affect some 
geographical areas more than others do. One way to diminish these consequences is to 
internalise them to the firm’s location decision via political decisions. This can take 
place by two ways: firstly, if some facilities are prohibited at some locations (e.g. 
nuclear power plant in a densely populated area). Secondly, if some other facilities are 
highly regulated at some locations (e.g. the height of a building). Other firms are 
given incentives to locate in a political jurisdiction (e.g. tax rebates, or infrastructure 
improvements). All these internalised externalities are viewed by the firms as 
established costs and constraints. The role of incentives is an effort to trade off these 
costs and constraints occurred by the investment of a multinational corporation 
(Current, 2000: 1).
Conclusively, although the influence of public incentives on firms’ location is 
disputable (Perrons, 1981: 83; Robinson, 1987: 10; Brewer and Young, 1997: 177; 
Barrios, Gorg, Strobl, 2002: 2) it is something more than evident that in the future the 
importance of incentives will continue to grow. The reason is that in the current
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globalised world countries find it difficult to compete without a strong arsenal of 
incentives. Most central and local governments believe, or hope, that fiscal incentives 
might be able to make the difference between competing countries where the basic, 
more important conditions, such as locational characteristics, are more or less the 
same. This also depends on the purpose of investment that a multinational corporation 
has in mind, e.g. the penetration of the market or an export-oriented strategy. The 
reason is that a firm, which enters a foreign market for a first time, may place more 
emphasis on incentives that lessen their initial expenses in comparison with a firm, 
which acquires or expands existing operations. This is more likely to take place for 
export- oriented investments.
But, due to the fact that currently the vast majority of countries (both 
peripheral and developed ones) offer incentives in order to attract foreign and 
domestic investments, this cannot by itself explain locational choice on the part of 
firms. According to Perrons (1981: 83) their impact can in any case be determined by 
meticulously establishing the differential nature of these incentives between countries. 
Thus, from the point that all countries now offer incentives, it seems that incentives 
are a necessary, but not sufficient condition for convincing a multinational 
corporation to invest in one country in relation to another one.
4.4 FDI in Greece: An Analysis of Outflows
So far we have seen that the main drivers of FDI have been the large 
multinational corporations mainly originated in the developed countries. But, since 
the openness of the markets and the expansion of globalisation this pattern seems to 
have changed. Smaller firms from developing countries have also started to invest in 
neighboured, mainly, countries and even beyond. Of course a main prerequisite for 
this was these firms to possess certain ownership advantages777. Greek multinational 
corporations tend to apply this rule (Salavrakos and Petrochilos, 2003: 332). 
Nevertheless, as we are going to see in the next lines, Greece via a dynamic 
performance in outward FDI since the early 1990s, upgraded its regional role, 
especially in the area of Balkans.
117 Of course Greek firms do not have competitive advantage of economic nature against large Western 
firms. They hold some cultural advantages as well as a location geographical advantage in certain 
cases, e.g. in relation to the neighboured countries such as Bulgaria, Albania and FYROM (Salavrakos, 
2003, www.da.mod.uk/CSRC. date access: August 2005).
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Since the collapse of communist regimes (1989- 1990) in South Eastern 
Europe new opportunities and dangers emerged for Greece. Before 1989 Greece was 
the only country in the Balkan area, and in South Eastern Europe in general, with a 
democratic regime. Geographically, Greece had no common land borders with any 
other democratic regime, but only with Italy via sea. This geographic isolation of the 
country had as a result Greece always being in the periphery of Europe. In chapter 1 
we explained the development path of Greece since 1945 and there is no need to 
repeat things here. But, when communism collapsed some new opportunities and 
threats emerge for Greece as the only country with stable economic and political 
regime, being next to the turbulent ex- communist Balkan countries.
In a sense, that period Greece should be considered as a reasonable FDI 
location for the large Western firms that would like to penetrate Balkan countries, but 
hesitated to do that via FDI, due to their unstable political and economic regimes. But, 
as we have seen in the previous chapters, Greece did not manage to attract more FDI 
since 1991, in relation to the previous years. On the other hand, a new big opportunity 
emerged for Greek and foreign firms, being located in Greece. Greece always had 
good relationships with the other Balkan and Eastern Europe countries and 
consequently the latter were keen to accept Greek FDI as a way to improve their 
economic and living standards, as well as to integrate further to Western values and 
institutions. As a result, the opening of the markets of South Eastern Europe in the 
early 1990s offered Greek industry a dynamic alternative to revive and/ or increase 
profits (Demos, Filippaios and Papanastassiou, 2004: 330).
Another reason that Greek outward FDI has been relatively high in South 
Eastern Europe is the lack of significant investment interest for FDI from the western 
developed countries775 for this region. To this has also contributed the geographical 
proximity of Greece to the countries of South Eastern Europe, cultural closeness (in 
comparison to other EU and Western countries) and the inexperience of Greek firms 
in international markets (Bitzenis, 2004: 8- 11; Demos, Filippaios and Papanastassiou,
118 The investments from the Western countries in South Eastern Europe is very low considering that 
only a percentage between 1.8%- 3.7% of the world wide FDI outflows goes to these countries 
(Bitzenis, 2004: 9).
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2004: 338). The countries of South Eastern Europe were the first step of the Greek 
firms to expand further abroad (e.g. to France and US) and increase their 
competitiveness. In other words geographical factor was important. According to 
Salavrakos (2003, www.da.mod.uk/CSRC, date access: August 2005) the majority of 
the Greek entrepreneurial activity is developing in Albania and Bulgaria, the two 
neighbouring countries of Greece. Thus, since 1990s Greek firms increased 
significantly the volume of their FDI in the Balkans via careful considerations of their 
financial and market structures, apparently being driven by the loss of local 
comparative advantage (Louri, Papanastasiou and Lantouris, 2000: 425). Of course 
the Greek economy remains small so the Greek volume of FDI outside South Eastern 
Europe cannot make any impact and attract the attention of economists and academic 
community.
In Table 4.4 below we can see the increase of FDI outflows in Greece, since 
1991, actually the first year that most of the South Eastern European countries 
enjoyed a democratic regime. From only 5 million dollars of FDI outflows in 1991, it 
reached the 607 million dollars in 2004, with the peak year in 2000 when FDI 
outflows from Greece were 2,102 million dollars. If we compare Table 4.3 below with 
Table 0.1 in the introductory part we can observe that there are years, such as 1998, 
2000 and 2002 where Greek outflows overpassed Greek inflows of FDI. This is a 
particular important conclusion as it shows the dynamism of Greek entrepreneurship. 
Lately, more and more Greek firms have obtained own- specific advantages in the 
form of patents, own technology etc. that have allowed them to upgrade their 
operations and become competitive in a world- scale (Salavrakos and Petrochilos, 
2003: 332; Kokkinou and Psycharis, 2004: 297).
Table 4.4: FDI Outflows in Greece, 1991- 2002 (Million of Dollars)
FDI OUTFLOWS IN GREECE. 1991- 2002
(Millions of dollars)
1991-1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Greece 5 156 262 539 2102 607 655 47 607
Source: UNCTAD, 2003: 253 and UNCTAD, 2005: 3003
It seems that post- 1989 period benefited Greece most with regard to FDI 
outflows rather than FDI inflows. Whereas the Greek State did not manage to follow
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global evolutions and make all the necessary arrangements so that Greece to remain a 
competitive country for foreign investors, even after the opening of the borders in 
Central and Eastern European countries, Greek firms seem to have been more 
dynamic and adoptive to the economic, social and political evolutions described in 
chapter I. Thus, we can see the opposite directions that the public and private sectors 
in Greece have moved.
Greek firms invested in the SouthEastern European countries for the same 
reasons the large multinational corporations of the developed world invest directly 
abroad. Such reasons are geographical proximity, low labour costs, lack of local 
competition, unsatisfied demand, favourable tax rates, knowledge of the market with 
its prospects for growth and in general cost reduction plans (Louri, Papanastasiou and 
Lantouris, 2000: 425; Salavrakos and Petrochilos, 2003: 345; Bitzenis, 2004: 8).
The above analysis shows that Greece has already started to act as a mature 
economy. Some of its largest and most dynamic firms have during the last decade 
expanded themselves, by direct investment, to other countries, especially to South 
Eastern Europe. These firms are mostly active in the traditional sector where the 
production of commodities mainly is based on cheap labour force. This has been the 
main driver for the Greek firms to expand abroad. Thus, it is rather unlikely foreign 
firms to invest in Greece in traditional manufacturing sectors, when at the same time 
similar Greek firms take their operations abroad.
On the other hand, the opening of the markets in the Central and South 
Eastern Europe, together with the enlargement of the European Union that included 
ten new Member States from that region has contributed negatively to the FDI inflows 
in Greece, as we are going to see in the next lines. In particular, Barry and Hannan 
(2001: 57) argue that most Central Eastern Europe bound FDI has been “market- 
seeking”. Although for the case of Ireland, that the two mentioned authors examine, 
this kind of FDI does not represent a threat, for the case of Greece (and Portugal) the 
case is completely different. As we are going to see in chapter VI, most of the 
multinational corporations invest in Greece in order to penetrate the domestic market, 
i.e. for the same reasons that they invest in Central and South Eastern Europe. On the 
other hand, according to Ekholm and Markusen (2002, www.econ.ku.dk, access date:
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September 2005) the countries of Central and Eastern Europe tend to attract vertically 
organised manufacturing firms, a different type of organised firm than the horizontal 
one, which in chapter III, I argued that Greece is more likely to attract. In other words, 
Greece and South Eastern European countries target partially the same kind of FDI, 
something that deteriorates the prospects of Greece to increase its share of inward 
FDI. As we are going to argue later Greece should focus to attract different kind of 
multinational corporations in order to be able to compete with South Eastern 
European countries. Greece should not compete with southeastern European countries 
in the field of assembly line production investment, rather than in the field of high- 
skilled, educated and more productive labour force.
Table 4.5: FDI Inward Stock (Million of Dollars)
FDI Inward Stock (millions of dollars)
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2004 2005
EU 217476 268253 748669 1136387 2240506 2418136 2623903 4023935 4499128
Memo: Greece 4524 8309 5667 10957 12499 12006 12056 27213 29132
EU Peripheral Countries
Ireland 32461 33361 34208 40406 118550 138266 157298 229241 211190
Spain 5141 8939 65956 109200 144803 164754 217769 346676 367656
Portugal 3665 4599 10571 18381 28469 32921 43962 65213 64517
Total Peripheral Countries 45791 55208 116402 178944 304321 347947 431085 668343 672495
Slovenia 607 1763 2809 3209 5074 4962 8064
Bulgaria 112 446 2716 3410 3889 7569 9173
Czech R. 1363 7350 21644 27092 38450 56415 59459
Estonia 688 2645 3160 4226 9530 12274
Hungary 49 569 11919 19804 23562 24416 60328 61221
Latvia 615 2084 2332 2723 4493 4783
Lithuania 352 2334 2666 3981 6389 6461
Poland 109 7843 34227 41031 45150 61427 93329
Romania 821 6480 7638 8786 18009 23818
Slovakia 81 810 4634 6213 10225 14501 15324
Total CEE countries 49 2841 32607 99377 120313 146920 243623 293906
Source: UNCTAD 2003: 257, 260; UNCTAD 2005: 308, 311; UNCTAD 2006: 303, 306
From Table 4.5 above we observe that in absolute numbers FDI inward stocks 
in South Eastern Europe remain very low in comparison to the old fifteen EU Member 
States, but even from the four peripheral countries of the old- fifteen European Union 
Member States. This means that in general terms the opening of the markets in South 
Eastern Europe has not affected the amount of FDI that has been invested in the EU- 
15 Member States. On the other hand, since the 1990s the inward stock of FDI in the 
ten new Member States of the South Eastern Europe has increased about 103- fold, 
where as at the same time in the old EU has increased only about 6- fold. Thus we can 
see that, at least up to 2005, FDI inward stock increases in the countries of South 
Eastern Europe a lot faster than the old EU countries. But, what about Ireland, 
Portugal and Greece, which is of our main concern? As far as all together peripheral
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countries (including Spain) of the old- 15 European Union is concerned, we observe 
that since the 1990s FDI inward stock has increased almost about 6- fold, which is 
about the same with the average EU fifteen Member States and significantly less than 
the average new member states of the South- Eastern Europe. This probably indicates 
that the Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain have negatively affected by the 
enlargement prospects of the European Union as far as inward FDI is concerned. In 
particular, as far as Ireland is concerned, since 1990 inward FDI stock has increased 
about 6- fold, this means to the same pace with the total EU. For Spain inward FDI 
stock since 1990 has increased slightly more than 5- fold, i.e. in a little slower pace 
than the EU total. For Portugal inward FDI stock since 1990 has increased about 6- 
fold, i.e. with the same pace as the total EU- 15 Member States. Finally, as far as 
Greece is concerned, the inward FDI stock since 1990 has increased about by 5- fold. 
This is slightly lower than the average EU- 15 Member States, but much lower than 
the average CEE countries. By this we can argue that the opening of the markets in 
the Central and South Eastern Europe may have just slightly negatively affected the 
FDI inflows in Greece.
Table 4.6: FDI Inward Stock as a percentage of GDP
FDI inward stock  as a percentage of GDP
1990 2000 2005
EU 10.9 26.3 33.5
Memo: Greece 6.8 12.4 13.2
EU Peripheral Countries
Ireland 119.5 133.8 105.7
Spain 12.5 26.9 32.6
Portugal 14.8 30.1 35.2
CEE Countries
Slovenia 3.8 15.2 23.7
Bulgaria 0.5 17.9 34.3
Czech R. 3.7 38.9 48.1
Estonia - 48.4 93.6
Hungary 1.6 49.0 55.9
Latvia - 27.0 28.7
Lithuania - 20.5 25.1
Poland 0.2 20.5 31.1
Romania - 17.5 24.2
Slovakia 0.5 18.4 32.8
Source: UNCTAD, 2006: 307,308,316
The same conclusion can be drawn even if we examine the FDI inward stock 
as a percentage of GDP. According to Table 4.6 above, even if Greece almost doubles
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its FDI inward stock as a percentage of GDP, nevertheless it remains much below 
Ireland and Portugal. In this issue Greece’s case seem to be much more similar to 
Portugal, rather than Ireland. In this respect, we observe that during the same time 
period, FDI inward stock as a percentage of GDP has also been doubled in Portugal 
reaching the 35.2 per cent in 2005 in relation to the 13.2 per cent of Greece. Similarly, 
in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe we observe once more the high inflows 
of FDI since the opening of their economy. One striking point is that from all the 
countries in the above Table, Greece has the lowest FDI inward stock as a percentage 
of GDP.
But, apart from the domestic market that might be a reason for the low 
performance of Greece, another reason might be the nationality of FDI. Most of FDI 
in Central and South Eastern Europe comes from other EU countries. On the contrary, 
in Ireland most of FDI comes from the US rather than the other EU countries (Barry 
and Hannan, 2001: 57; Barry, 2004: 757; Ekholm and Markusen 2002, 
www.econ.ku.dk, access date: September 2005). By this evidence the first two authors 
stress the importance of geographical and cultural proximity of Ireland. On the other 
hand, as we are going to see in chapter VI when analysing the results of the survey 
data, in the case of Greece most FDI comes from the other EU countries. This means 
that Greece competes with the countries of Central and South Eastern Europe for the 
same source of FDI.
The above mentioned data are until 2005, i.e. when the enlargement of the 
European Union has just become a reality. With enlargement and the free movement 
of capital the situation for Greece is expected to deteriorate, as it seems that both 
Greece and the countries of Central and South Eastern Europe partially compete for 
the same kind of FDI. Besides, as Barry (2004: 757) and Ekholm and Markusen 
(2002, www.econ.ku.dk, access date: September 2005) argue, enlargement will 
increase further the centrality of the more central of the CEE regions by putting an 
end to the border controls, minimising transport costs. Southern regions (like those of 
Greece, Portugal and Spain) that do not experience the beneficial effect will become 
relatively more peripheral and there is a high risk that there will be a diversion of 
production/jobs from Southern Europe.
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4.5 Conclusion
FDI and locational factors are closely related. Thus, the aim of this chapter 
was to present the factors that currently may influence the decision of a multinational 
corporation to invest in a country. Moreover, due to the current competition between 
nations to attract FDI, in the second part of this chapter, the most common incentives 
introduced by countries to lure foreign firms were presented. Nevertheless, neither 
locational factors, nor incentives by themselves, may affect the location choice of a 
multinational corporation to invest in one country in relation to another one. Its 
decision is also affected by other factors such as the business plans of multinational 
corporations, international circumstances, etc. Thus, location factors, and incentives, 
may only play a complementary and amplifying role in the decision of a multinational 
corporation to invest in a specific country. In the last part of this chapter, another 
factor, not locational this time, was also presented. The effect of the liberalisation of 
the South- Eastern European countries economies, and their entrance to the European 
Union, to the inward FDI stock in the old EU- 15 Member States and in Ireland, 
Greece and Portugal in particular. We observed that particularly Greece has been 
negatively affected by this outcome.
In chapter V the research methodology analysis takes place. In particular, I 
explain in detail the different methodological approaches used for the empirical study 
of my research question.
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CHAPTER V 
Research Methodology
5.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to explain in detail the different methodological 
approaches used for the empirical study of my research questions. The research 
methods adopted are a questionnaire, semi- structured interviews and the analysis of 
secondary data. In addition, I will provide detailed information on the way research 
questions and interviews were designed to address the objectives of the thesis, as well 
as some comments on the secondary data used.
5.2 Surveys
With regard to the methodologies that were chosen in order to collect the 
information necessary to explore my research questions, the survey technique was one 
of them. This option took place after considering the strengths and weaknesses of a 
number of research methods such as “talking with people”, “focus groups”, “personal 
interviews”, “telephone surveys” and “mail surveys”. Unfortunately, there was no 
complete list with all the foreign manufacturing subsidiaries in Greece. In this respect 
I had to make this list. Thus, during the initial stages of my research, when I was 
trying to fill in the list with all the foreign subsidiaries currently located in Greece, 
and being active in the manufacturing sector, I conducted a number of interviews with 
key informants that could supply me with this information, such as the personnel of 
the Hellenic Center for Investment and professors from the Greek universities that had 
done previous research on FDI.
The majority of the firms included in the database are obtained from a 
directory provided by Athens Economic University. In essence the list was of a 
private research company called ICAP and included the foreign firms located in 
Greece in 1997. Since then some firms included in this directory have closed their 
manufacturing activities in Greece119, while others that are not included in the list
119 From my research to fill in the list of foreign subsidiaries located in Greece, I have found that a 
number of these subsidiaries, either have closed their industrial activity in Greece and currently their 
parent companies service Greek market by exports, or they have been bought by their Greek partners. 
Thus they are no longer foreign ones. Although I have not kept exact numbers of these cases, I believe
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have been established in the country. During my employment at the Hellenic Centre 
for Investment I updated this database so that it now includes all the foreign 
subsidiaries with a manufacturing activity in Greece. At the end I concluded with a 
number of 144 foreign- owned subsidiaries located in Greece and have a 
manufacturing activity. This number, although it might seem low for a country like 
Greece, nevertheless from my experience and continuous research until the last 
moment I handed in the thesis, must include more than the 90 per cent of the whole 
population.
Then, I had to choose a research method technique that would provide me with 
the most complete answers to my research questions. From the list of different 
research method techniques mentioned above, I chose the mail survey for the 
following reasons: first of all a practical difficulty in the case I had chosen the focus 
group technique is that it would be actually very difficult to arrange a focus group 
session in a convenient date and time for managers from Athens and other regions of 
Greece. Particularly, which manager who lives and works outside Athens, would 
travel to the capital in order to answer the questions of a Ph. D. student? 
Unwillingness by the side of managers with regard to give an interview to a research 
student I would face even in the case of face to face interviews. Later in the current 
chapter, I am going to describe the problems I faced when I wanted to perform twenty 
interviews with regard to chapter VII of this thesis. Another reason was that it would 
not be easy to be accepted by the managers of the foreign- owned subsidiaries for an 
interview, risking by this way the possibility to have a single digit response rate. And 
as it will be described later in this chapter, I have faced a lot of difficulties even to 
perform just twenty interviews.
Additionally, questionnaires are familiar to most people, especially in the 
high- ranking personnel of a multinational corporation. These people very often 
complete questionnaires sent by their parent- company, with regard to the 
performance of the subsidiary, or by governmental and private bodies that ask 
information for statistical reasons. One of the advantages of the questionnaire is that 
no person gets in between the question and the respondent. The researcher’s own
that this evolution shows the de- industrialisation of the Greek economy, as well as the lack of 
competitiveness of the Greek economy.
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opinions will not influence the respondent to answer questions in a certain manner. 
Another problem that the questionnaire deals with is that it is less intrusive than 
telephone or face- to- face surveys. When a respondent receives a questionnaire in the 
mail, he or she is free to complete the questionnaire on his/ her own timetable. Unlike 
other research methods, the respondent is not interrupted by the research instrument.
Of course there are also certain disadvantages with regard to the methodology 
technique of the mail survey, some of which I faced during my research. In particular, 
one major disadvantage of written questionnaires is the possibility of low response 
rates. In such a case it can dramatically lower our confidence in the results. In my 
case, as I will explain later, I had to send multiple times the questionnaires, followed 
by repeated telephone calls, in order to get a response rate that would provide my 
research with the required validity and credibility. Another disadvantage of 
questionnaires is the inability to probe responses. Questionnaires are structured 
instruments. They allow little flexibility to the respondent with respect to response 
format. I tried to overcome this problem by well defining the research questions I 
wanted to examine, before sending the questionnaire and structuring it in such a way 
in order to increase the chances to get responses with regards to these research 
questions. Moreover, this is another reason why the mail survey was followed by face 
to face semi- structured interviews. Another problem has to do with who is filling in 
the questionnaire. When returned questionnaires arrive in the mail, it's normal to 
assume that the respondent is the same person you sent the questionnaire to. This may
not actually be the case. Many times business questionnaires get handed to other
{
employees for completion. I tried to overcome this problem by calling to the persons 
in charge that I wanted to fill in the questionnaire at least two times (and in some 
cases there was a third phone call), once when sending the questionnaire, and once 
three days later.
The conduct of the mail questionnaires research lasted a little more than 3 
months, between June and September of 2004. The reason for this long lasted period 
has been the unwillingness of the managers of the foreign- owned subsidiaries located 
in Greece to respond to the questionnaires. To achieve better results before sending 
out the questionnaire (by fax or e-mail) I contacted the person I wanted to respond to 
it and I was trying to explain the purpose of my study. This was also described in the
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cover letter that was sent with the questionnaire. Then, after having sent the 
questionnaire I contacted again the next day the same person asking him/ her if he/ 
she has read the questionnaire and if I could help with any questions that he or she 
could have. After one week and if I had no response to the questionnaire I called 
again to see if there has been any problem with it. At this point I have to remark that 
there were several occasions where the people I was talking to had either forgot or 
lost the questionnaire and thus I had to re- sent it to them. At the end there was a final 
phone call two weeks afterwards. From this last phone call I waited for one more 
week until I finally stop expecting a response. Nevertheless, the response rate at the 
end remained low. More precisely, 34 foreign owned subsidiary located in Greece, or 
24 per cent, had responded to my questionnaire. Thus, I decided to resend the mail 
survey after some time had passed. The period I chose to do that was the beginning of 
2006. In particular, I decided that February was the best time period to send the mail 
questionnaire. One of the causes of low response rate in the first time might had been 
that it took place during the summer period and when firms had to publish their mid­
term financial statements. Following the same approach technique as in the first time, 
I managed to double the number of responses, i.e. 73 responses out of 144 
subsidiaries, or 50.7 per cent.
The fact that I had to send the mail questionnaire twice, might had distorted 
the overall sample in relation to the population. A reason for this might be that the 
answers in the questionnaire, might be a result of the each time economic 
environment that might have influenced, positively or negatively, the economic 
results of the subsidiary. But, on the other hand, I considered that I had to increase the 
number of responses in order to increase the validity of my research. Thus, in order to 
see whether the fact that I had to unite two small samples in a large one, and this 
would not distort my overall sample against the population, I first made a two- tailed 
Spearman’s Rank Correlation test regarding the location of the parent companies of 
the two small samples. Thus, Table 5.1 below demonstrates that there is a strong 
positive association (0.601) between the two variables, i.e. between the sample A and 
sample B, regarding the origin of the subsidiaries that responded in the two samples.
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Table 5.1: Correlation Test between the Location of the Parent Companies of the Two
Samples
Correlations
Where is 
your HQ 
established? 
Sample A
Where is 
your HQ 
established? 
Sample B
Spearman's rho Where is your HQ Correlation Coefficient 1,000 ,601*
established?Sample A Sig. (2-tailed) t ,000
N 33 33
Where is your HQ Correlation Coefficient ,601*" 1,000
established?Sample B Sig. (2-tailed) ,000
N 33 39
**■ Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
I then further tried to strengthen the validity of my sample by examining the 
correlation of sample A and sample B with regard to the year of establishment of the 
subsidiary in Greece. In this respect, Table 5.2 below demonstrates that there is a 
medium to strong positive association (0.507) between the two variables, i.e. between 
the sample A and sample B, regarding the year of establishment of the subsidiary in 
Greece.
Table 5.2: Correlation Test between the Year of Establishment of the Subsidiaries of 
the Two Samples
Correlations
When was 
your 
subsidiary 
established in 
Greece?Sam 
pie A
When was 
your 
subsidiary 
established 
in Greece? 
Sample B
Spearman's rho When was your Correlation Coefficient 1,000 ,507*
subsidiary established Sig. (2-tailed) ,003
in Greece?Sample A N 33 33
When was your 
subsidiary established 
in Greece? Sample B
Correlation Coefficient 
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
,507**
,003
33
1,000
39
**• Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
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5.3 Discussion about how questions were chosen and developed, how they relate 
to the hypotheses/ research questions:
The questionnaire was divided in four parts: the background of the 
subsidiaries, the role of the subsidiaries, activities of the subsidiary and institutional 
factors and services. From the questions formed my aim was to explore, among other 
things, what have been the main reasons for investment in Greece, which are the main 
countries that foreign firms originate from, what type of subsidiaries are found in 
Greece, where they have located their manufacturing activity, what kind of power 
relationship exists between the subsidiary and the parent company, what is their 
opinion with regard to infrastructure and certain institutional factors in Greece. By 
this way I would have all the information needed in order to answer my research 
questions/ hypotheses as stated in the introduction.
At the end I constructed a questionnaire120 by which I hoped to identify some 
of the determinants of FDI in Greece during the post- war period. By identifying these 
determinants I will then evaluate the main variables affecting the decision to 
undertake FDI in Greece, as well as the main characteristics of the firms that currently 
have an industrial base in Greece. As a result of my analysis I hope to be able to 
identify the factors responsible for the underperformance of Greece in terms of its 
ability to attract FDI. The questionnaire has been constructed deliberately brief (four 
and a half pages) because large questionnaires are a problem, particularly when they 
have to be completed by people who manage large companies and their time is very 
limited.
From the 144 questionnaires sent, 73 were returned filled in. This is a 
satisfactory number of responses, particularly if someone has in mind the small 
number of foreign owned subsidiaries with a manufacturing activity located in 
Greece. Nevertheless, I further analysed some of the characteristics of the 144 
subsidiaries, that had obtained through the original list, with those of 73 subsidiaries 
in order to see if the two samples are correlated. Such characteristics were the location 
of the subsidiaries, their country of origin and year of establishment. From the
120 More precisely a five page questionnaire with closed questions was constructed and sent to the 
financial managers of 144 foreign subsidiaries that are currently located in Greece. See also Appendix 
1.
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comparison between the sample of responded subsidiaries and the population there 
seems to be a correlation.
5.4 Face to Face Semi Structured Interviews
Apart from the mail questionnaire research method that was described above, 
another kind of research was also performed, that of face to face semi structured 
interviews. Having experienced the unwillingness of managers from the mail 
questionnaires, and being almost sure that in the case of face to face interviews the 
result would also be the same, I tried to follow a method that would allow scientific 
validity by performing a small number of interviews. Additionally, interviews could 
provide me with information that it was not possible to obtain via the survey, as well 
as to verify or not the conclusions I had from the mail questionnaire. The reason is 
that through interviews someone may describe his/ her own experiences in terms of 
subjective phenomena (Herod, 306: 1993; Brink, 464: 1995) and the interviewer may 
understand individuals’ own perception of different phenomena (Flick, 2002: 6). Of 
course, on the other hand the risk of interviews is that the interviewee may not be 
objective in his/ her opinion as he/ she describes at most private and interpersonal 
experiences (Brink, 465: 1995).
In this respect I decided to choose 20 subsidiaries from those that replied to 
the questionnaire and arranged an interview with either the general or the financial 
manager of the firm121. But, what were the criteria by which the twenty firms were 
chosen? Two have been the main sources of choosing the type of foreign subsidiaries 
in Greece that I wanted to interview. First, was the theoretical framework with regard 
to the type of multinational enterprises that are most likely to invest in Greece, as I 
presented in chapter III. In particular, in that chapter, I argued that in Greece is more 
likely to invest a horizontal type of firm, which will produce the same or roughly the 
same products as in the other large European Markets and local management may 
have a moderate to high degree of autonomy in decisions that concern domestic 
market, but relies on the parent company as far as the transfer of knowledge and 
expertise.
121 For information regarding the dates and location of the interviews, see Appendix 5.
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The second source of choosing these twenty firms has been the results of the 
answered questionnaire that presented in chapter VI. Having also in mind the 
theoretical framework of chapter III, the basic criterion of choice has been whether 
foreign subsidiaries in Greece had some (84.9 per cent of the answered 
questionnaires) or no autonomy (12.4 per cent of the answered questionnaires) in the 
everyday business decision- making process and those that were more autonomous 
(just 2.7 per cent). This criterion is very important in understanding the type of 
foreign subsidiaries that are located in Greece, as it indicates the degree of importance 
that the parent company gives to the local market and its local resources (managerial 
and/ or scientific personnel, establishing linkages with local firms, etc.). The second 
criterion has been the method of establishment in Greece. In chapter VI we will see 
that the two most common ways of entry in the Greek market is either by creating a 
new establishment (45.2 per cent) or by taking over a Greek company (39.7 per cent). 
Finally, the third criterion has been the sector of activity of the foreign subsidiary in 
Greece. In this respect due to the fact of the analogy in the answered questionnaires 
that was two out of three in favour of modem industry, I followed the same analogy in 
the Greek subsidiaries that I planned to interview. Thus, fifteen out of twenty 
subsidiaries I interviewed are in the modem sector.
In a second phase I arranged two interviews with respective policy makers. 
Although there was no objection by these two policy makers to publish their names, I 
believe that it is better not do so as I have not any written permission by them. 
Nevertheless, I will give as much detail as I can regarding their position in public 
administration. Thus, the first interview was arranged with policy maker A of the 
Ministry of Finance and Economy. In particular, policy maker A works in the 
Department of Control and Approval of Private Investment in the Ministry of Finance 
and Economy. Policy maker A had an important role in the formation of the current 
and previous incentives Laws. Thus, his opinion is regarded as a very important one, 
particularly with regard to the incentives that the Greek government provides to 
private investors, as well as to the way the Greek institutional framework functions 
towards the issue of investment policy. The second interview was arranged with 
policy maker B, who works at the Hellenic Center for Investment. In particular, policy 
maker B is Research and Analysis Manager in the Department of Investment 
Research and Project Evaluation. Policy maker B has taken part in many investment
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roadshows as well as to the evaluation of projects on behalf of the Greek government. 
Thus, he has an extensive experience in contacts with foreign investors and knows 
very well how foreign investors conceive the Greek investment environment.
From the provision of the above information, regarding the professional 
background of the two interviewees, it is evident that they should be considered as 
key informants in the field of FDI in Greece. Both interviewees have contributed 
significantly to the formation of the last two incentive laws that have been 
implemented in Greece, and have also been key players in the writing of the new one 
that is going to be implemented since the first of January 2007.
But, what were the criteria by which these two key informants were selected? 
When I was planning the whole interview part of my thesis, I had numerous 
discussions with different academics and policy makers in order to understand how 
the Greek state has organised itself in order to deal with foreign investors. There were 
four departments that could come in contact with foreign investors: a) the Ministry of 
Finance and Economy, b) the Hellenic Center for Investment, c) the Foreign Ministry 
through their commercial attaches, and d) the Ministry of Development. From these 
discussions, the conclusion I came up with was that the commercial attaches and the 
Ministry of Development were referring the foreign investors for details and 
assistance, mostly, to the Hellenic Center for Investment, and secondarily to the 
Ministry of Finance and Economy. And this because, as far as the commercial 
attaches is concerned, their duty is only to provide some basic information about 
Greece and its economy and then refer those foreign investors that are interested to 
obtain further information to either the Hellenic Center for Investment, or the 
Ministry of Finance and Economy. As far as the Ministry of Development is 
concerned, it simply has no department responsible to provide information and 
assistance to foreign investors.
Thus, I decided to take only two interviews from the side of the state due to 
the fact that the Ministry of Finance and Economy, via the Department of Control and 
Approval of Private Investment, where policy maker A belongs to, and the Hellenic 
Center for Investment, where the policy maker B belongs to, are the two main 
departments that come constantly in contacts with foreign, and domestic, investors.
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By this way I avoided possible confusion or misdirection of research and conclusions 
from information that I could have received if I had chosen also to take interviews 
from policy makers of other public services (e.g. Ministry of Development or 
commercial attaches) that have little or no contacts with foreign investors.
Consequently, in chapter VII, I performed twenty interviews with managers of 
foreign subsidiaries located in Greece and two interviews with policy makers from the 
Greek public administration. Having established in chapter VI an overall perspective 
with regard to the role of foreign subsidiaries in Greece, and their views with regard 
to the investment environment in Greece, my aim in chapter VII, was to identify the 
logic and the meaning of the conclusions found in chapter VI, as well as to obtain any 
other information that could help me to answer my research questions/ hypotheses 
stated in the introduction of the thesis. For such a purpose the corporate interview 
research method, that would help me to understand the firm’s observed behaviour 
(Schoenberger, 1991: 180), has been adopted. By this way mail questionnaire and 
interviews would operate in a complementary way giving a better picture of the real 
investment environment in Greece and of course identifying more clearly the causes 
of the low performance of Greece in attracting FDI.
The structured questions asked are found in Appendix II of this thesis. The 
aim of these questions is two- fold. Taking the analysis of chapter VI one step further, 
these questions through face to face interviews with the general managers of twenty 
foreign subsidiaries located in Greece, aim to examine first, the particular role of the 
subsidiary in relationship to other subsidiaries located elsewhere in the world (to this 
goal contributed questions such as how much does your firm contributes to the final 
product? What is the degree of your decision- making process autonomy? During the 
last 5 years your decision- making autonomy has increased or decreased? Are you 
encouraged to pursue autonomous initiatives?), and second, the degree of interaction 
of the subsidiary with local and national institutions and their opinion with regard to 
these institutions (to this goal contributed questions such as Have you applied for 
subsidies during your investment process? Plans for further investment? If no why? If 
yes why? Have you asked the help of the Hellenic Center for Investment (ELKE) or 
any other governmental organisation during an investment process? If other 
organisation which? If ELKE was their help helpful? If not, why?).
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Despite the fact that there were only twenty interviews to be performed, I 
faced a lot of unwillingness by the managers of foreign subsidiaries to accept me and 
discuss the issue of FDI in Greece. For this reason it took me a long time, and a lot of 
phone calls, in order to persuade the managers of the appropriate foreign subsidiaries 
to accept me for an interview. A surprising aspect has been that the managers that 
have studied and work abroad have been more receptive in my demand for an 
interview. In total it took me three months to perform all twenty interviews, due to the 
unwillingness and the tight schedule of the contacted managers. The interviews were 
held between March and May 2006.
These twenty interviewees were chosen by the list of the 73 foreign- owned 
subsidiaries that had responded to the mail questionnaire. The main reason for this 
preference has been that interviews would provide me with more in-depth information 
with regards to the answers I had received from mail questionnaire. In case I had 
chosen interviewees from subsidiaries that had not responded to the questionnaire, it 
was highly likely to distort the validity of conclusions, as these would have emerged 
from two different samples. All interviews were held in Athens. The main reason of 
this preference has been the view that in Athens exist the headquarters of the largest 
foreign- owned subsidiaries that are established in Greece, as well as that due to the 
more frequent interaction of the managers of these subsidiaries with the State’s 
institutional bodies, as well as between them, they would provide me with more in- 
depth information with regard to my research questions.
Thus, having arranged the twenty interviews, my aim when I visited them was 
to get information with regard to the investment environment in Greece that could not 
be obtained by a mail survey. For this purpose my questions followed the same turn as 
in my mail questionnaire (background of the Greek subsidiary, role of the subsidiary, 
activities of the subsidiary and institutional factors and services). But, apart from the 
first question that I was raising each time I wanted to discuss a certain issue, there 
were a number of questions raised from the answers that the twenty managers were 
giving me. I followed this tactic as I wanted to make structured interviews, but at the 
same time to allow the managers to speak widely with regard to the issues I put into 
the table. Moreover, before the beginning of the interviews I assured them for the
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anonymity of their responses. By this way I gained their trust in order to get the real 
picture behind their story.
As far as the interviews with the two policy makers are concerned, these were 
arranged just after the interviews with the twenty managers of the foreign subsidiaries 
located in Greece were over. For these interviews I followed the same methodology as 
in the previous twenty ones, i.e. semi- structured ones. In appendix 3 are found the 
initial starting questions. The two interviews took place in the offices of the 
interviewees and lasted about 45 minutes each.
A main obstacle I had to deal with was the refusal of the twenty-two 
interviewees to record our discussion. The managers from the multinational 
enterprises preferred our discussion not to be recorded, as they feared that, somehow, 
either their competitors or public employees could obtain knowledge of their 
comments. Additionally, the two policy makers also preferred the interviews not to be 
recorded as they were very concerned about the media, or someone more superior 
than them, somehow, picking up their comments and use them against them or their 
services. Thus, in order to deal with this situation, i.e. not writing down all the time 
notes ignoring the essence of their comments, I adopted the following approach. 
During the interviews I was only taking short notes in order to be able to participate 
actively, with follow up questions, in the discussion that was taking place. But, 
immediately after the end of the interview I was trying to find a quiet place in order to 
write down some of his/ her comments that made a particular impression on me, but 
also a general comment of the interviewee’s overall stance in the issues that I had 
discussed with him/her before.
After having completed all twenty interviews with the managers of the 
multinational enterprises located in Greece and the interviews with the two key policy 
makers, my main task was to analyse the results. I did this in a systematic way, 
analysing the content of their answers, looking at the same time for recurring themes. 
For example, I mention the issue of “access to information” that is examined in my 
thesis. There were times in which the interviewees argued that they were indifferent if 
some other enterprises were managing to obtain information in advance from the 
Greek public administration about the introduction of a new law or a new procedure.
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In this case I should indicate that the interviewee has a neutral opinion on “access to 
information”. But, later in the interview, when we were discussing other issues, e.g. 
the taxation rules that are valid in Greece, I was witnessing a dissatisfaction regarding 
the retrospective implementation of certain tax norms, as well as the fact that some of 
their competitors appeared to be prepared for that, probably because they knew it 
some time in advance that such a norm is going to be initiated. In this case I had to 
consider that this interviewee has a negative, rather than neutral opinion, on the issue 
of “access to information”.
Thus, the analysis of the interviews took the following form. A first analysis 
was taking place just after the end of each interview. This analysis concerned an 
initial coding of the responses according to the themes that coincided with the major 
areas of questions that I had developed in my questionnaire (i.e. background of the 
subsidiary, roles of the subsidiary, activities of the subsidiary and institutional factors 
and services). I followed this method for two reasons. Firstly, I wanted to avoid to end 
up with a load of data from all interviews which could result to miss details of 
important information. Secondly, due to the fact that I could not record the interviews, 
analyzing the data just after the end of the interview, allowed me to have fresh in my 
mind the reactions and other details of the words of the interviewees. This has been 
very important for me, as only in such a way I was able to write down quotes of the 
interviewees’ arguments that had impressed me and contributed to my research.
In a secondary stage, after having completed all twenty interviews (I followed 
the same methodology for the two interviews from the key policy makers, but 
obviously I treated them as a different group) all information that concerned a specific 
theme, e.g. the role of the subsidiary in Greece, were placed in three groups. These 
three groups included the main group that integrated the majority of the interviewees 
and two other groups that concerned the two opposites from what the majority in this 
theme had argued. In this way I was able to get the big picture of the topic I was 
examining and at the same time identify how strong a tendency is formed. But, as I 
argued above, this coding was not taking place just from the initial response I was 
getting during the conversation of a theme, but from the whole discussion, i.e. always 
follow- up questions in a topic were taking place. And this because, as I demonstrated 
above, the initial argument of an interviewee could be misleading in relation to his
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stance in an issue. Following this methodology of interview analysis I was able to 
identify the logic and the meaning of the conclusions found in chapter VI, as well as 
to obtain any other information (particularly through the follow- up questions) that 
could help me to answer my research questions/ hypotheses stated in the introduction 
of the thesis.
5.5 Secondary Data
In order to establish the FDI underperformance of Greece in relation to Ireland 
and Portugal, as well as Greek FDI outflows, secondary data were used. According to 
Hofferth (2005: 893, 896) secondary data can be easily available, in a short time and 
with a low cost, whereas on the other hand, the researcher should be very careful in 
order not to let the data to determine the study direction, as well as there is the danger 
that the availability of data on certain field is likely to influence the direction of the 
research. Finally, sometimes it takes time to become familiar with data that the 
researcher did not personally collect.
In my case an initial problem I faced was that there were no available data, in 
a consistent way, for the period from 1945 to 1980 as far as FDI inflows are 
concerned. As a result I had to compare Greece, Ireland and Portugal since 1981. 
Moreover, for this purpose I had to use two different sources of data, UNCTAD and 
Eurostat, and combine their figures in order to make a sequence of 24 years. 
Although, in my research question I argue that I try to find out about the 
underperformance of Greece during the last two decades, so in this case it is 
reasonable to present the data since 1981, nevertheless if I had available data for the 
period before 1981 I would then be able to present the better performance of Greece 
during the prior to 1981 years. On the other hand, as far as FDI outflows are 
concerned, things were easier as all the data I needed were available from UNCTAD. 
Besides, the time period exploring in this case was somewhat shorter, since 1991, 
actually the first year that most of the South Eastern European countries enjoyed a 
democratic regime.
In the next chapter the results of the mail survey, sent to 144 foreign 
subsidiaries having a manufacturing activity in Greece, are analysed.
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CHAPTER VI
Interpreting the Particular Characteristics of Foreign 
Subsidiaries Located in Greece
6.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the findings of the research survey performed with an 
aim to answer the research questions identified in the introduction and which they 
emerged from the theoretical analysis of chapters I, II and III. In the methodology 
chapter I explained the details of the survey research. The questionnaire was sent to 
144 manufacturing subsidiaries in Greece, in order to get information about certain 
characteristics of their companies. In the end 73 subsidiaries replied, or 50.7 per cent 
of the population. This is a satisfactory response rate, particularly taking into account 
the small number of foreign subsidiaries that are located in Greece. In essence the 
questionnaire was sent to the population of the foreign manufacturing subsidiaries in
177Greece . As it will be shown in the next lines, the foreign subsidiaries that replied to 
the questionnaire have a locational pattern similar to the 144 subsidiaries. Moreover, 
the year of establishment and the country of origin between the population and the 
sample were also compared and showed similar characteristics.
6.2 Location of the Foreign Subsidiaries within Greece
The analysis of the characteristics of the foreign subsidiaries that are currently 
present in Greece will begin by describing the location of their manufacturing
• 177activity, and not where their administration centres (HQ) are found . First, the 
location of all 144 subsidiaries will be described. Then the location of the subsidiaries 
that replied to the questionnaire will be presented in order to see how representative to
122 Given my argument that 144 subsidiaries represent nearly all of the FDI with a manufacturing 
activity in Greece, I call this the population and I will refer to the 73 firms that replied to the 
questionnaire as the sample (i.e. from this population)
123 There are many cases where the location of the manufacturing activity and the local HQ differ. For 
example, a subsidiary might have the production activity in Thrace and the HQ in Athens. This 
happens for reasons of business efficiency, e.g. Athens is the economic centre of Greece and being 
there you can make more and better deals.
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the whole population has been the responding sample. The region rather than the 
prefecture has been taken as the locational unit of analysis.124
Chart 6.1 Location of 144 Subsidiaries
LOCATION OF 144 SUBSIDIARIES
8%
3%
4
12% 2%1%P/o
69%
□ Attiki
H Sterea Ellada
□ Thrace
□  Thessalia
■ Kentriki Makedonia
□  Pelloponisos 
a  Crete
□  Ditiki Ellada
From Chart 6.1 it is clear that the vast majority of the manufacturing 
subsidiaries are located in the region o f Attiki (69 per cent or 99 firms), followed by 
the region of Kentriki Makedonia (12 per cent or 17 subsidiaries) where Thessaloniki 
the second largest city (and prefecture in terms of population) of Greece is located. 
The reasons for these choices are discussed later in the chapter. Then comes the 
region of Sterea Ellada where the 8 per cent (or 12 foreign subsidiaries) of the 
subsidiaries in the population have been located. The main characteristic o f this 
region is the proximity to the largest market of Greece (Attiki) and the good 
communications. Smaller numbers of foreign subsidiaries are located in the rest 
regions of Greece as portrayed in Chart 6.1. Nevertheless, a particular characteristic is 
that foreign subsidiaries are not located at all in the insular regions of Greece, e.g. 
Ionian or Aegean regions, with the exception of the region of Crete, which attracts the 
1 per cent (or 1 subsidiary) of the population.
As already mentioned, a questionnaire was sent to all 144 subsidiaries asking 
for further information with regard to their activities in Greece. 73 subsidiaries replied 
to this questionnaire, making a response rate of 50.7 per cent. Chart 6.2 indicates the
124 Usually, a region consists o f  three or four prefectures.
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location of the subsidiaries replying to the questionnaire. There are similarities, as 
well differences, between those that replied and the total population.
Chart 6.2 Subsidiaries that Replied in the Questionnaire
Subsidiaries that Replied in the 
Questionnaire
57%
□  Sterea Ellada 
O Thrace
□  Attica
□  T h essa ly
H Kentriki Makedonia
□  Dytiki Ellada
According to Chart 6.2, in the replied questionnaires, the region of Attiki 
remains in the top of the locational preferences of the subsidiaries followed by the 
region of Sterea Ellada and then the region of Kentriki Makedonia. Making a different 
kind of comparison, if we distinguish between Southern and Northern Greece, 78 per 
cent of the foreign subsidiaries in the sample are located in Southern Greece, and only 
22 per cent in Northern Greece. When describing the particular characteristics of the 
subsidiaries, we are going also to analyse the reasons for such a location distribution 
within Greece. The major difference between the two charts is that in the second 
chart, the response rate is higher in Sterea Ellada than in Kentriki Makedonia, but in 
real terms the difference is only 5 firms and the location o f the responding firms is 
similar to the overall north south distribution of the firms125. Another, less important 
difference, is that in the second chart there were no responses from the regions of 
Crete and Pelloponisos.
To explain the locational preferences Table 6.1 groups the sample subsidiaries 
into those that export less than 50 per cent and to those that export more than 50 per
125 80 per cent o f  the subsidiaries in the first chart are located in Southern Greece, in  relation to 78 per 
cent in the second chart.
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cent. The foreign subsidiaries located in Thrace and Kentriki Makedonia are mainly 
export oriented. A large number o f subsidiaries (around 20 per cent or 8 subsidiaries) 
that are located in Athens are also export oriented, but still the majority of them, 
around 80 per cent or 33 subsidiaries, sell their products to the domestic market. 
Additionally, the foreign subsidiaries that are located in Sterea Ellada, Dytiki Ellada 
and Thessalia, i.e. in Southern Greece, seem to sell the vast majority of their 
commodities in the domestic market. One argument is that subsidiaries are located in 
Southern Greece (or more particularly in the area around Attica) mainly for the 
market proximity of their products. The area around Attica concentrates more than 50 
per cent of the whole population o f Greece. Moreover, there is a very good transport 
network there that allows the easy, cheap and on- time delivery of the produced 
commodities. Conclusively, we can argue that there is some kind of relationship 
between location within Greece and export orientation.
Table 6.1: Number and Percentages of Export/ Domestic Oriented MNEs in Greece
Number and Percentages of Export/ Domestic Oriented MNEs in Greece
p, gExport ( 
Thrace 3
Oriented
------------------------------------------------------
14%
75%
c 3
: Oriented 
-----------------------
86%
25%
Attiki S 20% 33 80%
0 3 100%
Kentriki Makedonia 6 67% 3 33%
Ditiki Ellada 0 0 2 100%
Total 19 — 54 —
6.3 Profile of Greek Subsidiaries
Next, a description o f the particular characteristics of the foreign subsidiaries 
that are located in Greece is presented. The nationality o f the subsidiaries that 
responded to the questionnaire and that of the original population (144 subsidiaries) 
are presented in Table 6.2 below and analysed.
Thus, according to Table 6.2 below, from the countries that replied to the 
questionnaire, USA and Germany are the main sources of FDI in Greece. In
153
particular, the two countries seem to have the most subsidiaries in Greece, by 16.4 per 
cent, or 12 subsidiaries each. But, from the original list o f 144 subsidiaries the 
majority o f subsidiaries comes from Netherlands (15.3 per cent or 21 subsidiaries) 
and then from France (10.9 per cent or 15 subsidiaries). Germany and USA, which 
were the top two countries from the subsidiaries that replied to the questionnaire, are 
in the fourth and sixth place respectively. One striking point in the population of 
multinational enterprises is that there are very few subsidiaries (only 3) from 
Southeast Asia. On the contrary, European countries seem to dominate inward FDI in 
Greece.
Table 6.2: Country of Origin of FDI
- — _ _
In order to see whether the sample comes from the population, i.e. whether 
there is a correlation between the country of origin o f the 144 multinational 
enterprises (population) and the country o f origin o f 73 multinational enterprises
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(sample) that responded in the questionnaire, we are going to do a two- tailed 
Spearman’s Rank Correlation test. The results are indicated in Table 6.3 below, as 
obtained by SPSS programme. Thus, Table 6.3 below demonstrates that there is a 
medium to strong positive association (0.510) between the two variables, i.e. between 
the population and the sample. This further strengthens the argument presented in the 
beginning of this chapter, i.e. that the subsidiaries that responded to the questionnaire 
are representative of the whole population. This makes the following results (and 
analysis) more valid.
Table 6.3: Correlation Test between Population and the Sample
Correlations
Sam ple Population
Spearm an 's rho Sam ple Correlation Coefficient 1,000 ,510**
Sig. (2-tailed) • ,000
N 73 73
Population Correlation Coefficient ,510** 1,000
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 i
N 73 137
**• Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
Next the analysis of the periods in which the foreign subsidiaries first 
established in Greece and survived until today takes place. Unfortunately, it is not 
possible to have data for subsidiaries that have left Greece for different reasons, as the 
questionnaire was sent only to these subsidiaries that still operate in the country. In 
order to make the interpretation of this question easier, the answers (dates) given in 
the questionnaires were grouped in three categories: 1945- 1969, 1970- 1989, and 
1990- 2004. This grouping matches the analysis in Chapter I (Fordist period, post- 
Fordist period and New Economy) that has been adopted in this thesis. Thus, in Table
6.4 below, the subsidiaries of the population (144) and the subsidiaries that replied to 
the questionnaire are analysed:
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Table 6.4: Year o f Establishment
Population
of Firms
100%100%
_____
The results in Table 6.4 above demonstrate that most of the subsidiaries (both 
when examining population, but also the sample) that have survived until today were 
first established in Greece during the post- Fordist period (1970- 1989), followed by 
the Fordist period (1945- 1969). During the most recent period (1990- 2004) Greece 
has attracted less subsidiaries with manufacturing activities.
As mentioned in chapter I, the time period 1970- 1989, or the so- called post- 
Fordist period, was particularly important for Greece. It is the period where the 
dictatorship collapses (1974), and Greece joins the European Union (1981). 
Additionally, it is the period where Fordism paradigm of production has started to 
collapse. Greece, being located in the periphery of (Western) Europe, is among the 
choices of international capital that seeks places (characterised by low labour wages) 
where it will be able to produce and distribute its products to the large markets in 
safety and in a short time.
Moreover, according to the results of Table 6.4 during the time period 1945- 
1969, or the so- called Fordist period, a significant number of firms that were 
established in Greece have survived until today. In particular, during the Fordist 
period the 30.1 per cent (or 22 subsidiaries) of the companies that responded in the 
questionnaire were first established in Greece and operate until today. After the end of 
the WW II and the civil war (1949), Greece struggled to restore its economy, and 
particularly its industrial infrastructure. During the 1950s and 1960s there was 
significant economic growth in Greece. This, in combination with cheap labour, made 
the country a favourable location for the large Western firms. According to the World 
Bank classification in that era (end of 1960s), as mentioned in Chapter I, Greece and
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Portugal were considered as Newly Industrialised Countries, with higher growth rates, 
particularly in industry, than the “old industrial countries”.
Finally, the fewest companies (15.2 per cent or 11 subsidiaries) have been 
established in Greece during the last period, or in the so- called “New Economy”. 
This is the period where FDI overpasses exports, as new locations and markets have 
become available to the international capital. In other words, whereas foreign 
investment reaches its peak during the 1990s , at the same time Greece attracts less 
and less FDI127 despite its efforts to adjust the productive capacity to the market 
competition (Caloghirou, Voulgaris and Zambarloukos, 2000: 79). As a consequence, 
the results here coincide with the analysis in the introductory chapter, concerning the 
poor performance of Greece as a FDI location. Efforts to improve the competitiveness 
of the country started in the beginning of 1990s, but from the results these efforts 
were not consistent and also they were not satisfactory in order to reverse the 
tendency.
Another characteristic examined is the way of entry of the multinational 
corporations in Greece. Depending on the activity of the firm, ownership structure can 
be very important. Thus, the simplest form of inter- firm alliance via ownership and 
investment is the parent- subsidiary relationship. Practically every large firm owns 
(wholly or partially) smaller firms to which it might allow a degree of autonomy from 
the parent company. There is no effort to absorb the subsidiary completely because it 
might reduce flexibility. Another form of alliance is the joint venture form. It occurs 
when two firms enter directly into a shared ownership agreement. Joint venture goes 
further than licensing and technology- sharing agreements in combining strengths of 
independent firms. Joint ventures have long been used as a way to enter foreign 
markets, set up producing subsidiaries abroad, gain access to natural resources, etc. 
(Sayer and Walker, 1992: 134). Nevertheless, the way of entry in a foreign country 
depends also on the kind of commodities a firm produces. For example, technology- 
based manufacturing firms may wish to control from the very beginning the whole 
spectrum of an investment in a new country. The reason is that the comparative 
advantage of these firms are the so- called intangible assets, i.e. scientific knowledge,
126 See Introduction Chapter for an analysis of FDI flows.
127 See the introduction of the thesis for an analysis of the Greece’s track record in attracting FDI.
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production skills, know how and brand names (Nakamura and Xie, 1998: 572). Table
6.5 documents the different ways the sample of foreign firms entered Greece.
Table 6.5: How Subsidiaries Originally Established in Greece?
Way of Establishment Number Percentage
By the take over of an existing company 29 39.7%
As a joint venture with existing Greek Company
TO_. „ f  „ ___L _______ __a.
6 8.3%
A  ^ 00/d v  m e ir c a u o ii ui a new  esia u  
Other 5
4j .Z/o
6.8%
I otal -------------------------- 73 100%
According to Table 6.5 above, the majority of the foreign subsidiaries (45.2 
per cent or 33 subsidiaries) replied that they were established by the “creation of a 
new establishment”. On the other hand, 39.7 per cent of the subsidiaries (or 29 
subsidiaries) stated that the parent company entered the Greek market by the take over 
of an existing company. These results show that foreign firms are generally divided 
with regard to their preferred way of entry into Greece. Moreover, according to these 
results, a large number o f foreign firms prefer to enter the Greece market on their 
own, without seeking any special partnership with local entrepreneurs.
But is there any relationship between the country of origin and the way of 
entry of multinational corporations? To investigate this we divided firms to American 
and European ones. We should expect that due to geographical proximity and 
common cultural attitude European Firms should be less hesitant in investing in 
Greece without seeking partnership with local firms128:
Table 6.6: Wav o f Entry & Origin o f the Foreign Firm
How Originally Established?
Continent By the take As a joint with By the creation of O ther Total
over of an 
e x is t in g
existing Greek 
r o m n a n v
a new
pdliihlkhmfnl
company
v u i u p a i i j v is ia u i iJ l i i i iv K it
i
Europe 18 5 34 3 60
30% 8.4% 56.6% 5% 100%
America 8 1 1 3 13
61.6% 7.7% 7.7% 23% 100%
Total 26 6 35 6 73
_________ __ 35.7% 8.2% 47.9%----------------------------- 8.2% 100%
128 By the term local firms w e mean the firms that are located in the sam e region, e.g. region o f  Attica, 
or region o f  Sterea Ellada, etc.
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Indeed, Table 6.6 demonstrates that most American companies seem to prefer 
to enter the Greek market via the take over of an existing company. In other words 
they prefer to invest in already established companies (and probably to the already 
established products these firms produce) to the Greek market, instead of starting 
something new. On the contrary, European Union countries, such as Germany, 
France, UK and Italy, are less hesitant to enter the Greek market by creating their own 
subsidiary. An explanation for such a different behaviour between American and 
European firms, might be that the former might be afraid that their products consumed 
in USA or other European countries might not fit in the culture and tastes of the Greek 
consumers. Moreover, as mentioned in chapter IV, with regard to the location factors 
that affect the decision of a multinational corporation about where to invest, for the 
American multinational corporations the previous policies of a State towards 
multinational capital, and especially the likelihood of nationalisation or control of the 
investment decisions taken by the firms, may affect negatively their decision to invest 
in this country (Schoenberger, 1985: 253). The contradictory policies of the Greek 
State towards the multinational capital since 1945, as well as the extensive 
nationalisation that took place between 1974 and 1985, might still make the American 
firms hesitant to invest in Greece. This might also explain the low FDI in the early 
1990s, as memories were still fresh with regard to the inconsistency of the Greek 
State towards foreign investors.
The degree of ownership to a new establishment created to a foreign country is 
also a very important decision taken by a multinational corporation. It affects the 
degree of control, but also the risks and profits that the new establishment might or 
might not bring to the multinational corporation. Moreover, it affects the productive 
efficiency enjoyed by the subsidiaries, but also the diffusion of technology to them by 
the parent company. According to Louri, Loufir and Papanastasiou (2002: 42) the 
main reason that multinational corporations select full ownership is the resource 
intensity of the industry and firm- specific variables. Geographical and cultural 
distance plays a negative role, while invested capital and prospective firm profits play 
a strong positive role. Thus, in Table 6.7 below we present the degree of ownership 
that the 73 foreign subsidiaries, decided to obtain when first invested in Greece, and
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also examine if these subsidiaries, by the time, have increased or decreased their
share.
Table 6.7: Original and Current Ownership Percentages by Foreign Firms with 
Respect to their Subsidiaries
Orij
XI / i  * 1 /  a u
final Cur-------------------------rent
"o^o----- 8--------
nio. of firms
4 5.5%
ixo. of firms
2
rercent
2.7%
21-40 2 2.7% 2 2.7%
41 -60 13 17.8% 3 4.1%
61-80 4 5.5% 2 2.7%
81-100 50 68.5% 64 87.8%
Total 7?........................ . 100% 73 100%
According to Table 6.7, the vast majority o f the foreign firms when first 
invested in Greece did so dynamically by taking over more than 80% of the subsidiary 
they created. This means that foreign multinationals do not want to risk any of their 
proprietary rights and also by full ownership it is easier to exercise the management 
policy they want, determine transfer pricing, as well as secure more profits. Moreover, 
it seems that these foreign firms, over time, have strengthened their percentages to 
these subsidiaries. Such a move should mean that they find the Greek market, at least 
profitable for their businesses and thus have an interest to maintain their investments.
But, is there any relationship between the original percentage of a 
multinational corporation to a subsidiary and the way o f entry? According to Table 
6.8 below, there seems to be such a relationship. Regardless their way o f entry in the 
Greek market, the sample foreign firms obtained the majority of the shares to their 
new investments in Greece.
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Table 6.8: Relationship between Wav o f Original Entry and Original Percentage
What was the original percentage? 
¥-20%  21-40% f 41-60% 61-80% Total
26
100%
As far as the main goals o f the multinational corporations when they decided 
to invest in Greece, these are presented in the Table 6.9 below:
Table 6.9: What Were the Motivations by the Parent Company to Invest in Greece?
Motivations No. of firms
Availability of natural resources 8 10.9%
As the best way to competitively access the Greek 
market
38 52.1%
To access neighbored countries 8 10.9%
The existence of local cluster of firms working on 
similar or complementary activity
5 6.8%
To defend market share in the Greek market 14 19.3%
Total _ 100%
Table 6.9 demonstrates that, for the sample subsidiaries, the main rationale for 
locating in Greece was that they considered this way to be the most competitive way 
to access the Greek market (52.1 per cent or 38 multinational enterprises). 
Additionally, 19.3 per cent (or 14 companies) o f the multinational enterprises thought 
this was the best way o f defending their market share. If  we try to interpret these 
results, a first clear argument is that foreign investments in Greece are mostly made 
with regard to the domestic market. This might be an important cause for the low FDI 
inputs in the Greek market. This might be, firstly, because they consider that the value 
of the Greek market in their overall profits is so small that it does not worth the 
devotion o f time and resources to improve it. Second, they might consider that they
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can effectively defend or access the Greek market only by exporting their products 
from another country and managing them via local commercial representatives. A 
third parameter might be that other reasons, such as bureaucracy or the general 
economic environment in Greece, might discourage them from investing directly in 
the country. If these arguments are true, then it gives us a reasonable (but not the only 
one) explanation with regard to the low FDI inflows in Greece. We intend to examine 
the validity of these variables below.
Additionally, the low response rate in the option “the existence of local cluster 
of firms working on similar or complementary activity” shows that Greece has not 
managed to create a strong industrial base in any activity, and thus to be a location of 
other similar firms that want to take advantage of economies of scope (or external 
economies of scale) that could be created. This is a very important conclusion that is 
going to be explored further during the interviews with managers of foreign 
subsidiaries located in Greece. With regard to the number of employees foreign 
subsidiaries have, the results are demonstrated in Table 6.10 below. The responses 
given were divided, as shown in the next table, in 7 categories for the better 
interpretation of the results.
Table 6.10: How many Employees does your Establishment Have?
Number of employees No. of firms Percentage
0-100 21 28.7%
101-200 7 9.6%
201-300 19 26.0%
301-400 17 23.3%
401-500 3 4.1%
501-1000 2 2.6%
1001 over 4 5.7%
Total 73 100%
Table 6.10 indicates that only 9 of the subsidiaries out o f 73 in Greece employ 
more than 400 people. 36 subsidiaries (or about 50 per cent) are in the range 200- 400. 
These ranges are very low in comparison to the European standards, and the
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190subsidiaries located in Greece would be considered as small medium enterprises . 
These numbers are reasonable if we have in mind that the majority of the subsidiaries, 
as seen before, produce for the domestic market, which is small in size.
But, in order to research further whether this is the case, I am going to 
distinguish industry sectors in modem and traditional ones. This distinction is used in 
order to demonstrate, together with other findings of the research, whether Greece 
attracts, or not, labour intensive industries. Thus, the distinction between traditional 
and modem sector, which has been taken by the Greek National Statistics Service, is 
related with the use or not in the production procedure of new technical means. More 
precisely, a company is being placed to the traditional sector if the commodity that 
produces is being manufactured since a long time ago (e.g. early 20th century) without 
significant technological change, e.g. food and agriculture products or beverages. On 
the other hand a company is being placed to the modem industry, if the commodity 
produced is based on technological development, e.g. machinery and electric 
equipment. This general distinction of industry sectors, despite some potential 
limitations it might have, nevertheless it comes in accordance with the general belief, 
and practice I would argue, that the more technology an industry uses, the less labour 
is occupied in it. Conclusively, this distinction can contribute to the purpose of this 
part of the research, i.e. to see what kind of industries Greece attracts. Thus, Table 
6.11 in the next page presents this distinction.
129 According to the Appendix I of the Community Law 70/2001/EC as amended by the Committee 
2003/361/EC one of the criteria to consider a firm as a small- medium one is that this firm has to 
employ less than 250 employees.
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Table 6.11: Sector Description
Sector Number Sector Description Modem or Traditional
20 Food and Agricultural Products Traditional
21 Beverages Traditional
22 Tobacco and Tobacco Products Traditional
23 Textile Products Traditional
24 Fabric and Leather Products Traditional
25 Wood and Cork Traditional
26 Furniture Traditional
27 Paper and Products Traditional
28 Newspapers, Magazines and Publishing Traditional
29 Leather and Fur Traditional
30 Rubber and Plastics Modem
31 Chemicals, Gases, Medicines and Cosmetics Modem
32 Petroleum and Coal Products, Gas bottling Modem
33 Non- Metallic Mineral Products Modem
34 Primary Metal Products Traditional
35 Metal Products and Structures Modem
36 Machinery Modem
37 Electric Equipment Modem
38 Transportation Means Modem
39 Miscellaneous Manufactured Products Traditional
Source: Greek National Statistics Service
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Table 6.12: Relationship between Number of Employees and Sector of Classification
Sector of Activity
Number of Employees Modern Traditional Total
0-100 13 8 21
27.6% 30.8% 28.7%
101-200 4 3 7
8.5% 11.5% 9.6%
201-300 15 4 19
31.9% 15.4% 26.0%
301-400 10 7 17
21.3% 26.9% 23.3%
401-500 2 1 3
4.2% 3.8% 4.1%
501-1000 1 1 2
2.1% 3.8% 2.6%
1001 over 2 2 4
4.2% 7.7% 5.7%
Total 47 26 73
100% 100% 100%
According to Table 6.12, Greece seems to fail to attract companies seeking to 
produce labour intensive mass- produced goods. On the contrary most of the 
subsidiaries seem to be active in the modem sector, which usually uses less labour 
and more technology in producing the commodities. This result (in combination with 
the previous two conclusions, i.e. that most of foreign subsidiaries in Greece target the 
domestic market and are considered as small and medium enterprises) is consistent 
with my provisional expectations in the introductory part of the thesis, i.e. that Greece 
fails to attract companies seeking to produce labour intensive mass- produced goods. 
More precisely, Greece seems to attract similar type of companies to other European 
Union countries, i.e. companies that use expertise highly- skilled and not cheap labour 
force, but not in the large quantities as the other European Union countries.
Lastly, the pattern of the relationship between the company size and the 
company’s origin is investigated in the Table below:
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Table 6.13: Relationship between Number of Employees and Nationality of the Parent
Company
Number of Emp oyees
Nationality 
of parent 
company
0-100 101-
200
201-
300
301-
400
401-
500
501-
1000
1001
over
Total
Netherlands 4
40%
2
20%
4
40%
10
France 3
37.5%
1
12.5%
2
25%
2
25%
8
Italy 1
25%
2
50%
1
25%
4
Germany 4
33.3%
1
8.33%
3
25%%
2
16.8%
1
8.33%
1
8.33%
12
USA 1
8.33%
1
8.33%
3
25%
4
33.3%
1
8.33%
2
16.8%
12
Switzerland 1
20%
1
20%
2
40%
1
20%
5
UK 1
20%
2
40%
1
20%
1
20%
5
Cyprus 3
75%
1
25%
4
Luxembourg 2
50%
1
25%
1
25%
4
Ireland 1
50%
1
50%
2
Belgium 1
50%
1
50%
2
Austrial 1
100%
1
Sweden 1
50%
1
50%
2
Canada 1
100%
1
Denmark 1
100%
1
Total 21 7 19 17 3 2 4 73
As already mentioned the majority of the subsidiaries established in Greece 
are considered as small and medium sized. Nevertheless, from Table 6.13 a 
conclusion is that USA seem to be the origin country of the largest enterprises located 
in Greece, followed by Germany and UK. Other conclusions are difficult to be drawn 
due to the scattering of the data.
6.4 Roles of Subsidiary
At the beginning of the current chapter (Table 6.1) we presented the foreign 
subsidiaries located in different regions of Greece and whether they are export or
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domestic oriented. Now, we will further analyse the degree of export orientation of 
the foreign subsidiaries in Greece. More precisely, at a first place, we are going to 
present analytically how much of their production the foreign subsidiaries that 
responded to the questionnaire export.
Table 6.14: What Proportion of the Production is Exported?
Proportion o f exports No of subsidiaries Percentage
0-10 44 60%
11-20 5 6.9%
21-30 2 2.7%
51-60 14 19.4%
61-70 5 6.9%
91-100 3 4.1%
Total 73 100%
Table 6.14 demonstrates that the majority of the foreign subsidiaries located in 
Greece (60 per cent or 44 subsidiaries) export from 0 to 10 per cent of their whole 
production. From these subsidiaries, 26 do not export at all. In total, the 69.6 per cent 
(or 51 subsidiaries) of these subsidiaries, export a maximum of 30 per cent of their 
production. On the other hand, only 30.1 per cent (or 22 subsidiaries) of the 
subsidiaries export more than 50 per cent of their production. These results (in 
combination with the motivations and the number of employees analysed before) 
strengthen the view that foreign firms establish a subsidiary in Greece mainly with a 
view of supplying the internal market and exports being a secondary target.
Furthermore, in order to see if the results of Table 6.14 can be generalised to 
the entire population we will make a test of significance. In particular, my expectation 
is that foreign firms establish subsidiaries in Greece mainly with a view of supplying 
the internal market and exports being a secondary target. Thus, the null hypothesis is
Ho: Subsidiaries in Greece are mainly export oriented.
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Table 6.15: Null Hypothesis Testing- Subsidiaries in Greece are Mainly Export
Oriented
One-Sample Test
Test Value = 0
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Lower Upper
What proportion of your 
production is exported? 11,867 72 ,000 3,5342 2,9406 4,1279
From the Table 6.15 “One- Sample Test” we see that the value 0.0 is less than 
the value a=0.05 so we reject the null hypothesis. This means that the trends we 
analysed above concerning the production orientation (which is towards the internal 
market rather than abroad) are statistically significant. Moreover, because the mean 
difference is between the lower and upper level given in the above table, this means 
that there are 95 per cent chances that our interval will contain the population mean. 
The interpretation of these results shows that the respondents of the sample have a 
similar behaviour pattern to the population, with regard to the export orientation of the 
foreign subsidiaries in Greece.
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Going deeper to the analysis of the profile of the foreign subsidiaries located 
in Greece, the pattern of the relationship between the export percentage and the sector 
(modem or traditional one) the subsidiary is active is investigated.
Table 6.16: Relationship between Proportion of Exported Production and Sector
Classification of the Subsidiary.
Sector C assification
Proportion of Exports % M odern Traditional Total
0-10 24 20 44
51.1% 76.9% 60%
11-20 4 2 6
8.5% 7.7% 6.9%
21-30 2 2
4.3% 2.7%
51-60 9 4 13
19.1% 15.4% 19.4%
61-70 4 4
8.5% 6.9%
91-100 4 4
8.5% 4.1%
Total 47 26 73
100% 100% 100%
Table 6.16 demonstrates that the subsidiaries being active in the traditional 
sector export (in their majority) only small amounts of their production. On the other 
hand, all the companies that export more than 60 per cent are active on the modem 
sector. These results could be considered as surprising ones, because one should 
expect that the traditional sector’s subsidiaries that Greece attracts, invest in the 
country in order to take advantage of the natural resources or cheap labour (both main 
characteristics o f a traditional sector firm) and export their commodities. But, this is 
not the case. On the contrary, this result is consistent with our previous findings, i.e. 
that natural resources is not a major factor for investing in Greece and second that the 
country fails to attract labour- intensive subsidiaries.
In chapter III we discussed the types of multinational corporations and the 
degree of autonomy each type allows to subsidiaries. This degree of autonomy might 
extend from full control by the parent firm to complete autonomy (from the parent 
company) at a regional or local level. There are different types of multinational 
corporations, depending either whether the analysis takes place in time (e.g. Dicken,
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1998, who examines the transformation of multinational corporations over time), or in 
space (e.g. Belis- Bergouignan, Bordenave and Lung, 2000, who argue that the 
greater the degree of homogeneity, the greater the degree of hierarchical control) or 
examines the strategic targets set by the management of the multinational corporation 
(e.g. King and Sethi, 2001)130. All these authors distinguish between different types of 
multinational corporations according to the management structure created in order to 
get effective decisions with regard to their every day operation and strategic goals. 
Consequently, the degree of autonomy that multinational corporations allow to their 
subsidiaries located in Greece will enhance our knowledge about the type of foreign 
firms that invest in the country. This is an issue that is also going to be discussed 
during the interviews with the managers of foreign subsidiaries located in Greece and 
will allow us to understand what kind of foreign subsidiaries are located in Greece 
and whether the relationships developed between the parent company and the 
subsidiary influences FDI inflows. Table 6.17 presents the role of the subsidiary in 
Greece in terms of the output.
Table 6.17: How would you Evaluate the Role of your Subsidiary?
Role of subsidiary No of subsidiaries Percentage
Produces some of the parent’s already 
existing product lines 43 58.9%
Produces a certain set of components 
and the final product is produced 
elsewhere
5 6.8%
It has autonomy and creative resources 25 34.3%
Total 73 100%
The data in Table 6.17 show that the majority of the subsidiaries (58.9 per cent 
or 43 firms) produce some of the parent’s already existing products for the Greek 
market. Although, we cannot be sure of the reasons that these firms produce the 
parents’ products, nevertheless, if we take into account the typology of Dicken 
(1998), we could argue that it is the “classic global” organisation model that mostly 
applies in the Greek case131. If we take into account the typology of Belis-
130 For a detailed analysis o f  different types o f  Multinational Firms see chapter III o f  the Thesis.
131 A s referred in chapter III this type o f  Multinational Firm w as first used by Ford in early 1900s and 
revived only in 1970s and 1980s by Japanese firms, which started their international operations. It is 
based upon a strict centralisation o f  assets and responsibilities in w hich the role o f  subsidiaries is to 
assemble and sell products, as w ell as to implement strategies already decided by the centre.
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Bergouignan, Bordenave and Lung (2000), it is the “World- wide company” that 
mostly applies in the Greek case132. Lastly, if we take into account the typology 
developed by King and Sethi (2001), this kind of operation mostly applies to 
“portfolio management”133. On the other hand, 34.3 per cent (or 25 subsidiaries) of 
the companies responded that they have autonomy in what they produce. These 
companies might have got this autonomy for two reasons: first, because their 
production remains domestic- oriented and the parent company tries to penetrate the 
Greek market by producing products that are close to the Greek culture and 
distinctiveness. In other words it tries to produce products that may have great local 
demand134. The second reason might be that the parent company tries to expand its 
products, which are oriented to the world market, by giving the opportunity to its local 
branches to integrate local ideas to products sold world- wide. Finally, just 6.8 per 
cent (or five subsidiaries) produce a certain set of components and the final product is 
produced elsewhere. This means that very few foreign subsidiaries produce 
intermediate products, which are then transferred to other plants for the final 
assembly.
When I previously analysed the background of foreign subsidiaries in Greece, 
I argued that only 10.9 per cent (or 8 subsidiaries) were established in order to take 
advantage of the natural resources that exist in the country. As a result, it was argued 
that for those foreign firms, Greece is not probably regarded as a peripheral country, 
where multinational corporations invest in order to take advantage of natural 
resources, or any other characteristics of such a country. Thus, the result concerning 
the low number of firms producing intermediate products, further strengthens my 
argument that Greece is not considered as a peripheral country for foreign investors. 
Finally, this result also strengthens the argument that the Greek market probably lacks 
(in quantity and quality) the necessary small firms that are vital in today’s economic 
activity in order either to supply raw materials to the main industrial units, or to
132 This type of Multinational Firm is both homogenous and ethnocentric. When such a firm invests 
abroad, at the beginning it duplicates the original company's organisational structure. By this way the 
firm presents an homogenous form across different nations.
133 This type of firm focuses on a specific region, especially for production facilities. But, marketing
and distribution activities are performed globally. Their manufacturing activities are highly centralised 
as far as their management is concerned.
134 If this is the reason then according to Belis- Bergouignan, Bordenave and Lung (2000) this is the so- 
called “Multidomestic Company” Multinational Firm.
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produce part of the final products. In this way, foreign subsidiaries fail to establish 
strong links with local firms.
In relation to the degree of autonomy and the national origin of the foreign 
subsidiaries located in Greece, the following results are given:
Table 6.18: Relationship between Nationality of the Parent Company and the Role of
Subsidiary
How would you evaluate the role o f  your subsidiary?
What is the Produces some Produces a certain It has autonomy Total
nationality of the of the parent’s set of components and creative
parent company? already existing and the final resources
product lines product is produced
elsewhere
Italy 3 1 4
75% 25% 5.5%
Germany 7 2 3 12
58.3% 16.7% 25% 16.4%
Sweden 1 1 2
50% 50% 2.7%
USA 3 2 7 12
25% 16.7% 58.3% 16.4%
France 3 5 8
37.5% 62.5% 10.9%
Switzerland 4 1 5
80% 25% 6.9%
UK 3 2 5
60% 40% 6.9%
Netherlands 7 3 10
70% 30% 13.7%
Canada 1 1
100% 1.4%
Cyprus 3 1 4
75% 25% 5.5%
Luxembourg 3 1 4
75% 25% 5.5%
Ireland 2 2
100% 2.7%
Belgium 2 2
2.7%
Austria 1 1
100% 1.4%
Denmark 1 1
100% 1.4%
Total 43 5 25 73
100% 100% 100% 100%
172
Table 6.18 demonstrates that the American firms operate in a more 
autonomous basis in relation to the European companies. On the other hand, the 
majority of German subsidiaries produce some of the parent’s already existing 
products.
Table 6.19: Relationship between Role of the Subsidiary and Operation of an R&D
Department
Do you have an R&D departm ent?
How would you evaluate the role of 
your subsidiary?
No Yes Total
Produces some of the parent’s already 26 17 43
existing product lines 59.1% 58.6% 58.9%
Produces a certain set of components 4 1 5
and the final product 9.1% 3.5% 6.8%%
It has autonomy and creative 14 11 25
resources 31.8% 37.9% 34.3%
Total 44 29 73
100% 100% 100%
Table 6.19 demonstrates that in relation to the subsidiaries, which stated that 
they have autonomy and creative resources to perform their operation, almost half of 
them have an R&D department. Probably, these firms either believe that the Greek 
scientific labour force can produce some products that could be sold in a world basis, 
or they use these R&D departments to adapt their products to the Greek tastes. 
Moreover, just a little less than half of the subsidiaries that produce some of the 
parent’s already existing products have an R&D department. This might take place 
because as the aim of most of the foreign firms that invest in Greece is the Greek 
market they want to adopt some of their products to the Greek tastes.
Table 6.20: Do you have a Marketing and Sales Department?
No of Firms Percentage
No 9 12.3%
Yes 64 87.7%
Total 73 100%
According to Table 6.20, almost all subsidiaries (87.7 per cent or 64 firms) 
stated that they have a marketing and sales department. This probably means that 
almost all foreign subsidiaries have some kind of commercial activity in Greece, apart 
from just producing some products. The rest subsidiaries of the sample either have no
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commercial activity in Greece, or sell their produced commodities using different 
channels.
6.5 Activities of the Subsidiary
The third part of the questionnaire tries to identify which are the particular 
activities of the foreign subsidiaries located in Greece. More precisely, it tries to 
identify the relationships of the subsidiaries, first, with the parent companies, and 
second with local firms.
Thus, in the first place it examines the proportion of the production supplies 
that the subsidiary imports from the parent company or other subsidiaries of the 
multinational group13 5.
Table 6.21: What Proportion of your Production Supplies is Imported from the Parent 
Company?
Imported Proportion % No of Firms Percentage
0-20 39 53.4%
21-40 9 12.3%
41-60 3 4.1%
61-80 7 9.6%
81-100 15 20.6%
Total 73 100%
According to Table 6.21, a little more than half of the subsidiaries (53.4 per 
cent or 39 subsidiaries) import a small amount of production supplies from their 
parent companies (between 0-20 per cent of their input needs). On the other hand,
20.6 per cent of the subsidiaries (or 15 firms) import almost all of their production 
supplies by their parent companies. The remaining subsidiaries are found in between 
these two levels. From these results there does not seem to be a great dependence, as 
far as the production supplies is concerned, of the subsidiaries on their parent 
companies as 65.7 per cent or 48 subsidiaries import less than 40 per cent of their 
production supplies by their parent companies.
135 The information provided in Tables 6.21 and 6.22 refer to the value o f  inputs.
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Next, the percentage of supplies that subsidiaries purchase by local136 firms is 
examined.
Table 6.22: What Percentage of your Supplies is Purchased by Local Firms?
% of supplies purchased No of Firms Percentage
0-20 32 43.9%
21-40 12 16.5%
41-60 16 21.9%
61-80 5 6.8%
81-100 8 10.9%
Total 73 100%
The above results demonstrate a tendency that has already started to be formed 
by the interpretation of the other results on this questionnaire. 39.6 per cent of the 
foreign subsidiaries (or 29 firms) get more than 40 per cent of their input supplies 
from local firms to use them for their final production. On the other hand, the 60.4 per 
cent of the companies (or 44 subsidiaries) get a maximum of 40 per cent of their 
supplies inputs from the local firms. These results show some kind o f interdependence 
that has been formed between multinational enterprises and local Greek firms. On the 
contrary, a lot of subsidiaries seem to operate on a parallel (semi-) independent basis. 
This conclusion can be considered as a negative one because from the moment that 
the production of a commodity has no dependence on local added value, makes easier 
the decision of a multinational corporation to transfer its production to another 
location. Especially, in the case where the HQ of the multinational corporation 
considers that the Greek market, either is not that important any more, or can be 
served by different methods (i.e. imports). Moreover, local firms do not seem to 
benefit from gaining knowledge of production methods and management that uses 
foreign firms.
136 B y the term local are meant other firms that are found in a distance o f  300  km from the subsidiary. 
Usually this distance includes the region that the foreign subsidiary is located, as w ell as the 
neighboured regions. A  region usually includes 3-4 prefectures.
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Table 6.23 below demonstrates the degree of the decision- making autonomy 
that the foreign subsidiaries enjoy in Greece.
Table 6.23: What is the Degree of your Decision- Making Autonomy?
Degree of decision making- autonomy No of Firms Percentage
Decisions by parent/ regional headquarters 
without consulting Greek subsidiary
9 12.4%
Decisions by parent/ regional headquarters 
after consulting Greek subsidiary
17 23.3%
Decisions by Greek subsidiary after 
consulting parent company
45 61.6%
Decisions by Greek subsidiary without 
consulting parent company
2 2.7%
Total 73 100%
According to the above results the vast majority of the firms (61.6 per cent or 
45 subsidiaries) responded that the decisions are taken mainly by the Greek subsidiary 
after consulting with the parent company. Moreover, 23.3 per cent of the firms (or 17 
subsidiaries) replied that the decisions are taken by the parent company, but only after 
consultation with the Greek subsidiary. This shows the small degree of autonomy that 
the subsidiaries enjoy in Greece. There might be three reasons for this. First, that the 
managerial personnel in the subsidiaries does not have the expertise to take decisions 
that will affect the course of the firm in Greece. Second, simply that the multinational 
corporations do not think that the Greek case needs any special strategy (that will be 
formed by the knowledge of the local managers) in order to be accessed, and that the 
strategy planned by the HQ for all the subsidiaries around the globe is enough. Third, 
they want to have full control of their business in Greece at all time.
These two results, which show an exchange of strategic ideas between the 
local branches and the parent companies (in 84.9 per cent of the cases regardless who 
gets the final decision), reveal that the production is mainly oriented towards the 
Greek market, or in the best case in other neighbouring countries. This result is 
consistent with the argument that Greece attracts domestic oriented FDI. In this case, 
the Greek highly- skilled personnel is (in most cases) the most suitable to decide 
which strategy is the best for penetrating or expanding the Greek market. The parent 
company can provide assistance to the local personnel, either by transferring know­
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how, e.g. on marketing techniques, or by just giving its approval to the strategy that is 
to be followed. On the other hand, only 15.1 per cent of the subsidiaries have no 
involvement in the decision of the strategy that is to be followed for the produced 
commodity.
6.6 Institutional Factors and Services
The fourth, and last, section of the questionnaire examines the attitude of the 
foreign subsidiaries towards some institutional factors and services when first 
invested and now. The reason is to see whether there has been any improvement in 
how the subsidiaries see these institutional factors and services. Thus, the first such
|  O '!
factor is bureaucracy .
Table 6.24: How do you Rate Bureaucracy. When First Invested and Currently?
W hen first invested Currently
Very Satisfied 0 0
0% 0%
Satisfied 5 12
6.8% 16.4%
Neither satisfied/ nor unsatisfied 15 15
20.6% 20.6%
Unsatisfied 29 31
39.7% 42.5%
Very unsatisfied 24 15
32.9% 20.5%
Total 73 73
100% 100%
According to Table 6.24, when foreign firms first decided to invest in Greece 
the 72.6 per cent of them (or 53 subsidiaries), developed a negative opinion, as far as 
bureaucracy is concerned, which was probably formed by their interaction with public 
services. This is a particularly negative result, especially if considering the fact that 
only 6.8 per cent of the foreign subsidiaries (or 5 firms) had a positive opinion 
regarding bureaucracy in Greece. Despite the continuous announcements by the 
Greek governments of the last twenty years towards their determination to ease the 
investment environment in Greece, and particularly despite the increase in the 
competition among countries to attract FDI, the situation in Greece does not seem to
137 By the term bureaucracy w e mean the number o f  papers/ permissions and the subsequent time 
necessary in order for an investor to begin its business operation.
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have changed if we take into consideration what is currently the opinion of the foreign 
subsidiaries about bureaucracy. In particular, currently, 63 per cent of the subsidiaries 
(or 46 firms) are still very unsatisfied or just unsatisfied with bureaucracy in Greece, 
which is a minor improvement in relation to the previous years. On the other hand, the 
number of firms, which state that they are satisfied by the red- tape procedures in 
Greece has increased slightly to 16.4 per cent (or 12 firms). The rest of the firms still 
remain neutral about the bureaucratic status in the country.
Indeed the above dissatisfaction of the investors is reasonable if  we see Table 
6.25 below. This Table shows that in Greece currently someone needs more permits 
and days to start a firm, in comparison to other selected EU countries, some of them 
competitive to the type of FDI Greece also tries to attract.
Table 6.25: Permits and Days to Start a Firm
Country Permits to start a firm Days to start a firm
UK ' 2 7
Denmark 3 30
Germany 3 30
Ireland 3 15
Netherlands 3 10
Portugal 5 60
Spain 5.5 60
Greece 6.5 60
Source: World Economic Forum 2001, Global Competitiveness Report 2001- 2002
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The second institutional factor examines the opinion of foreign subsidiaries
1 -jo
about the Greek legislative framework , when first invested and now.
Table 6.26: How do you rate legislative framework, when first invested and
currently?
When first invested Currently
Very Satisfied 0 1
0% 1.4%
Satisfied 8 8
10.9% 10.9%
Neither satisfied/ nor unsatisfied 36 37
49.3% 50.6%
Unsatisfied 16 14
21.1% 19.2%
Very unsatisfied 13 13
17.8% 17.8%
Total 73 73
100% 100%
As far as the legislative framework is concerned (Table 6.26), although the 
opinion of the foreign subsidiaries is slightly better than in the case of bureaucracy, it 
still remains negative as a whole. In particular, when first invested, almost the 
majority o f the subsidiaries (49.3 per cent or 36 subsidiaries) had a neutral view 
concerning the legislative framework in Greece, where as the 38.9 per cent (29 
subsidiaries) had a negative view and only the 10.9 per cent (or 8 subsidiaries) had a 
positive opinion. Currently, the number of firms that are satisfied with the Greek 
legislative framework has increased marginally by one subsidiary (12.3 per cent or 9 
subsidiaries), where as the number of firms that have a negative opinion has decreased 
only by 1.9 per cent, to 37 per cent (or 27 subsidiaries). As a whole, the opinion of 
foreign subsidiaries in Greece remains unchanged during the last years, meaning that 
all the efforts of the Greek government to improve the legislative framework in order 
to facilitate investments have failed. I would argue that the main problem of the Greek 
legislative framework is the complexity of the Greek laws and normative rules.
The third institutional factor that is examined in the questionnaire is the access 
to information139 that foreign firms have in Greece, in relation to domestic firms.
138 By the term legislative framework w e mean all these laws that determine business operations and 
investments.
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Table 6.27: How do you Rate Access to Information, When First Invested and
Currently?
When first invested C urrently
Very Satisfied 0 2
0% 2.7%
Satisfied 4 24
5.5% 32.9%
Neither satisfied/ nor unsatisfied 41 28
56.2% 38.4%
Unsatisfied 22 14
30.1% 19.2%
Very unsatisfied 6 5
8.2% 6.8%
Total 73 73
100% 100%
As far as the “access to information” factor is concerned (Table 6.27), the 
picture is mixed. During the first years of their investment, the majority of foreign 
firms (56.2 per cent or 41 subsidiaries) had a neutral view, where as 38.3 per cent (or 
28 subsidiaries) had a negative view and just 5.5 per cent (or 4 subsidiary) had a 
positive view. Currently, what seems to have happened is that foreign firms have a 
clearer picture on how the situation is (probably because now they have the 
experience on how the “system140” in Greece works). In particular, the number of 
firms that have a neutral opinion has decreased to 38.4 per cent (or 28 subsidiaries), 
where as the number of firms that have a negative point of view has also decreased 
reaching the 26 per cent (or 19 subsidiaries). On the other hand, the number of firms 
that have a positive point of view has increased substantially reaching the 35.6 per 
cent (or 26 subsidiaries).
Having described the opinion of subsidiaries that replied to the questionnaire 
with regard to bureaucracy, legislative framework and access to information, we can 
argue that the absorptive capacity of Greece to changes in the international business 
environment remains low. Foreign businesses are still unable to justify behaviours and
139 By the term access to information w e mean the “rules” o f  the market, e.g. for procurement o f  
equipment by the government, which have to be the same for local and foreign businesses.
140 By this term I mean the methods and procedures required to be follow ed by the managers o f  a firm 
in order to gain access to information necessary to com pete in the market.
180
rules of the Greek State. In other words, laws, customs, and so forth remain less 
familiar for the foreign investor and in this respect there should be other factors that 
may offset these deficiencies141. In other words, given that the foreign firms have 
located in Greece despite the negative views on bureaucracy, legislative framework 
and access to information, there must be some other compensating advantages.
The fourth institutional factor that is examined is taxation as this will influence 
local production costs. Gorter and Parikh (2003: 193- 194) argue that much of the tax 
competition literature suggests that countries try to attract foreign capital by setting 
low corporate income tax rates. According to this statement, low tax states should 
attract relative high FDI. Thus, when a firm is about to choose amongst a small 
number of locations, it will compare the post- tax level of profits arising in each 
location (Devereux and Griffith, 1998: 337). In this respect, the following answers 
were given to the questionnaire:
Table 6.28: How do you rate taxation, when first invested and currently?
W hen first invested Currently
Very satisfied 0 0
0% 0%
Satisfied 16 18
21.9% 24.7%
Neither satisfied/ nor unsatisfied 21 19
28.8% 26%
Unsatisfied 26 23
35.6% 31.5%
Very unsatisfied 10 13
13.7% 17.8%
Total 73 73
100% 100%
In a sense, the results from the Table 6.28 mirror the stagnancy of the Greek 
taxation laws during the last 30 years, as well as the fact that Greece has one of the 
highest taxation rates in Europe. In particular, when first invested, 49.3 per cent (or 36 
subsidiaries) of the companies held a negative view concerning the Greek taxation 
system, whereas only the 21.9 per cent (or 16 subsidiaries) of the companies had a 
positive view and 28.8 per cent (or 21 subsidiaries) a neutral opinion. On the other
141 One such factor may be agglomeration or urbanisation econom ies or adequate infrastructure, etc.
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hand, currently the number of firms that have a positive opinion regarding the Greek 
taxation system has only slightly increased, i.e. 24.7 per cent (or 18 subsidiaries), and 
the number of firms that have a neutral view has decreased also slightly reaching the 
26 per cent (or 19 subsidiaries). Respectively, the number of foreign firms that have a 
negative view has remained the same, i.e. 49.3 per cent (or 36 subsidiaries). This 
stagnancy in the negative opinions could be considered reasonable and, probably, 
mirrors the discontent of the foreign firms (and the native firms I would argue) about 
the slow pace by which the Greek State tries to change a widely recognised negative 
taxation system.
Finally, the last institutional factor examined is the opinion of the foreign 
firms regarding the incentives that the Greek State provides to new investors in the 
manufacturing sector. As mentioned in chapter IV, one way for the countries to 
increase their competitiveness is the initiation of policy measures aiming to the 
facilitation of making business within their land. One such measure is incentives.
Table 6.29: How do you rate incentives, when first invested and currently?
When first invested Currently
Very satisfied 0 4
0% 5.5%
Satisfied 16 26
21.9% 35.6 %
Neither satisfied/ nor unsatisfied 23 18
31.5% 24.7%
Unsatisfied 27 20
37% 27.4%
Very unsatisfied 7 5
9.6% 6.8%
Total 73 73
100% 100%
Incentives is the only field where foreign firms have a rather more positive 
view with regard to the attitude of the state towards attracting foreign investment. At 
this point, I have to mention that when this questionnaire was sent, the law that 
determines the incentives provisions to new and old manufacturing investments was 
about to change. These changes were known to the people who responded to the 
questionnaire, in the first phase of the sent questionnaire, and the investment law had 
already started being implemented when I resent the questionnaire, and it might have
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affected their opinion. In general the Greek government follows the world tendencies 
(e.g. regulatory changes towards liberalisation, tax incentives, subsidies, etc142) with 
regard to the adopted policies measures for promoting investments. Thus, with regard 
to the replies the 73 subsidiaries gave, where as only 21.9 per cent (or 16 subsidiaries) 
of the foreign firms were satisfied with the investment incentives when first invested 
in Greece, currently this percentage has increased to 41.1 per cent, or 30 subsidiaries 
(almost doubled). On the other hand, the 46.6 per cent (or 34 subsidiaries) of foreign 
firms had initially a negative opinion about the incentives, and currently this 
percentage has decreased to 34.2 per cent (or 25 subsidiaries). Of course, this 
percentage is still significant, but the trend is downward. Finally, the number of firms 
that had a neutral view regarding incentives was initially 31.5 per cent (23 
subsidiaries) and now has fallen to 24.7 per cent (or 18 subsidiaries). But, as stressed 
in chapter IV the influence of public incentives on firms’ location is disputable 
(Perrons, 1981: 83; Robinson, 1987: 10; Brewer and Young, 1997: 177; Barrios, 
Gorg, Strobl, 2002: 2). Very strong incentives by themselves cannot be the sole factor 
that may affect the location decision of a multinational enterprise. Incentives, are one 
factor, among many others, that will be considered by the multinational corporations 
when they decide where to invest. Thus, the improvement of the opinion of foreign 
subsidiaries that replied to the questionnaire cannot by itself be considered as that the 
Greek investment environment has changed for the better. It is the overall picture of a 
country’s investment environment that is important.
The second part of the last section of the questionnaire is concerned with the 
opinion of foreign subsidiaries in Greece with regard to some services that the Greek 
State provides in order to facilitate the business activity. In particular, the survey 
asked firms to respond to the quality of infrastructure when they first invested in 
Greece and to the present time. In general, the results (presented in Table 6.30) show 
that it has been a clear improvement. For example, in relation to road/ rail network, 
when first invested, only 9.7 per cent (or 7 firms) of the foreign subsidiaries located in 
Greece were satisfied with the road/ rail network, whereas 43.6 per cent (or 32 firms) 
were unsatisfied. This trend seems to have changed as currently, the 53.4 per cent (or 
39 firms) of the sample have a positive view for the road/ rail network, whereas only
142 For a detailed analysis of these policy measures see chapter IV.
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the 16.5 per cent (or 12 subsidiaries) have a negative one, and 30.1 per cent (or 22 
subsidiaries) are neutral. This change on the view of managers concerning the road/ 
rail network of Greece seems to be consistent with the huge investments that have 
taken place during the last 10 years in this section.
The same positive view the subsidiaries also have for the air/sea 
transportation, which is also a way for distributing their commodities. With regard to 
telecommunications, the striking point is that currently only 6.8 per cent (or 5 
subsidiaries) have a negative opinion. The significant investments that have taken 
place during the last decades in the telecommunication services seem to have 
contributed to the high percentage of satisfaction in this field by the foreign 
subsidiaries. No negative views exist for the services currently provided by the Greek 
state with regard to energy supply. Finally, with regard to industrial areas, this is the 
only field that foreign subsidiaries still seem to keep a hesitant position.
Table 6.30: How do you Rate Road/ Rail Network, Air/ Sea Transportation, 
Telecommunications, Energy Supply and Industrial Areas when First Invested and
Currently?
Very
Satisfied
Satisfied Neither satisfied/ 
Nor unsatisfied
Unsatisfied Very unsatisfied
Then Now Then Now Then Now Then Now Then Now
Road/ rail network — 3
4 1%
7
9.7%
36
49.3%
34
46.7%
22
30.1%
24
32.9%
6
8.3%
8
10.7%
6
8.2%
Air/ sea 2 9 23 37 31 18 17 6 3
transportation 2.7% 12.3% 31.5% 50.7% 42.5% 24.6% 23.3% 8.3% 4.1
Telecommunications — 10
13.7%
12
16.4%
50
68.5%
34
46.7%
10
13.7%
22
30.1%
3
4.1%
5
6.8%
—
Energy supply — — 32
43.8%
54
74%
37
50.7%
17
23.3%
4
5.5%
2
2.7%
— —
Industrial Areas — — 18
24.6%
26
35.6%
46
63,1%
40
54.7%
9
12.3%
7
9.7%
— —
As mentioned in chapter IV, adequate infrastructure143 can influence positively 
the decision of a multinational corporation to invest in a country. Adequate 
infrastructure can contribute to the on time distribution of products to the market(s). A 
good road/rail and air network, as well as provision of telecommunication network 
and energy supply at low rates increase the competitiveness of a country. Besides, 
adequate physical infrastructure contributes to the minimisation of distance, which at 
our time is more important than ever before for the firms in order to remain
143 In chapter IV w e presented a definition o f  adequate infrastructure, provided by Christodoulou 
(1996).
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competitive, at world, regional or local level. Consequently, it seems that Greece does 
not suffer from a poor physical infrastructure and provision of services. On the 
contrary, it seems that the efforts made during the last fifteen years are recognised by 
foreign investors. Nevertheless, a negative point seems to be the low esteem of 
foreign firms for the industrial areas formed by the Greek State.
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6.7 Location and Incentives
The third issue that concerns this thesis is the importance of incentives in 
attracting FDI in Greece. Before analysing the relationship between location of 
foreign subsidiaries in Greece and incentives provided by the Greek government, I 
will first give a short review of incentives in Greece. The initial starting point for 
introducing incentives in the Greek development policy has been the termination of 
the Marshall Plan in 1952. More precisely, the Legislative Decree No. 2687 of 1953 
was introduced under which the repatriation of capital could begin one year from the 
date that the enterprise financed by foreign capital begins to produce. The repatriation 
amount could not exceed 10 per cent of the capital initially imported. Since then, 
other laws were also introduced, such as Law No. 4171 of 1961, as amended by 
Legislative Decrees No. 4256 of 1961 and No. 916 of 1971, which covered 
investment projects in excess ofDrs. 90 million. In 1975, Law No. 159/75 simplified 
the procedures for approval of FDI, but also raised the amounts for investments to be 
eligible for treatment under Law No. 4171/61 from 90 million to 150 million 
drachmas. Three years later, Article 33 of Law No. 849/78 replaced Legislative 
Decree No. 4256/61 allowing even more capital repatriation by foreign investors 
(Spyridakis, 1999: 111-112). In this respect it is evident that these laws did not aim to 
a policy of equal regional development, but rather to lure foreign investors to invest in 
Greece, not considering the location.
The modem status of incentives provided by the Greek government is based 
on Laws 1262/ 82, 1892/92, 2601/98 and 3299/04 that include an array of incentives 
aiming to stimulate the attraction of foreign industries, particularly in the less 
favoured locations of Greece. A main characteristic of this evolution are the 
continuous adaptations as far as the geographical targeting of the incentives as well as 
the kind of incentives provided each time. Additionally, with the Gazette 854/A/94, 
the Ministry of Finance and Economy introduced incentives for long term investment 
plans (2-5 years) implemented by already operating firms in Greece (Articles 23a and 
23b). With the introduction of Law 2601/98, these two articles were incorporated to 
the general investment Law and have also been included in the next amendment of 
Law 3299/04. As we are going to see in the next line, the aim of all incentive laws,
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which has been the geographical dispersion o f industrial activity towards the less 
developed regions of Greece, was not particularly successful
Map 6.1 Incentive Zones in Greece
ALBANIA
TURKEY
ZONE A 
ZONE B 
ZONE C  
ZONE D1 
ZONE D 2  
ZONE D 3  
20 Km Zone 
Industrial Estates
Source: www.elke.gr
Thus, having already mapped the location o f subsidiaries in Greece, then I 
compared this with the map o f incentives offered in order to find their relationship144. 
In particular, Greece is divided in four zones as far as the incentives given. Zone D is 
divided in Zone D l, D2 and D3 and includes the region of Thrace, part of Epirus, 
Kentriki and Western Macedonia, the prefecture of Dodecanese and offers up to 55
144 The incentives g iven  are according to the N ew  Investment Law, L3299/2004.
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per cent subsidies to new and existing manufacturing companies. Zone C includes 
almost all Greece (except Attica and part of Thessaloniki) and offers up to 45 per cent 
of subsidies to new and existing manufacturing companies. Zone B includes part of 
Thessaloniki and offers up to 45 per cent of subsidies to new and existing 
manufacturing companies. Finally, Zone A includes the region of Attica and part of 
Thessaloniki and provides no incentives for new or existing manufacturing 
companies145.
In the introductory part of the thesis I argued that my expectations are that 
foreign firms tend to ignore government financial assistance. Indeed, according to the 
previous findings, foreign firms tend to ignore incentives when they decide to invest 
in Greece, as most of them are being located in areas where the government gives low 
subsidisation for investment in relation to other regions o f Greece. Another way to see 
if  this is true is to see if there is any relationship between the location preference of 
foreign firms and the regions that offer the highest incentives. Chart 6.3 below 
includes all 144 subsidiaries.
Chart 6.3: Location and Incentives
Location & Incentives
w 120
Zone D Zone B Zone C Zone A 
Incentive Zones
Thus, from Chart 6.3 we can see that the majority of subsidiaries are located in 
regions that offer no incentives. In particular, this is happening as most of the
145 Alternatively to subsidies, firms may chose to be qualified for tax exem ptions or cash grants for the 
expenses o f  w ages relating to the em ploym ent created by the investment applied for.
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subsidiaries are located in the region of Attica, where the Greek State offers no 
incentives for manufacturing activity, as it tries to decentralise the economic activity. 
Nevertheless, foreign firms seem to insist to invest in Athens, as they consider that 
proximity to the main Greek market is more important from some funding provided 
by the Greek State. Probably, this is happening as the majority of the FDI in Greece 
seem to be domestic oriented. Of course someone should consider the fact that many 
investments that are included in the survey took place much earlier. Nevertheless, 
these old investments remain located in areas with very few, if any, tax and other 
financial incentives and the more recent incentives, since 1982 when the current 
concept of incentives based on equal regional development was introduced, seem to 
have the same preference in locations.
Of course, the subsidiaries presented in Chart 6.3 above have not all been 
established during the implementation of L. 3299/04 that divides Greece in four areas. 
On the contrary the majority of them have been established in Attica region a long 
time ago. This preference of most investors to be established within Attica region, 
irrespectively of their year of establishment has its explanation. All the incentive laws 
that described in previous paragraphs had very little effectiveness due to the failure to 
meet a critical issue of their implementation, that of the spread of investments in 
different regions of Greece, and in particular in the less developed ones. The main 
cause, among others, of this failure has been that the incentive laws before 1970s did 
not give much priority to the strengthening of the periphery against the centre 
(Attica). All these laws were distinguishing Greece in two parts, compared to four 
parts that the modem incentive laws distinguish Greece, that of Athens and the rest of 
the country. The difference of subsidy percentage between these two parts was very 
little, 10 per cent, and thus investors, foreign and domestic ones, preferred to invest in 
the region of Attica. The main concern of these investment laws, as also mentioned 
earlier, was just to attract foreign investors, without paying much attention to the 
location were these investments were about to be established. Moreover, since 1970s, 
other vital problems in the implementation of investment laws, such as the scarcity of 
funds by the Greek state, the lack of co-ordination during the evaluation procedures, 
their short term of implementation and the large bureaucratic procedures that required 
by the investors had as a result the latter to prefer not to apply for these benefits 
(Kampelis, 1999, www.alex.eled.duth.gr/pamth, access date: May 2007). As
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mentioned above, only since the introduction of L. 1262/ 82 there has been a clear 
devotion of the Greek state to stimulate the attraction of investments in the less 
favoured Greek regions. This has taken a dual form. On the one hand, it was increased 
the difference of subsidy in the less favoured regions against the region of Attica, 
currently this difference may reach the 25 per cent, and on the other hand, there were 
put serious bureaucratic obstacles in establishing manufacturing industries in the 
Attica region.
6.8 Conclusions
This chapter has provided a mapping of the location of foreign subsidiaries 
with a manufacturing activity within Greece and showed how the majority of 
subsidiaries are located in the regions of Attica and Sterea Ellada (which is next to 
that of Attica). Indeed the vast majority of the subsidiaries are located in Southern 
Greece and mainly target the domestic market, whereas subsidiaries in Northern 
Greece are more likely to be the export- oriented. Thus, we can argue that Greece 
mainly attracts subsidiaries that produce for the domestic market.
The majority of foreign subsidiaries emanate from the Netherlands and France 
though the response rate to the survey was higher from subsidiaries belonging to US 
and German firms. In other respects there was sufficient similarity (a significant 
Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient) between the population and the sample to 
have confidence in the survey results
One striking point is that there are very few subsidiaries (only 3) from 
SouthEast Asia. On the contrary, European countries seem to dominate inward FDI in 
Greece.
The results demonstrate that most of the subsidiaries (both when examining 
population and the sample) that have survived until today were first established in 
Greece during the post- Fordist period (1970- 1989), followed by the Fordist period 
(1945- 1969). During the most recent period (1990- 2004) Greece has attracted less 
subsidiaries. According to the analysis of chapter I, the post- Fordist period has been 
the best one for Greece with regard to the amount of FDI attracted.
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Additionally, the results showed that foreign firms (particularly of Europe) 
are generally divided with regard to their preferred way of entry into Greece, between 
creating green field investments and merger and acquisition. American companies in 
particular seemed to prefer to take over of an existing company, whereas firms from 
European Union countries, such as Germany, France, UK and Italy were more likely 
to create a new subsidiary within Greece, perhaps as a consequence of better 
knowledge of Greek culture and tastes by the Europeans.
Then, we presented the degree of ownership that the 73 foreign subsidiaries, 
decided to obtain when first invested in Greece, and also examined if these 
subsidiaries, by the time, have increased or decreased their share. The results showed 
that the vast majority of foreign firms when first invested in Greece did that 
dynamically by taking over more than 80 per cent of the subsidiary they have created. 
Moreover, these foreign firms, over time, have strengthened their percentages to these 
subsidiaries, which probably means that they find the Greek market, at least profitable 
for their businesses and thus have an interest to maintain their establishments. 
Furthermore, we demonstrated that there is a relationship between the original 
percentage of a multinational corporation to a subsidiary and the way of entry. The 
results showed that regardless of method of entry, these foreign firms took over the 
majority percentage of their new investment in Greece.
As far as the main rationale for the subsidiaries to invest in Greece, this was to 
competitively access the Greek market. In general, the domestic market seemed to be 
the main cause for investment in Greece. This might be an important reason for the 
low FDI inputs in the Greek market. A further important point demonstrated was the 
low response rate in the option “the existence of local cluster of firms working on 
similar or complementary activity”. It means that Greece has not managed to create a 
strong industrial base in any activity, and that no particular linkages seem to have 
been created between local firms and foreign subsidiaries.
Moreover, the foreign subsidiaries located in Greece would be considered as 
small and medium enterprises. A clearer view was given by investigating the 
relationship between the company size and the sector activity (i.e. whether they
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belong to a modem or traditional sector of activity) of these subsidiaries. The results 
showed that Greece fails to attract firms seeking to produce labour intensive mass- 
produced goods. On the contrary most of the subsidiaries seem to be active in the 
modem sector, which usually uses less labour and more technology in producing the 
commodities. This result (in combination with the previous two conclusions, i.e. that 
most of foreign subsidiaries in Greece target the domestic market and are considered 
as small and medium enterprises) is consistent with my provisional expectations in the 
introductory part of the thesis, i.e. that Greece fails to attract companies seeking to 
produce labour intensive mass- produced goods.
Going deeper to the analysis of the role of the foreign subsidiaries located in 
Greece, the pattern of the relationship between the export percentage and the sector 
(modem or traditional one) the subsidiary is active, was investigated. In this respect, 
we saw that subsidiaries being active in the traditional sector, export (in their 
majority) only small amounts of their production. This result was consistent with our 
previous findings, i.e. that natural resources are not a major factor for investing in 
Greece and second that the country fails to attract labour- intensive subsidiaries.
The third part of the questionnaire tried to identify the degree of autonomy of 
the subsidiary by the parent company. The results showed some kind of 
interdependence that has been formed between multinational enterprises and local 
Greek firms, but not to a great extent. On the contrary, a lot of subsidiaries seem to 
operate on a parallel (semi)- independent basis. This conclusion can be considered as 
a negative one because from the moment that the production of a commodity has no 
dependence on local added value, the decision of a multinational corporation to 
transfer its production to another location is made easier. Especially, in the case where 
from the HQ of the multinational corporation consider that the Greek market, either is 
not that important any more, or can be served by different ways (i.e. imports). As far 
as the decision- making autonomy that foreign subsidiaries located in Greece enjoy, 
the results showed that this is limited.
Another aim of this thesis, was to investigate the satisfaction of the foreign investors 
with the quality of infrastructure and the operation of some institutional factors in 
Greece (i.e. bureaucracy, legislation, access to information, taxation and incentives).
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The analysis of the survey results showed that bureaucracy, legislative framework and 
taxation system still influence in a negative way the opinion of foreign investors about 
Greece, contrary to “access to information”, incentives and quality of infrastructure 
(with the exception of industrial areas) factors where opinions have improved. In 
general, the results showed that Greece does not suffer from a poor physical 
infrastructure and provision of services. On the contrary, it seems that the efforts 
made during the last fifteen year are recognised by foreign investors.
In the introduction of this thesis I stated that I also aim to explore the 
significance of government incentives in attracting FDI in Greece. In particular, my 
intention was to investigate the importance of the incentives provided by the Greek 
government in FDI decisions. From the analysis of the survey it was shown that 
multinational corporations tend to ignore incentives when they decide to locate in a 
specific region in Greece. Thus, it seems that it is other factors that play a more 
important role in the decision of a foreign firm about where in Greece to establish its 
operation. Such a factor seems to be proximity to the main Greek market. Probably, 
this happens as the majority of the FDI in Greece seems to be domestic oriented.
Consequently, from the interpretation of the questionnaire that was sent in 144 
foreign subsidiaries located in Greece some very important conclusions are drawn, 
concerning the special characteristics of foreign subsidiaries located in Greece. A 
correct interpretation of these patterns will be very helpful for government institutions 
that design and implement the policy that concerns the attraction of FDI in Greece. 
Because, in my view, a country in order to excersise a proper policy of attracting FDI, 
should first identify its strengths and weaknesses, then identify what kind of 
investments it would like to attract, and finally the role that it would like to play 
(local, regional, peripheral, global) in the each time global system that is formed. But, 
steps two and three are not possible without step one.
The next chapter (chapter VII) uses another form of research (interviews) in 
order to assess the results of chapter VI. In particular, in the next chapter I present the 
results of twenty (20) face to face interviews with the Managing Directors of foreign 
subsidiaries located in Greece and two (2) interviews from Greek government policy 
makers. With regard to the interviews with the Managing Directors, the chapter
193
explores the in depth relationships developed between the parent firm and the 
subsidiary within the Greek economic environment, as well as the corporate processes 
that influence the decision of a foreign firm to invest in Greece. With regard to the 
interviews with the policy makers the chapter explores their comments and reactions 
to the results of research performed in this chapter.
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CHAPTER VII
Why Greece does not Attract an Adequate Amount of FDI?
7.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is three- fold. In a first place, by taking the analysis of 
chapter VI one step further, this chapter, through face to face interviews with the 
general managers of twenty (20) foreign subsidiaries located in Greece, aims to 
explore their locational rationale. More precisely, through interviews I explore the 
corporate processes that influence the location decision, as well as the in depth 
relationships developed between the parent firm and the subsidiary within the 
domestic economic environment. In this way, these twenty interviews will explore 
further the issues arising from the questionnaire findings with regard to the main 
purpose of investment in Greece, the importance of incentives and the types of 
multinational corporations that invest in Greece. But, this time the issues that arose 
will be explored through the experiences, emotions and feelings of the interviewees. 
Secondly, it will allow some of the issues arising from the theoretical analysis in 
chapter I (institutional thickness of the Greek state towards FDI), chapter III (type of 
multinational corporations that are more likely to invest in Greece), and chapter IV 
(reason of investment in Greece, role of incentives, quality of infrastructure and 
services of a country) to be analysed empirically within the Greek context. Finally, it 
will compare and contrast these findings with the views of two people working in 
important positions of government bodies, which are responsible for creating a pro­
investment environment and assist foreign investors to invest in Greece.
In particular with regard to the corporate processes that influence the decision 
of a foreign firm to invest in Greece it aims to seek answers in relation to the purposes 
behind the decision of the foreign firm to invest, their opinion on the operation of the 
domestic institutional framework (which is a major issue in this thesis) and whether 
they have asked for assistance for their investment from the Greek State (through 
incentives or other form of public assistance). With regard to the relationships 
developed between the parent firm and the subsidiary within the domestic economic 
environment it aims to seek answers in relation to the decision- making autonomy of
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the subsidiary from the parent company, the subsidiary’s (production and managerial) 
role to the final output that goes to the customers and finally the organisational 
structure of the subsidiary.
Thus, these twenty interviews also try to give a further insight to the research 
questions set in the introduction of this thesis and researched by the questionnaire in 
chapter VI, i.e. with regard to the institutional capacity of Greek public administration 
to foresee the evolutions in world economy, as well as to adopt and follow a coherent 
policy towards FDI, the importance of infrastructure to the attraction of FDI in the 
country, the type (nature) of foreign firms that are more likely to invest in Greece and 
finally the role of incentives in this effort made by the Greek government during the 
last years in order to increase the volume of FDI inflows. Interviews allowed me to 
obtain complex details about these issues and further interpret the results of chapter 
VI.
Then further two interviews were arranged, this time with policy makers of the 
Greek State. More precisely, policy maker A works in the Department of Control and 
Approval of Private Investment in the Ministry of Finance, and policy maker B is 
Research and Analysis Manager in the Department of Investment Research and 
Project Evaluation of the Hellenic Center for Investment. These two interviews were 
arranged in order to get the opinion of the State in some of the conclusions of my 
research.
7.2 Type (Nature) of Foreign Firms that are more Likely to Invest in Greece
One of the major tasks of these interviews was to identify the strategic aims 
behind the decision of investing in Greece. Contrary to the results of the survey, 
according to the interviewees the main cause of investing in Greece was to serve the 
European market146. According to the manager of company 1, that established in 
Greece before 1990s, “the parent company was searching a country in order to 
establish a presence for a first time in Europe. Two countries were finally chosen. 
Greece for its low labour cost and strong presence in the Greek market, and France for
146 See also Table 7.2 in Appendix 4.
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its extensive know- how and abundant scientific labour on their field of activity”. 
Moreover, there seems to be a connection between the time of investment and the 
strategic goals of the firm. More precisely, a number of foreign firms (six 
subsidiaries) that invested in Greece before 1990s, and particularly during the so- 
called post- Fordist period, aimed to serve the European market apart from Greece. 
Greece was a suitable location as there was abundant, cheap by European standards, 
labour force. But, currently only three subsidiaries export some of their products to 
the European Market, i.e. their number has halved. On the other hand, the subsidiaries 
that invested in the country since 1990 aimed mainly at the Greek market, and 
secondarily other countries of South Eastern Europe. According to the manager of 
Company 6 “Greece was chosen as a location for our first investment in South Eastern 
Europe, because we considered it as the most economically and politically stable 
country. Moreover, Greeks currently have the highest purchasing power than other 
Balkan populations. If our investment here performs well then we will examine the 
possibility to expand to other neighboring countries”. This is consistent with our 
previous conclusion in chapter VI with regard to the domestic orientation of the 
foreign subsidiaries in Greece. It also gives some basis to the arguments of the two 
policy makers that will be analysed later in the chapter that Greece can become the 
gateway of foreign investors to Balkans and South Eastern Europe in general. In my 
question whether exports percentage has increased or decreased in relation to the past 
five years, the answer from most of the managers was that it has decreased. 
Characteristic has been the comment by the manager of company 9 who argued that 
“a few years ago our parent company created a new subsidiary in Romania. This 
subsidiary has a much bigger production capacity than we do and serves most of the 
other markets in the area. We currently work in a supplementary way in cases of 
sudden increase in demand of some products. Nevertheless, we are competent to serve 
the Greek market without importing anything”. These, words could be considered 
rather worrisome for the future presence of this subsidiary in Greece. The subsidiary 
is limited to a complementary and not protagonist role of serving other markets of 
South Eastern Europe, although it is the oldest established one in the area. A new 
expansion investment in the subsidiary in Romania or a new investment in another 
South Eastern Europe could make the subsidiary in Greece obsolete. There are recent 
examples where manufacturing subsidiaries have shut down and Greece is served via 
exports from other countries.
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As far as the type of commodities the subsidiaries in Greece produce, most of 
them (16 out of 20) mostly produce some of their parent’s already existing products. 
But, five of them also produce at the same time somewhat differentiated products 
specifically targeting the Greek market and the neighborhood countries. Some of 
these subsidiaries (three in particular), also export these differentiated products in the 
markets of Western Europe and elsewhere (America). With regard to this issue, the 
manager of company 1 argued that “a decade ago we managed to convince our parent 
company to export some of our locally produced products to the other European 
markets that we serve. The success of these products to these markets resulted in more 
exports to America, the home of the parent company. By then our strategic role has 
increased significantly and we are encouraged all the time by the parent company to 
use our local knowledge to make products for the world market”. It is evident that if a 
subsidiary manages to produce products that are competitive at world scale, then the 
role of this subsidiary will be increased. In this case the Greek subsidiary was favored 
by the tolerance and acceptance of the parent company to take a risk and initiate a 
new commodity, produced by a subsidiary of a peripheral European country to the 
main markets of Europe and then to America. Additionally, the management of the 
Greek subsidiary was also eager to get a bigger strategic role to the network of the 
parent company as the manager of company 1 stressed to me: “we were in 
competition with the other European subsidiary found in France about who would get 
the first role in the European market. We managed to get it by first producing a local 
commodity that could be sold all over the world”. The other four subsidiaries mostly 
produce differentiated products, but which mostly target the domestic market. As the 
manager of company 12 argued “our parent company tries to increase its local share 
by adapting its commodities to local tastes and customs” As far as the every day 
decision- making process in the Greek market is concerned, fifteen out of twenty 
subsidiaries have an autonomous strategy role but always after the consultation/ 
advice by the parent company. No foreign subsidiary has a clear independent role 
with regard to the company policy in the Greek market. The manager of company 20 
commented that “there is a strict operational framework set by our parent company. 
Our parent company set the targets and the priorities of our marketing policies”. 
Moreover, the manager of company 14 commented that “how can we have an 
independent role in the Greek market when the products we produce and sell are of
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our parent company?”. It seems that the dependency of the subsidiary by the parent 
company has to do with the role of the former in Greece, i.e. producing products that 
have been designed elsewhere and have to be promoted in the Greek market.
Another important issue emerged from these 20 interviews concerned the 
increasing role of outsourcing in Greek business practice, but not for the reasons 
explained in chapter IV, but rather for clearly domestic reasons, i.e. rigidity of 
employment laws. More precisely, a significant number of foreign subsidiaries (six 
out of twenty), where they can, outsource part of their production to local firms. 
According to the manager of company 5 “outsourcing seems to gain ground lately in 
Greece particularly as a method of labour cost- cutting. My firm uses this tactic more 
and more as it cannot always predict downturns in the production orders and the 
competition for keeping costs low is very intense”. The rigidity of employment laws 
that are still valid in Greece as a cause for outsourcing was also stressed by the 
manager of company 9 who argued that “from the moment I have not the ability to 
hire or fire personnel according to my production needs, I prefer to transfer this cost 
to companies that are more willing to take it”. Thus, the cause of this outsourcing 
seems to be different from the points made in the clustering literature147, but is more 
to do with labour militancy/ regulation. In particularly, the cause is not the 
specialization or quality of native firms in producing a part of a specific product, but 
on the contrary the rigidity of employment laws, which in their turn as we are going to 
see below, are an adequate obstacle in the reluctance of foreign firms for further 
investments in Greece.
7.3 Institutional Framework in Greece
In the introduction of the Thesis I argued that the institutional framework in 
Greece, which is argued to be excessively bureaucratic, has a negative impact in the 
attraction of FDI in Greece. The interviews of twenty foreign- owned subsidiaries in 
Greece seem to strengthen the findings of the questionnaire in the previous chapter. 
As it will be described next, the continuous changes, by the State, of laws, 
bureaucracy and access to information still remain important weaknesses to the proper
147 In chapter IV, I explained how clustering is being developed, and particularly how Ireland and 
Portugal have benefited by this.
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operation of the Greek business environment. More precisely, from the interviews 3 
key themes emerged:
1. Rigidity of bureaucracy
2. Legislative framework
3. Access to information/ timing
Beginning with the (re)investigation of bureaucracy status, by all subsidiaries 
was mentioned the rigidity and high interference of the Greek public sector and the 
State in general in every day aspects of a firm. According to the arguments of the 
interviewees, if someone wants to start a new business he or she needs a lot of time 
until he or she starts running it, which as a result loses the advantage of initiation. The 
manager of company 1 characteristically stressed to me as an example the experience 
of a friend of his who “needed 4 years to obtain all the necessary licenses in order to 
start operating in Greece. If this person knew what is about to being through in order 
to get all the necessary licenses, he would never had decided to invest in Greece”. 
Another example stressed by the manager of company 16 who argued that “the 
volume of paper work the Account Department of the company has to do in order to 
be in accordance with the requirements of the State is enormous and in order not to 
miss anything with the Greek requirements he has to employ one person more than he 
would do if procedures were more simplified”. Eight managers also stressed the need 
for differentiation in the treatment the State should have in favour of large enterprises 
that want to invest in the country. According to the manager of company 10 “three 
years ago our parent company asked from the Greek State to help to the as soon as 
possible approval of necessary grants in order to create new facilities in Northern 
Greece. Whereas the government replied positively, in practice nothing was speeded 
up with result at the end the investment to be abandoned. The main cause of this 
inconsistency was the low ranking public employees who have the power to delay 
procedures despite the desires of the central government”. Moreover, the manager of 
company 13 argued that “the Greek State issues almost every year laws on the special 
requirements for an investment in Greece, which do not always simplify the situation, 
and prevent us from making long- term commitments, a necessary condition to make 
a large investment”. This negative picture of Greek bureaucracy mirrors the findings 
of the survey as presented in chapter VI. It seems that bureaucracy in Greece causes
200
an important dissatisfaction to investors, which deters them from further investing in 
the country.
Legislative framework is also very time consuming, as mentioned by the vast 
majority (eighteen out of twenty) of the managers that were interviewed. According to 
the argument of the manager of company 8 “until 1992 there were limitations in the 
exportation of earnings. This made us create accounting tricks in order to use the 
revenues according to our intentions”. Moreover, laws that put obstacles in the 
creation of a proper investment environment in Greece are very slowly lifted. 
According to the example stressed by the manager of company 6 “the legislative 
framework with regard to the renewable energy is very slowly developed and not in 
the right direction, for example making the process of creating an aeolian park 
complicated and time consuming. Our parent company that would like to invest in this 
field, as it considers Greece a very good location for the creation of an aeolian park, is 
very disappointed”. As a result bureaucracy and legislative framework put a lot of 
obstacles in the operation of new and old businesses distorting the investment 
environment.
Another point that emerged from these interviews was that of access to 
information. According to the manager of company 4 “our firm is, most of the time, a 
late receiver of the changes that the Greek governments introduce in laws that affect 
the business environment we operate. I have witnessed cases where our Greek 
competitors knew in advance important information with regard to public bids, e.g. 
the starting date and the duration of the public bid”. Another manager, that of the 
company 11, argued that “very often changes in laws have a retrospective power 
resulting in disturbing the smooth operation of the company”. Some other 
interviewees (five) expressed no particular opinion about access to information issues 
as it does not influence their every day operations. As characteristically stressed by 
the manager of company 18 “we deliberately avoid getting involve in purchases by 
the Greek State, as the procedures are very time consuming and we do not believe that 
the rules are the same for all parts of the competition”. Of course, the above stressed 
arguments might be a result of the fact that these companies have not managed so far 
to get any important purchase by the Greek government, although they would like to 
have. Thus, they try to put all the blame on the Greek government. Nevertheless, even
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if this is the case it does not hide the bad use of information by the Greek State that 
distorts the investment environment and deters companies from competing fairly.
A very important issue in Greece, as in most places of the world, is taxation 
rates and rules. In my question in this issue I recognised a satisfaction with regard to 
the decrease in tax rates, but not with regards to the rules. According to the manager 
of company 7 “the decrease in taxation rates will help us to show better financial 
results to our parent company, as well as to consider further investments in the 
future”. Moreover, the manager of company 11 stressed that “the decrease in taxation 
rates is indeed a positive step to improve competitiveness in the Greek economy, but 
it should not be followed by indirect increases elsewhere, e.g. public utilities”. On the 
other hand the manager of company 4 argued that “the problem of my company is not 
taxation rates, but taxation rules. By these rules the Greek State holds us hostages as 
many laws are open to different interpretations”.
The above mentioned arguments conclude to the existence of a very rigid 
investment environment in Greece. This has also as a result the existence of very few 
plans for new investments by multinational enterprises in Greece. For example, the 
manager of company 4 argued that “we are very disappointed by the excess, but not 
legitimate, competition in the industry sector in which we are active. We consider 
further investment at this point as too risky”. Nevertheless, there is another reason for 
the absence of any plans for investment in Greece. As argued by the manager of 
company 12 “the domestic orientation of this subsidiary makes any further investment 
in Greece unnecessary”. Nevertheless, the most disappointing aspect of this issue is 
that the parent companies of most of the subsidiaries plan new investments in other 
parts of Europe, particularly in Eastern Europe. According to the manager of company 
2 “in the next few months our parent company will begin the construction of new 
logistic facilities in Poland”.
Institutional framework has an impact on the investment environment 
depending on the type of firms a country tries to attract. For Greece that is more likely 
to attract horizontal type of multinational corporations, as argued in chapter III, there 
is a need for improvement in its institutional framework. Foreign subsidiaries that are 
to be established in Greece are more likely to be local centers for the Balkan region
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and maybe Eastern Europe. The reason is that Greece has developed economic and 
political institutions that are familiar to those of other Western countries, which are 
the major sources of FDI. Thus, Greece, being always in the West should use the 
institutional framework as its strong point in order to compete with the other South 
Eastern European countries. Nevertheless, Greece did not manage to take advantage 
of its embedded Western values in order to attract more FDI in relation to its 
competitors of South Eastern Europe. The conclusion from the twenty interviews, 
with regard to the operation of the institutional framework in Greece, is that its 
rigidity deters the subsidiaries that already operate in the country from obtaining a 
more important role in the operation of the whole Group.
7.4 Incentives
With regard to the incentives provided by the Greek government on new 
investment, some contradictions emerged. The general view is a satisfaction with the 
incentives provided, but on the other hand there seems to be no intention by these 
companies for some kind of investment in the near future, in order to take advantage 
of the praised incentives. More precisely, according to the manager of company 6 
“incentives in Greece are among the most generous in Western Europe as far as I 
know, nevertheless future investment is determined by other factors too, such as the 
general aims of the parent company in Europe”. Additionally, the manager of 
company 9 put into the discussion another issue of the incentives provided by the 
Greek government, that of bureaucracy. In particular, he argued that “if we apply for 
incentives, then we are obliged to be under strict scrutiny by the Greek government 
over the next five years. In this way I consider that we lose a great part of our 
flexibility”. Finally, the manager of company 16 argued that “incentives are good but 
in order to participate someone needs to have gathered a lot of paper before hand. 
This is negative for someone who wants to do the investment only if the incentives 
are approved”. From the above answers it seems that incentives in the case of Greece 
are not a determinant factor for investment.
7.5 Quality of Infrastructure
Finally, with regard to the quality of the infrastructure in Greece (road 
network, rail network, air/ sea transportation, telecommunications and energy supply) 
in the vast majority of interviews (seventeen out of twenty) there was satisfaction
203
about the progress that has been made. According to the manager of company 3 
“during the last fifteen years, there has been a great improvement in all kind of 
infrastructure, with the assistance of European Funds”. In general, the contribution of 
European Funds was particularly stressed by the interviewees. As the manager of 
company 9 argued, “I do not know how much progress would have been made in the 
improvement of infrastructure if there were not European Structural Funds. You see, 
Greece has a particularly difficult terrain and the construction of 1km of road usually 
costs more than constructing the same road in another EU country”. On the other 
hand, in other interviews some complaints expressed with regard to the retardation in 
the completion of major infrastructure projects. For example, the manager of 
company 14 argued that “how is it possible the Greek government urges us to invest 
in the periphery of Greece, when Egnatia Odos, the biggest transportation project in 
Greece, is being constructed for over 15 years, and nobody knows yet when it is going 
to finish”. Thus, it seems that although the importance of infrastructure as a factor for 
investment in Greece has decreased, something that also emerged in the survey in 
chapter VI, nevertheless the retardation in the completion of certain projects 
contributes to the unequal spread of investment (Athens vs. the rest of Greece).
7.6 Interviews with Policy Makers of the Greek Government
Having analysed the results by the survey and the interviews with general and 
finance managers of the 20 foreign subsidiaries located in Greece, I then arranged two 
(2) interviews with policy makers of the Greek Government, as I also mentioned in 
the introduction of the chapter. A striking point has been their similar responses in 
more issues raised during the interviews. Both, policy maker A (who works in the 
Department of Control and Approval of Private Investment in the Ministry of Finance 
and Economy) and policy maker B (who is Research and Analysis Manager in the 
Department of Investment Research and Project Evaluation of the Hellenic Center for 
Investment) stressed the small number of foreign investors active in the 
manufacturing sector that decided to invest in Greece. Especially, policy maker A 
(who works in the Ministry of Finance and Economy) argued that “with great 
difficulty I can recall five foreign investors that visited me during the last two years in 
order to invest in the manufacturing sector by using the incentives provided by the 
Greek government”. Moreover, both interviewees argued that most foreign investors 
wish to invest in the country via Greenfield investment, with the participation of local
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partners. As policy maker A argued “foreign investors usually use Greeks only at the 
beginning as mediators between them and the Greek authorities, but when the time for 
the investment comes, they do it by themselves (by holding the 100 per cent of the 
shares of the newly created company)”. Additionally, policy maker B (who works at 
the Hellenic Center for Investment) argued that “most of the time foreign investors 
are in partnership with Greek businessmen, except the very large investments that 
they prefer to do by themselves”. This is not surprising if we also take into account 
the results of the survey in chapter VI, which showed that multinational corporations 
hold the majority of the shares of the new investment in Greece from the very 
beginning.
Another striking point, which does not come in accordance with our findings 
from the survey and the interviews with the managers of the foreign subsidiaries 
located in Greece, is that according to the argument of both policy makers the foreign 
investors that invest in Greece mainly target the neighboring markets (Balkans, 
Eastern Europe, Turkey and Middle East) rather than the Greek market. The Greek 
market is a secondary target for them. This difference between the previous findings 
and the comments by the two policy makers may have to do with the most general 
policy of Greece towards foreign investors during the last 15 years. In particular, we 
have to be cautious of this argument by policy makers as by these words they might 
try to validate the arguments of the Greek Authorities, i.e. that Greece is an ideal 
location for Western investors that wish to penetrate the Balkans, Eastern Europe, 
Turkey and the Middle East.
A very interesting answer was given by both interviewees with regard to the 
reasons that a foreign investor decides to approach government authorities before 
investing in Greece. Both interviewees commented that this is due to the extensive 
bureaucracy that exists in the country in order for an investment to take place. More 
precisely, as I was told by policy maker B, “there is no way for someone to invest in 
the country without having contact with Greek Authorities. As a result, foreign 
investors prefer to have these contacts in the highest possible level (Ministry of 
Finance) instead of getting into the regular bureaucratic procedures. In this way they 
expect to deal with bureaucratic requirements faster than following the conventional 
procedure”. Additionally, foreign investors always have a fear that their investment
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may stop at a lower level of government (e.g. by the Local Government of the area 
where they want to invest)148. Thus, by having contacts at the central government they 
try to overpass this obstacle. As policy maker A stressed to me, “foreign investors 
would like an institutional protection of their investment at central level”.
Finally, both interviewees argued that foreign investors seem satisfied by the 
incentives provided by the Greek government. According to policy maker B “Greece 
provides among the most generous incentives in Western Europe”. But as policy 
maker A stressed to me, “nevertheless, they would also like some other forms of 
incentives, such as special prices in power and water supplies. But, such kind of 
incentives the Greek government does not provide, as it avoids entering into special 
negotiations with individual investors”. Nevertheless, incentives by themselves are 
not a prerequisite for an investment as both interviewees recognized.
On the other hand, there were differences in their responses on two issues. The 
first difference had to do with regard to which sectors foreign investors mostly invest 
in Greece. More precisely, policy maker A argued that “foreign firms invest in Greece 
mostly from the pharmaceutical and high tech sectors”, where as policy maker B 
argued that “firms from food and beverages, as well as chemical industry mostly 
invest in the country”. Nevertheless, this difference might be the result of their own 
experience, and not of actual figures, as well as particularly policy maker B tries to be 
in accordance with the general aim of Hellenic Center for Investment, which tries to 
attract FDI from these sectors. Moreover, policy maker B is in charge for promoting 
Greece in these sectors he has mentioned to me.
The second difference was with regard to the R&D investments in the country. 
In particular, policy maker A argued that “foreign investors not only include R&D 
departments in their investment plans, but very often they just want to invest in this 
area and have the production process in another country”. But, as policy maker A 
stressed afterwards, “foreign investors, are disappointed when they hear that there are 
no incentives for firms that want to invest just in R&D, but they have to include in
148 Greece has a lot of negative examples of investments that have been stopped due to the objections of 
the local government. A characteristic example is that of TVX gold mining company that never 
managed to implement its investment in Chalkidiki after strong objections by the local government and 
despite the approval of the investment by the central government. At the end TVX left the country.
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their plans a manufacturing activity in order to be entitled for the incentives provided 
by the Greek Law”. On the other hand, policy maker B argued that “most foreign 
investors mostly invest in manufacturing activity and there are very few plans that 
include R&D activity”. We need to remember that according to the findings of the 
survey in chapter VI, most of the foreign subsidiaries located in Greece do not have 
R&D activity. Nevertheless, from the words of two policy makers we can recognise 
the shortsighted policy of the Greek government, as it has failed to include R&D 
investments in the incentives package.
7.7 Conclusion
In general the findings of the twenty-two interviews support the results of 
chapter VI and strengthen my overall conclusions in relation to the significance of the 
institutional framework and market access. But, also it provides some insightful 
explanations with regard to the causes behind the results of the survey. More 
precisely, with regard to the corporate processes that influence the decision of a 
foreign firm to invest in Greece, currently this is the access to the Greek market. With 
regard to the relationships developed between the parent firm and the subsidiary 
within the Greek economic environment, there seems to be a very limited production 
and organisational autonomy for the subsidiary.
As far as the other research questions/ issues this thesis explores, there is some 
kind of embedding with respect to the linkages between foreign subsidiaries and local 
firms. The rigid labour laws seem to have contributed to this. Additionally, as far as 
the operation of institutional framework in Greece is concerned, there are still many 
weaknesses that affect negatively the decisions for new investments from abroad. The 
poor institutional framework seems to influence in a negative way the role of the 
subsidiaries located in the country. The bad operation of Greek institutional 
framework was also stressed by the two policy makers who argued that foreign 
investors would like to have an institutional protection of their investment, 
particularly against obstacles that may appear at the level of local government. In its 
turn this decreasing role of the subsidiaries affects negatively further investment in the 
Greek market.
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On the other hand, there has been significant improvement in the incentives 
provided by the Greek government to new and already existing firms that plan new 
investments in the country, as well as to the quality of infrastructure. But, there is also 
the need for further improving of weaknesses of these incentives, e.g. bureaucracy 
and special examination of very large investments. But, as we have argued repeatedly 
in this thesis, incentives by themselves are not adequate in order to influence the 
decision of a foreign firm to invest in Greece. Moreover, with regard to the quality of 
infrastructure, although the significant improvement, with the assistance of European 
Structural Funds, is recognised by the interviewees, nevertheless there is a 
dissatisfaction about the speed of this improvement.
Thus, the investment environment (which the institutional framework, 
incentives, quality of services and infrastructure are part of), can shape the role of a 
subsidiary in relation to other subsidiaries of the same multinational corporation being 
located in other countries. In this way the degree of autonomy of foreign subsidiaries 
being located in Greece might be a result of the investment environment that exist in a 
country. This in combination with the type of firms that are most likely to invest in 
one country, in the case of Greece the horizontal type of firm as argued in chapter III, 
can provide us with an insight why Greece does not attract more FDI.
Moreover, from the twenty-two interviews, a further interesting point is 
revealed. In particular, with regard to the reasons foreign firms create subsidiaries in 
Greece, the initial intentions of the parent companies have not just been the serving of 
the Greek market. Nevertheless, due to the changing economic and political 
conditions since 1989, this target has changed and currently the subsidiaries mainly 
serve the Greek market, as they export only a minimum amount of their production. 
This situation could be reversed, and Greece becomes the initial starting point for 
multinational corporations that want to expand to South Eastern Europe, if 
institutional framework improves, as argued above. Especially, since the Greek Firms 
have already started to invest in large numbers in South- Eastern Europe as seen in 
chapter IV. This means that Greece has created important links with those countries 
and a pool of labour that has knowledge of the market of South- Eastern Europe has 
been formed. On the other hand, there is always the risk that European Union firms 
start supplying the Greek firms instead.
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Thus, from the above analysis some important conclusions are drawn. First, 
that the Greek investment environment negatively influences the relationships 
developed between the parent company and the subsidiary. This, in its turn, seems to 
influence the corporate processes of the location decision in Greece, but also the 
possibility for further investments in the country by already established multinational 
enterprises. Moreover, the decreasing role of foreign subsidiaries located in Greece, 
not only in terms of management and production autonomy, but also in terms of 
market(s) that have been assigned to serve, in the era of globalization, has contributed 
to the poor performance of Greece in FDI.
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CONCLUSION
8.1 Summary of Major Findings
The aim of the analysis in the preceding chapters was to identify the reasons 
for the underperformance of Greece in the attraction of FDI. As a benchmark were 
used two other European Union peripheral countries, notably Ireland and Portugal. 
From this analysis (theoretical and research one) several key points were identified 
that also contribute to the discussion made by the academic community with regard to 
FDI and the European peripheral countries, particularly Greece which is the main 
issue of analysis in this thesis. As it will be commenting right below, the 
underperformance of Greece has not taken place by accident, but it is the result of 
certain events.
Having first examined the post- war development of the world economy and 
production and how Greece, Ireland and Portugal have been influenced by these 
changes (chapter I) three key points have emerged as being largely responsible for the 
underperformance of Greece in attracting FDI. First, are the different processes of 
integration of Greece, Ireland and Portugal into the new world economic conditions 
formed each time (Fordism, post- Fordism and New Economy) and described in this 
chapter. Second, is the rigid institutional framework that has been formed in Greece. 
In particular, Greek institutions have failed to recognize ahead of time of the changes 
happening in world economy and implement a policy that would take advantage of 
them. Third, it is the inconsistency appeared at top political level in Greece with 
regard to the attitude of the State towards foreign investors (nationalization policies).
In chapter II, I described how these changes in world production, and 
consequently in the location of firms, influenced the relevant theories. More precisely, 
in chapter two, I reviewed and compared some fundamental location theories (the 
traditional location theories, New International Division of Labour theory, product life 
cycle theory, the theory of comparative advantage, the “New Economic Geography” 
theory) and how these evolved due to the changes in the world economic conditions 
as described in the previous chapter. The most important findings in this respect were 
Krugman’s emphasis on the significance of market size effects and Ietto Gillies’ stress 
on the significance of the strategic decisions that multinational corporations take.
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Both of these factors were found to be important in understanding the locational 
rational of firms locating in Greece and the precise role that these subsidies play.
Additionally, in chapter III, I drew on the literature relating to multinational 
firms in order to identify their evolution and the specific factors influencing their 
locational decision making process, due to the changing economic conditions 
described in chapter I. As a result I adopted a simpler two- type organisation model of 
the multinational corporations, i.e. the vertical- horizontal organisation of production. 
Then I developed the type of multinational corporation that Greece is more likely to 
attract. In particular, I suggested that Greece is more likely to be preferred by 
horizontally organized multinational corporations, for reasons explained in that 
chapter. This conclusion limits significantly the number of multinational corporations 
that could invest in the country, but also gives guidance with regard to the orientation 
strategy of the Greek State towards multinational corporations.
In chapter IV, having reviewed some major factors that may affect the 
investment decisions of multinational corporations, I then categorised the locational 
requirements of different types of multinational corporations. These locational 
requirements differ according to the type of the investment as well as the commodity 
produced. But, certain characteristics by themselves are not a sufficient element for 
the attraction of FDI. This is a very complicated process depending on a variety of 
factors, such as the international circumstances, the multinational corporations 
business plans and of course the long-term (economic, political etc.) conditions of the 
country in question. Moreover, in the same chapter, having analysed the Greek FDI 
outward flows, I illustrated that Greece is no longer a net recipient of FDI, but on the 
contrary is also a source of FDI as many of its large firms invest abroad (especially in 
the South- Eastern Europe) in the form of direct investment.
Chapter VI discusses the findings from the survey. More precisely, a first 
conclusion is drawn from the mapping of the location of the manufacturing activities 
of the foreign subsidiaries in Greece. Most of them are found in the region of Athens 
and secondarily in Thessaloniki, with the other regions hosting much less foreign 
subsidiaries. Moreover, according to the findings of this chapter, in Southern Greece 
are located the foreign subsidiaries that mainly target the domestic market, where as
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in Northern Greece are located the export- oriented subsidiaries. Thus, it is clear that 
Greece mainly attracts subsidiaries that produce for the domestic market.
Other issues were also examined in chapter VI, such as the nature of the 
foreign subsidiaries currently present in Greece, in terms of their national origins, 
time period of entry in Greece, way of entry, degree of ownership, reason to enter the 
Greek market, type of FDI located in Greece, degree of autonomy by the parent 
company. From this analysis, some striking points are first that there are very few 
subsidiaries from South- East Asia. On the contrary, European countries seem to 
dominate inward FDI in Greece. This might be due to the timing of investment, as 
more foreign investments in Greece are since a long time ago when South East Asia 
would not have been a source of FDI. Moreover, American companies seem to prefer 
to enter the Greek market via the take over of an existing company, whereas European 
Union countries, such as Germany, France, UK and Italy prefer to enter the Greek 
market by creating their own subsidiary. Better knowledge of Greek culture and tastes 
by the Europeans seems to be an explanation for this result. As far as the main 
locational rationale for the subsidiaries is concerned, the main factor was to 
competitively access the Greek market. In general, domestic market seemed to be the 
main cause for investment in Greece. This might be the main reason for the low FDI 
inputs in the Greek economy.
Additionally, the survey findings showed that subsidiaries in the traditional 
sector, export (in their majority) only small amounts of their production. This result 
was consistent with our previous findings, i.e. that natural resources is not a major 
factor for investing in Greece and second that the country fails to attract labour- 
intensive subsidiaries. The results also showed that the majority of the subsidiaries 
have no local autonomy with respect to decision making. As far as linkages with local 
firms are concerned, the results showed some kind of interdependence that has been 
formed between multinational enterprises and local Greek firms, but not to a great 
extent. On the contrary, a lot of subsidiaries seem to operate on a parallel (semi)- 
independent basis. This conclusion can be considered as a negative one because from 
the moment that the production of a commodity has no dependence on local added 
value, makes easier the decision of a multinational corporation to transfer its 
production to another location.
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Another aim of this thesis was to investigate the satisfaction of the foreign 
investors in relation to the quality of infrastructure and the operation of some 
institutional factors in Greece (i.e. bureaucracy, legislation, access to information, 
taxation and incentives). The findings of chapter VI showed that there is a 
dissatisfaction about bureaucracy and taxation, a neutral opinion about legislation and 
a more positive response towards access to information and incentives. But, with 
regard to incentives, foreign firms tend to ignore regionally differentiated incentives 
when they decide to locate in a specific region within Greece. Finally, with regard to 
infrastructure in Greece there is a positive opinion of foreign- owned firms 
recognising the important investments that have taken place in this area during the last 
15 years.
Chapter VII examined the significance of the State institutional capacity to 
foresee the evolutions in world economy, as well as to adopt and follow a coherent 
policy towards FDI; the importance of infrastructure; the type (nature) of foreign 
firms that are more likely to invest in Greece and finally the role of incentives in this 
effort made by the Greek government during the last years in order to increase the 
volume of FDI inflows. For this purpose, twenty (20) interviews with either general or 
finance managers of foreign subsidiaries located in Greece took place, as well as two 
(2) interviews with policy makers of the Greek government.
In particular, with regard to the corporate processes that influence the decision 
of a foreign firm to invest in Greece, this is the access to the Greek market. With 
regard to the relationships developed between the parent firm and the subsidiary 
within the Greek economic environment, there seems to be a very limited production 
and organisational autonomy for the subsidiary. This finding was contrary to the 
analysis of the questionnaire where the picture was more mixed. Nevertheless, these 
two conclusions strengthen the analysis in chapter III, with regard to the horizontal 
type of multinational corporations that are most likely to invest in the country.
With regard to the operation of the institutional framework in Greece there are 
still many weaknesses that affect negatively the decisions for new investments from 
abroad. The poor institutional framework was stressed by all interviewees and seems
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to influence in a negative way the role of the subsidiaries located in Greece. The 
negative role of the Greek institutional framework was also stressed by the two policy 
makers who argued that foreign investors would like to have an institutional 
protection of their investment, particularly against obstacles that may appear at the 
level of local government. In its turn this decreasing role of the subsidiaries affects 
negatively further investment in the Greek market. On the other hand, there has been 
significant improvement in the incentives provided by the Greek government to new 
and already existing firms that plan new investments in the country, as well as to the 
quality of infrastructure. With regard to the incentives, the satisfaction of investors 
was also acknowledged by the two policy makers. Nevertheless, these two factors by 
themselves are not adequate in order to influence the decision of a foreign firm to 
invest in Greece. As stressed in chapter IV, there is a mixture of factors that 
contribute to the final decision of a multinational corporation about where to invest.
But, from the twenty interviews with the managers of foreign subsidiaries 
located in Greece, a further interesting point is revealed. In particular, with regard to 
the reasons foreign firms create subsidiaries in Greece, the initial intentions of the 
parent companies have not just been the serving of the Greek market. Nevertheless, 
due to the changing economic and political conditions since 1989, this target has 
changed and currently the subsidiaries mainly serve the Greek market, as export only 
a minimum amount of their production. It seems that the opening of the markets in 
Eastern Europe has increased significantly competition for FDI, not in favour of 
Greece.
The different points revealed between the survey results and the in- depth 
interviews are interesting. It might be a consequence of the in depth interviews being 
less representative of the range of subsidiaries in Greece. On the other hand, it may 
reflect the way that in depth interviews are more probing and provide richer 
information about the actual role of subsidiaries- in this case the actual degree of 
autonomy that firms actually have, than from a simple tick box response to a survey. 
But, both the results from the literature review and the research analysis revealed 
many interesting points with regards to the causes of the underperformance of Greece 
in attracting significant amounts of FDI in the manufacturing sector. With regard to 
the institutional framework, long term weaknesses, particularly its rigidity and
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shortsighted policy planning and implementation were identified. The institutions of 
the state have always been used by the governments as a tool to obtain political 
advantages and less as a tool to develop those mechanisms that would ensure the 
continuity and stability of the State against people and investors, domestic and foreign 
ones. Only, since the beginning of 1990s this trend started to change, but even then 
the process has been very slow and is limited by the endogenous weakness of the 
system itself. One such characteristic weakness is the low educational level of the 
public employees, the lack of any consistent policy for their training in new things 
during their career and probably most important the lack of any vision provided by the 
governments. A public employee has no chance to get in a shorter time period than a 
colleague of him with the same years of work a higher salary or a better position in 
public administration. Thus, this rigidity of the State has been stamped by the inability 
of the State to implement consistently long- term targets.
Equally, significant has been the identification of the cases for investment in 
Greece by the foreign companies. Since the collapse of Communism at the end of 
1980s, and the political turbulence in the Balkan area, Greece found itself for a 
significant time period geographically isolated from the other European Union 
countries. The only secure access to Greece was by the sea via Italy. This limited the 
chances of Greece being chosen as a potential investment location in order to serve 
neighborhood markets. At the same time the countries of Eastern Europe were making 
all the necessary political and economic actions in order to become an attractive 
locations for foreign investors.
As far as the location of most of the foreign subsidiaries is concerned, a 
concentration of FDI around the two major urban centres of Greece was identified. 
This trend of locating businesses in the two major cities of Greece is not a recent one. 
On the contrary it starts since the late 1940s. Despite an effort by the Greek 
governments in the 1980s and 1990s to provide incentives in order to convince the 
businesses to locate their manufacturing activities outside Athens, it has not happened 
to any great extent. Currently, the new incentives law, as the old one, subsidies the 
establishment of a manufacturing activity in Athens with at least 30 per cent. This is 
another characteristic example of the inconsistency of the Greek State towards 
domestic and foreign investors.
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But, what was surprising to me with the analysis of the research results was 
the satisfaction of foreign investors with infrastructure in Greece. Greece was a very 
late starter in investing consistently and massively in the improvement of its 
infrastructure. Even now there are significant weaknesses in some basic issues, but at 
the same time very important, for the attraction of FDI and in general the maintenance 
and expansion of industrial base of Greece. For example in a visit of mine, as an 
employee of the Hellenic Center for Investment, in the industrial area of Thessaloniki 
in 2004, I was recipient of complaints with regard to the repeated interruptions of 
power supply. One explanation I can give for this result is that due to the fact that 
most investments that intend to serve the Greek economy are located in Athens, where 
the majority of the population exist, the existence of adequate infrastructure for the 
supply of the local markets is less significant.
Moreover, equally surprising has been the type of multinational corporations 
that are most likely to invest in Greece. Some one would expect that Greece, being in 
the periphery of Europe, would be most likely to attract subsidiaries that will be part 
of a wider vertical organisation of production. Greece would be chosen for its of 
cheap labour force (in comparison to other EU- 15 countries) and raw material and 
assembly line manufacturing activities would be established in the country. On the 
contrary, the analysis of this Thesis in chapter III, but also the responses in the 
questionnaire and the interviews, showed that Greece is most likely to attract 
horizontal type of multinational corporations (market oriented).
But, the findings of the empirical work also contribute to the theoretical ideas 
examined in the previous chapters, particular those of the French Regulation School. 
Although, I have clearly stated throughout my thesis that I do not follow exactly any 
theoretical school, nevertheless, I have adopted the periodisation of the French 
Regulation School as the basis to describe the transformations of the world economy 
and through this the transformation of the Greek economy since 1945. In this respect, 
one aspect of my thesis was to explain how the Greek capitalist system works, taking 
into account the different development route followed since 1945, in comparison to 
the other western European economies, and of course Ireland and Portugal. In this 
aspect, very interesting has been the evolution of the Greek division of labour since
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1945, always in relation to the influences by the international, economic and political 
evolutions (peripheral Fordism). I can argue that the Greek division of labour has 
been transformed through political action by the ruling class (emergence of 
dictatorship), compared to the transformation of the international division of labour 
that was transformed, mainly, through the technological advancements and the need 
by the multinational corporations to expand their markets.
Nevertheless, despite this different development route in the first decades 
since the end of WWII, the entrance of Greece into the then European Community 
resulted to start a convergence, economic, political, social and organisational one, in 
relation to the other western countries. Thus, I argued that Greece’s performance in 
FDI is not the result of certain accidental events, but rather the result of certain 
choices by the Greek institutions. In this respect, the Regulation approach shares the 
claim of evolutionary and institutional economics that economic development is 
largely path- dependent and irreversible (Jessop, 1997: 295). In other words, the clear 
choice by the Greek ruling class for attachment of the Greek institutions to the 
western values has, more or less, predicted their evolution, as it happened to Ireland 
and Portugal. But, in the Greek case, despite the continuous convergence of the Greek 
institutional system to that of other western countries, this has not been able to 
respond adequately to the requirements created by the diminishing of national barriers 
to international capital and the vanishing of import- substituting policies. More 
precisely, the creation of a common market, but also the expansion of globalisation, 
also changed the performance requirements of the Greek institutions. Unfortunately, 
from the conclusions of this thesis, the Greek institutions did not manage to adapt 
themselves to the new world conditions by implementing long- term and consistent 
policies.
On the other hand, the French Regulation approach considers the state both as 
a subject involved in regulating the economy and as an object of regulation in its own 
right. (Jessop, 1997: 297). The Greek institutional framework has been identified as 
being one of the main causes for the underperformance of Greece in attracting FDI. 
This has been due to the state intervention in the economy via financial forms (e.g. 
high inflation and public deficit, weakening of the national currency), regulatory 
forms (e.g. laws regarding property or foreign investors rights) and/ or a mixture of
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both. The point is that the Greek institutional framework has been unable to take 
advantage of the changes (at economic, social and political level) happening at world 
scale due to its weakness to regulate norms that will ensure the compatibility of 
different government mechanisms as well as the deficiencies of the market against 
foreign, and domestic, investors.
Another important aspect of my research is that I emphasize the role of formal 
(i.e. the central government and its mechanisms, such ministries and public 
organisations) rather than “informal” (e.g. social capital, “soft” factors such as trust 
and networking, habits, norms and routines) institutional systems as an important 
factor for the creation of an appropriate investment environment that will improve 
Greece as a location to attract FDI. This has not taken place by accident. Since the late 
1980s there is a neglect of the state’s role in regional and national development 
(Markusen, 2003: 705). More precisely, my analysis shows how the behavior of the 
key formal actors in arranging the investment environment in Greece, i.e. the state and 
its agencies, are responsible for the underperformance of Greece in attracting FDI. 
Within this framework there is a debate among economic geographers regarding the 
sources of economic development that lie in the character of locally embedded social, 
cultural and institutional arrangements (Amin, 1999: 369).
This focus of mine in formal institutions is due to the fact that central 
government in Greece remains the key actor in driving regional and national 
economic development. Public intervention, i.e. formal institutional intervention, is a 
prerequisite for development. This intervention can take the form of the formation of 
the appropriate legal and regulatory environment, which are essential for technical 
change (Asheim, 1996: 380; Amin and Wilkinson, 1999: 124; Williamson, 2000: 
597). In particular, it is the central government that defines investment environment 
via the incentives, tax rules, planning restrictions etc. This is in accordance with the 
development policy followed by other advanced economies that has been largely 
firm- centered, incentive- based, state driven and standardised (Amin, 1999: 365).
More precisely, through my thesis analysis I stress the fact that contemporary 
economic (regional and national) development is subject to the diverse forms of 
(formal) institutions that have been created through the different social and political
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experiences. The importance of culture and other broader historical factors as a cause 
of development is stressed by several authors (Asheim, 1996: 395, Amin, 1999: 367; 
Williamson, 2000: 598). In this respect, one of the major tasks of this thesis was to 
demonstrate sufficiently the processes of economic and political restructuring within 
the context of changing institutional arrangements in relation to Greece (in particular), 
Portugal and Ireland149. Thus, in the case of Greece, political and economic instability 
of the past has as a result the reluctance of the central government to give some of its 
power to regional or local authorities regarding the formation of the investment 
environment. This is in accordance with authors who argue, despite some general 
belief, that formal institutions remain the key to regional and national economic 
development (see for example Asheim, 1996 and Lovering, 1999).
On the other hand, it is clear that formal institutions by themselves are not the 
only factors for creating conditions of national and/ or regional development (Asheim, 
1996: 380; Morgan, 1997: 492; Amin and Wilkinson, 1999: 124, Yeung, 2005: 48). 
Thus, the high concentration of firms in the Attica region, where also the Greek 
government is located might be examined further in the framework of proximity 
(cultural and geographical) and learning. Effective learning, adaptation and 
innovation cannot be considered only as a result of informal factors (such as 
networking, trust, norms, etc.), but also of formal knowledge provided by the state 
institutions (Asheim, 1996: 380; Amin and Wilkinson 1999: 125). To this seems to be 
a general agreement between scholars (Morgan, 1997: 500). But, in Greece it appears 
that the central government has been reluctant so far in allowing state owned 
agencies, e.g. the Hellenic Center for Investment, to develop these networks that 
could operate as communication routes between the state and the firms, in a similar 
way for example of Welch Development Agency (Morgan, 1997: 499). On the 
contrary, the Hellenic Center for Investment, under the instructions and strict control 
of the central government, operates as an enforcement mechanism of the decisions 
taken at the central level.
149 See chapter I.
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8.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Thesis
Having completed my research I can recognize certain strengths and 
weaknesses of my thesis. Beginning with the strong points of my thesis, a first 
argument is that I develop in a convincing way my own economic and political 
periodisation, based on French Regulation School. In a way I complement and extend 
French Regulation approach of the world development since 1945. Moreover, I 
demonstrate the different understanding of capitalist dynamism and development by 
Greece and the consequent different political route followed in relation to other 
countries with common characteristics such as Ireland and Portugal that are used as a 
benchmark.
Additionally, a particularly strong contribution is the extensive research that 
took place in order to fill in the list with the foreign subsidiaries with a manufacturing 
activity currently located in Greece. There are high possibilities that this list covers 
more than 95 per cent of the foreign subsidiaries with a manufacturing activity 
currently located in Greece. This, in combination with the satisfactory response rate 
(over 50 per cent) strengthens the validity of my research and conclusions. As a result 
of my research, important elements about FDI in Greece are revealed, such as reason 
for investment, types of multinational corporations more likely to invest in the 
country, mapping of FDI etc. The research clearly identifies the main causes of 
underperformance of Greece in FDI inflows. This could be a very useful tool for the 
policy makers in charge of attracting more FDI. In this respect the Thesis also makes 
clear what is meant by institutional framework as a cause for the underperformance of 
Greece. It also reveals other factors as less important for the underperformance of 
Greece, contrary to the widespread belief, e.g. infrastructure. Finally, it demonstrates 
the importance of incentives as a factor of attracting FDI in the case of Greece.
On the other hand, there are some weak points that although do not change the 
essence of the quality of my research, nevertheless may give some ground for 
criticism. A first weak point is the long time that lasted the completion of the Thesis 
that had as a result some figures and facts to become obsolete (e.g. figures with regard 
to FDI inflows in Greece and at world scale in general). As a result I had to change 
these figures at least three times, something that put into a lot of risk the proper 
completion of the thesis. A further risk of the long time period for the completion of
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the thesis was that my topic could have been covered by someone else, as FDI started 
becoming an issue of discussion in Greece during the last years. Nevertheless, by this 
time I have not been informed about any similar research.
Moreover, the reluctance I faced by the management of many foreign 
subsidiaries located in Greece to fill in the questionnaire, further put into risk the 
validity of my research. Everybody acknowledges that the higher the response rate the 
more reliable and real are the results. But, from those who responded to the survey, 
having in mind the lack of enthusiasm by the managers in general to response to it, 
there is no way to know whether they have given honest responses.
8.3 Further Research
This thesis has covered a wide topic, FDI, and has specifically specialized in 
Greece. As a result certain issues were raised that could be explored with further 
research. In particular, during the research the significance of the institutional 
framework as a factor that influences the attraction of FDI in Greece was highlighted. 
In this respect the Greek institutional framework as a deterministic factor of economic 
development requires more research- especially if it to go beyond the well known 
stereotypes that I have alluded to.
During the presentation of interviews in chapter VII, bureaucracy in Greece 
emerged that causes an important dissatisfaction to investors, which deters them from 
further investing in the country. Nevertheless, there might be another reason from 
deterring already established multinational enterprises from further investing in the 
country. The longer history of FDI in Greece might have meant that a higher 
proportion of the inward investors have established links with local firms. In this case, 
this would be a measure of success as FDI in Greece has become embedded and 
hence there is less need for new FDI. Nevertheless, this is a topic that requires further 
research.
A further issue that could be explored in the future is related to the actual 
structure of contemporary multinational corporation at world scale and on the way 
strategic decisions are taken. Certain typologies were presented in this thesis,
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nevertheless multinational corporations change their structure all the time in order to 
deal with the new challenges that emerge because of the globalisation and the opening 
of the markets. In this respect, also further research on the type of multinational 
corporations that are most likely to invest in Greece is required, having in mind the 
interdependence between global and domestic political and economic evolutions.
Moreover, further research on what type of multinational corporations have 
invested in Greece and the particular advantages and disadvantages these firms may 
cause to Greece could take place. My questionnaire provides useful information on 
this issue, but there is always space for specialization and more in- depth analysis. 
Finally, a last issue that requires further research has to do with the agglomeration 
economies developed (if this is the case) between the foreign subsidiaries with a 
manufacturing activity located in Greece and other local firms. This topic may be 
related with research on the linkages that have been created with native and foreign 
firms in Greece.
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APPENDIX 1 
QUESTIONNAIRE
LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
Questionnaire for the completion of the Ph.D. thesis titled: 
FDI in Greece: An Analysis of Underperformance
Name of Company...................
Name of Parent Company........
Nationality of Parent Company
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I  BACKGROUND OF GREEK SUBSIDIARY
1. When was the subsidiary established?
2. How was your company originally established?
(please tick any relevant)
(a) By the take over of an existing Greek company.
(b) As a joint venture with existing Greek company
(c) By the creation of a new company with its own 
production facilities.
(d) Other
3. What was the original percentage posessed by the foreign affiliate?
4. What is the current percentage posessed by the foreign affiliate?
5. What were the motivations of the parent company to establish a subsidiary 
in Greece? (Please tick each factor you consider relevant)
Only
motivation
Main
motivation
Secondary
motivation
A consideration Not a 
factor
Availability o f  natural resources
As best way to competitively 
access the Greek market
To access neighbored countries
Comparative low input costs
Level o f qualification/ 
distinctiveness o f skills o f the 
Greek workforce
Availability o f  local scientific 
inputs
The existence o f  local cluster of 
firms working on similar or 
complementary activity
The incentives provided by the 
Greek government
To defend market share in the 
Greek market
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II. ROLES OF SUBSIDIARY
6. What is the company produces? .............................................................
7. What is the value of sales of the subsidiary?  €
8. Has this value increased or decreased in the recent years ....................
9. What percentage of the sales of the whole MNE group 
do your sales represent?
10. What proportion of your production is exported?
11. What percentage of your exports goes to other parts 
of your multinational group?
12. How would you evaluate the role/activity of your subsidiary? 
(Please tick each factor you consider relevant)
Only
motivation
Main
motivation
Secondary
motivation
A  consideration Not a 
factor
Produces some o f the parent’s 
already existing product lines 
for the Greek market
Produces a certain set o f  
components parts or existing 
final products for a multi­
country or global market
It has autonomy and creative 
resources to develop, produce 
and market a restricted product 
range (totally innovative 
products) for multi- country 
(regional or global) markets
13. Do you have an R&D department?
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I ll  ACTIVITIES OF THE SUBSIDIARY
14. Where in Greece is your manufacturing activity located? 
(Please give full address) .............................................
if you have more than one plant in Greece please give their addresses in the 
following lines:.........................................................................................................
15. What proportion of your sales are made by the following markets?
Greece
European Union (including new Member States o f Eastern and Central Europe)
Balkan countries
Other countries in Europe
Rest o f the world
16. What proportion of your production supplies is imported from the parent 
company or other subsidiaries of the Multinational Group?
%
%
17. What percentage of your supplies is purchased by local firms?
18. What is the degree of your decision- making autonomy?
(Please tick any relevant)
1) decisions taken mainly by parent/regional HQ without consulting with/seeking 
advice from Greek subsidiary.
2) Decisions taken mainly by parent/regional HQ after consulting with/seeking 
advice from Greek subsidiary.
3) Decisions taken mainly by Greek subsidiary after consulting with/seeking 
advice from parent/regional HQ.
4) Decisions taken mainly by Greek subsidiary without consulting with/seeking 
advice from parent/regional HQ.
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IV INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS AND SERVICES
19. When first invested, how do you rate the following institutional factors in 
Greece?
(Please tick any relevant)
Very
Satisfied
Satisfied Not so 
satisfied
Unsatisfied
Bureaucracy
Legislative
framework
Access to information
Taxation
Incentives
20. Currently, how do you rate the following institutional factors in Greece?
(Please tick any relevant)
Very
Satisfied
Satisfied Not so 
satisfied
Unsatisfied
Bureaucracy
Legislative
framework
Access to information
Taxation
Incentives
21. When first invested, how would you rate the quality of the following services 
in Greece?
(Please tick any relevant)
Very
Satisfied
Satisfied Not so 
satisfied
Unsatisfied
Road network
Rail network
Air/sea
transportation
T elecommunications
Energy supply
Industrial areas
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22. Currently, how would you rate the quality of the following services in 
Greece?
(Please tick any relevant)
Very
Satisfied
Satisfied Not so 
satisfied
Unsatisfied
Road network
Rail network
Air/sea
transportation
T elecommunications
Energy supply
Industrial areas
Please return to: 67, Pythagora street 
17563, Palaio Faliro 
Athens, Greece
Thank you very much for your time.
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APPENDIX 2
INTERVIEWS
Questions:
1. How much does your firm contributes to the final product?
2. Have you applied for subsidies during your investment process?
3. What is the degree of your decision- making process autonomy?
4. In which country is the company that gives you orders established?
5. During the last 5 years your decision- making autonomy has increased or 
decreased?
6. Are you encouraged to pursue autonomous initiatives?
7. Have you established any synergies with local firms? If yes, why (motive)?
8. Plans for further investment? If no why? If yes why?
9. If R& D why?
10. Have you asked the help of ELKE or any other governmental organisation 
during an investment process? If other organisation which? If ELKE was their 
help helpful? If no, why?
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APPENDIX 3
INTERVIEWS WITH POLICY MAKERS
1. Which countries mostly invest in Greece?
2. What type of FDI do they mostly interest? Greenfield investment, purchasing 
of local firm, other?
3. In which sectors do they invest?
4. Are foreign investors mostly interested to invest by themselves or in 
partnership with Greeks?
5. Their investment plans target only the Greek market or other markets too?
6. Do their plans include R&D?
7. What are the main reasons they come to a government institutions and not try 
to invest by themselves?
8. What is the opinion of foreign investors on the incentives provided by the 
Greek government?
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APPENDIX 4
Table 7.1: Case Study Criteria
Case Study Criteria
Subsidiary Autonomous
role
N on-
autonomous
role
M odem
Industry
Traditional
Industry
Partnership 
with Greek 
company
N o
partnership 
with Greek 
company
Year o f  
Establishment
1 X X X 1979
2 X X X 1966
3 X X X 1971
4 X X X 1990
5 X X X 1964
6 X X X 1996
7 X X X 1991
8 X X X 1988
9 X X X 1983
10 X X X 1976
11 X X X 1980
12 X X X 1990
13 X X X 1982
14 X X X 1967
15 X X X 1963
16 X X X 1994
17 X X X 1975
18 X X X 2001
19 X X X 1968
20 X X X 1979
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Table 7.2: Type (Nature) of Foreign Firms that are more Likely to Invest in Greece
Type (nature) of foreign firms that are more likely to invest in Greece
Subsidiary Sector Way of entry Reason to invest
1 Traditional Take over an existing Greek 
company
Enter the European market. 
A ccess the Greek market
2 Modern Greenfield investment Serve the European market. 
A ccess the Greek market
3 M odem Take over an existing Greek 
company
A ccess the Greek market
4 M odem Greenfield investment A ccess the Greek market
5 Traditional Take over an existing Greek 
company
Serve the European market. 
A ccess the Greek market
6 M odem Joint Venture with a Greek 
company
A ccess the Greek market
7 M odem Joint Venture with a Greek 
company
A ccess the Greek market
8 M odem Greenfield investment A ccess the Greek market
9 M odem Greenfield investment A ccess the Greek market
10 M odem Greenfield investment A ccess the Greek market
11 Traditional Take over an existing Greek 
company
Serve the European market. 
A ccess the Greek market
12 Traditional Joint Venture with a Greek 
company
A ccess the Greek market
13 Traditional Greenfield investment A ccess the Greek market
14 M odem Greenfield investment Serve the European market. 
A ccess the Greek market
15 M odem Greenfield investment Serve the European market. 
A ccess the Greek market
16 M odem Take over an existing Greek 
company
Serve the European market. 
A ccess the Greek market
17 M odem Take over an existing Greek 
company
A ccess the Greek market
18 M odem Greenfield investment A ccess the Greek market
19 M odem Greenfield investment Serve the European market. 
A ccess the Greek market
20 M odem Greenfield investment A ccess the Greek market
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Table 7.3: Type (Nature) of Foreign Firms that are more Likely to Invest in Greece
(2)
Type (nature) of foreign firms that are more likely to invest in Greece
Subsidiary Sells in the Greek 
market
Number of 
employees
Linkages with local 
firms
1 93% 22 60%
2 80% 70 10%
3 99% 120 26%
4 70% 380 5%
5 100% 180 10%
6 40% 45 10%
7 100% 55 5%
8 100% 150 40%
9 100% 130 30%
10 100% 75 20%
11 60% 90 25%
12 50% 175 0%
13 100% 50 5%
14 100% 70 0%
15 100% 160 0%
16 100% 65 10%
17 100% 680 45%
18 50% 55 30%
19 100% 80 25%
20 100% 90 20%
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Table 7.4: Type (Nature) of Foreign Firms that are more Likely to Invest in Greece
0)
Type (nature) of foreign firms that are more likely to invest in Greece
Products Decision- making autonomy
1 Som e o f  the parent’s already 
existing products
After the consultation/ advice by the 
parent com pany
2 Som e o f  the parent’s already 
existing products
N o decision- making autonomy
3 Som e o f  the parent’s already 
existing products
After the consultation by the parent 
company
4 Som e o f  the parent’s already 
existing products
N o decision- making autonomy
5 M ostly differentiated products After the consultation/ advice by the 
parent company
6 M ostly differentiated products After the consultation/ advice by the 
parent company
7 Som e o f  the parent’s already 
existing products
N o decision- making autonomy
8 Som e o f  the parent’s already 
existing products
After the consultation/ advice by the 
parent company
9 Som e o f  the parent’s already 
existing products
N o decision- making autonomy
10 Som e o f  the parent’s already 
existing products
N o decision- making autonomy
11 Som e o f  the parent’s already 
existing products
After the consultation/ advice by the 
parent company
12 M ostly differentiated products After the consultation/ advice by the 
parent company
13 Som e o f  the parent’s already 
existing products
After the consultation/ advice by the 
parent company
14 Som e o f  the parent’s already 
existing products
After the consultation/ advice by the 
parent company
15 Som e o f  the parent’s already 
existing products
After the consultation/ advice by the 
parent com pany
16 Som e o f  the parent’s already 
existing products
After the consultation/ advice by the 
parent company
17 M ostly differentiated products After the consultation/ advice by the 
parent company
18 Som e o f  the parent’s already 
existing products
After the consultation/ advice by the 
parent company
19 Som e o f  the parent’s already 
existing products
After the consultation/ advice by the 
parent company
20 Som e o f  the parent’s already 
existing products
After the consultation/ advice by the 
parent com pany
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APPENDIX 5
Table 7.5: Date and Location o f the Interviews
Subsidiary/ Policy Maker Interview Date Location
1 3 March 2006 Athens
2 3 March 2006 Athens
3 6 March 2006 Athens
4 17 March 2006 Athens
5 24 March 2006 Athens
6 24 March 2006 Athens
7 31 March 2006 Athens
8 3 April 2006 Athens
9 3 April 2006 Athens
10 14 April 2006 Athens
11 14 April 2006 Athens
12 28 April 2006 Athens
13 28 April 2006 Athens
14 5 May 2006 Athens
15 8 May 2006 Athens
16 8 May 2006 Athens
17 19 May 2006 Athens
18 19 May 2006 Athens
19 22 May 2006 Athens
20 26 May 2006 Athens
Policy maker A 29 May 2006 Athens
Policy maker B 29 May 2006 Athens
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